tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post1486846148376671253..comments2023-11-17T03:55:40.736-05:00Comments on Ink Spots: Center for National Policy recommends changes to NATO's Afghanistan strategyLilhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18373158801523577733noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-42237947988154455692012-05-19T11:52:43.323-04:002012-05-19T11:52:43.323-04:00You recognize that the C in CFSOCC-A is for "...You recognize that the C in CFSOCC-A is for "combined," which is the doctrinal term for multinational, right? It's not a U.S.-only HQ.Gulliverhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12558335790019565924noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-47780808731242315882012-05-18T20:38:49.019-04:002012-05-18T20:38:49.019-04:00"Dissolve ISAF and place CFSOCC-A in charge o..."Dissolve ISAF and place CFSOCC-A in charge of the military mission by April 2013 and reduce the force in country to approximately 30,000 troops (6-8K of which would be from partner nations)."<br /><br />What is he smoking? Does he think of those partner nations troops as auxiliary troops which are in de facto possession of the U.S.?S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-56462231907403889982012-05-18T11:59:03.975-04:002012-05-18T11:59:03.975-04:00And I guess the answer, pretty obviously, is that ...And I guess the answer, pretty obviously, is that two and a half years of war have happened in the interim.<br /><br />(I understand your frustration at this whole thing, because I similarly opposed escalation in 2009. But don't pretend like you don't understand what the difference is now: other things have been tried and have failed.)Gulliverhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12558335790019565924noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-317800726703771412012-05-18T11:58:40.941-04:002012-05-18T11:58:40.941-04:00For one, we were still in the post-coital glow of ...For one, we were still in the post-coital glow of successful COIN in Iraq in 2009 and just couldn't wait to use it to fix Afghanistan. Reality has disillusioned the world of the universal utility of COIN, which by 2012 seems to not be working all that well. Or worth the cost for whatever gains are realized. <br /><br />I think the authors do a pretty good job laying why they think a change is needed.Jason Fritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18335313679058470722noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-86949557161766362612012-05-18T11:53:13.459-04:002012-05-18T11:53:13.459-04:00I guess the question, as always, is to explain pre...I guess the question, as always, is to explain precisely what changed from 2009 to 2012 to justify a change in strategy.<br /><br />Aside from folks like O'Hanlon, pretty much everyone else now seems to agree on roughly the same set of recommendations, I think. I'm just not clear on why that is since anyone making this case in 2009 was essentially laughed out of the room and largely marginalized.Bernard Finelhttp://bernardfinel.comnoreply@blogger.com