tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post1586386420661074416..comments2023-11-17T03:55:40.736-05:00Comments on Ink Spots: Scheduling DefeatLilhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18373158801523577733noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-19338545081291650412011-05-27T17:32:55.903-04:002011-05-27T17:32:55.903-04:00Jason:
On the whole I'm sympathetic to your a...Jason:<br /><br />On the whole I'm sympathetic to your argument, and I agree with it. <br /><br />Just as a dissenting footnote, though, page 15 of the Iraqi Perspectives Project references Vietnam as a factor Saddam in doubting US resolve. I think that can easily be explained away - Saddam was bizarre enough that he would have incorporated or dismissed any evidence contrary to his belief structure - but I thought it worth noting. <br /><br />Mercer, "Reputation," and (from what I understand), Press in "Calculating," both conform with your assessment. <br /><br />I was struck, though, by the IPP, as well as the fact that Mercer, in "Emotional Beliefs" (International Organization, Winter 2010, page 14) - who, again, does not agree with "saving face"-type arguments - referenced Saddam's assessment of the Vietnam case (among others) in a way that runs contrary to his (Mercer's) prior arguments.<br /><br />ADTSADTSnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-63217294009353811722011-05-27T10:50:08.692-04:002011-05-27T10:50:08.692-04:00Here's another resource on the subject: an Arm...Here's another resource on the subject: an <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA536828" rel="nofollow">Army War College thesis (pdf)</a> from 2010 examining lessons learned from withdrawals through a few different case studies. One of the main conclusions: <br /><br /><em>The long-term strategic effect on the occupying nation is rarely as significant as it appears when the withdrawal is being considered and conducted.</em><br /><br />(Not gonna lie: I haven't read the whole thing, so I can't vouch for its quality. But might be worth taking a look.)Gulliverhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12558335790019565924noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-39073113851843051542011-05-27T10:49:38.406-04:002011-05-27T10:49:38.406-04:00I'm glad you wrote this, and I particularly ap...I'm glad you wrote this, and I particularly appreciate the way you've contested some of the platitudes used to critique withdrawal timelines in your points 2 and 3.<br /><br /><em>The idea here is that organizations at war with the government and the intervening force may react positively to a timetable in two ways: decrease military activities to prepare for when the intervening force is gone OR transition to a more political footing in a possible peaceful nation.</em><br /><br />I've been consistently bemused by the criticism that withdrawal timelines somehow benefit the enemy because "he'll just wait us out, and then get violent again when we're gone!" Uh, ok, great! That means we can spend the rest of our time in country helping to build host-nation capacity and transition to civil authority free of major concerns about security, so that the host nation is better prepared to stand alone when we finally DO leave. If the enemy decides to take an operational pause, why should we complain about that?<br /><br /><em>You know who didn't lose face with their allies and who didn't embolden their enemies from leaving a strategically insignificant war by a timetable? The United States after doing so from Vietnam.</em><br /><br /><a href="http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_support/vietnam/Memo_11-Sep-67.pdf" rel="nofollow">This declassified paper</a>, prepared by the CIA in 1967, <a href="http://library.usask.ca/vietnam/index.php?state=view&id=927" rel="nofollow">declassified in 1993</a>, and first pointed out to me by Alma a couple of years ago, examines the claim that precipitate withdrawal from Vietnam would do irreparable damage to U.S. credibility and influence around the world. A couple of noteworthy points that I've pulled out for emphasis:<br /><br />1) The authors concede that "the contingency we are discussing in this paper would constitute a rather dramatic demonstration that there are certain limits on US power, a discovery which would be unexpected for many, disconcerting for some, and encouraging to others." (It is hard to imagine that limits on U.S. power do exist would come as a shocking revelation to anyone in 2011.)<br /><br />2) "Historically, great powers have repeatedly absorbed setbacks without permanent diminution of the role which they subsequently played."<br /><br />3) "An unfavorable outcome in Vietnam would be a major setback to the reputation of US power which would limit US influence and prejudice our other interests in some degree which cannot be reliably foreseen."<br /><br />4) "Probably the net effects would not be permanently damaging to this country's capacity to play its part as a world power working for order and security in many areas."<br /><br />5) "But any honest and dispassionate analysis must conclude that, if the US accepts failure in Vietnam, it will pay <em>some</em> price in the form of new risks which success there would preclude."<br /><br />6) "If the analysis here advances the discussion at all, it is in the direction of suggesting that <strong>such risks are probably more limited and controllable han most previous argument has indicated</strong>."<br /><br />I <em>do</em> appreciate that changes in the geopolitical context in the intervening period mean that certain conclusions about Vietnam could not be expected to hold in the case of modern conflicts, but considering the similarity of the popular credibility-related arguments against withdrawal, it's worthy of consideration. Look through the whole thing -- it's not long.Gulliverhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12558335790019565924noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-30394019085623461812011-05-27T10:27:49.499-04:002011-05-27T10:27:49.499-04:00Well it's not strategically insignificant, but...Well it's not strategically insignificant, but since we muffed it - pull out - if we get hit again (yes) then full punitive measures.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-37006464110560143682011-05-27T10:11:00.131-04:002011-05-27T10:11:00.131-04:00Not to piss in the punch bowl, but considering tha...Not to piss in the punch bowl, but considering that the Executive Branch has disregarded the "timelines" in the War Powers Act, I see no reason they wouldn't do the same with a Congressionally mandated Afghan withdrawal timeline.<br /><br />(Though I'm generally supportive of anything that might help get us out of this Afghan goat rope. So, yeah, I wish they would have passed the timeline thing.)Keithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13273126562329542046noreply@blogger.com