tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post5151830422119430944..comments2023-11-17T03:55:40.736-05:00Comments on Ink Spots: "The more things change...": Historical observations on the difficulty of SFALilhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18373158801523577733noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-46837683735516163592011-08-11T10:38:47.907-04:002011-08-11T10:38:47.907-04:00Anon @0857 -- the FAO program allows 1 yr or so fo...Anon @0857 -- <em>the FAO program allows 1 yr or so for the participating officer to "acquaint" himself with the country, culture and people by giving him/her free reign during this period to basically backpack and tour around meeting people of various status in the country. This is the most "anthropological" program since understanding of a country means to becoming familiar with the various levels of a particular society.</em><br /><br />This isn't quite right. FAOs do a year of in-country training, and sometimes it can be quite unstructured. But they're really there to do follow-on language training when it comes right down to it.<br /><br />The FAO construct isn't that useful here for several reasons. First of all, there aren't enough of them to use only FAOs as trainers and advisors. Second, FAOs aren't selected or trained for the SFA mission but rather to bring regional expertise across a range of different functions, including serving on embassy country teams and GCC/component planning staffs. And on top of that, FAOs are expected to have regional expertise (despite getting language training and living experience in only one country); that's not good enough for guys serving in the advisor role.Gulliverhttp://www.tachesdhuile.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-12064800801201562472011-08-11T10:32:14.519-04:002011-08-11T10:32:14.519-04:00Here's the link to a pdf of the Combat Studies...Here's the link to a pdf of the Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper-turned-book that Anon @ 0907 mentioned above (and which I didn't know existed until now), in case anyone's interested.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/ramsey_op19.pdf" rel="nofollow">Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present</a> (pdf)Gulliverhttp://www.tachesdhuile.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-35658294106973647932011-08-11T10:27:47.755-04:002011-08-11T10:27:47.755-04:00Madhu and Keith -- What this should tell us is tha...Madhu and Keith -- What this should tell us is that historically, culturally, institutionally, and emotionally, we are not good at this sort of thing and ought not to continually try and re-engineer entire societies in our own image, whether through the State department/World Bank/UN/IMF-ish route - or the military route.<br /><br />I understand what you're saying here and agree in large part, but I don't think it's all that pertinent to the advise and assist/train and equip model. The intent isn't to "re-engineer foreign societies" in our image, or at least it ought not to be. Part of doing this job well is recognizing that every security force won't look the same, and that certain adjustments will need to be made to adjust to cultural, historical, geographical, and other peculiarities.Gulliverhttp://www.tachesdhuile.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-12608350781562049672011-08-11T10:17:57.320-04:002011-08-11T10:17:57.320-04:00While we may not do very well in forcing others to...While we may not do very well in forcing others to change or re-engineering societies, do we do well helping others when they reach out for assistance/training/funding?MikeFnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-8989902654502968182011-08-11T10:11:54.716-04:002011-08-11T10:11:54.716-04:00I agree with Madhu. The lesson from Vietnam and o...I agree with Madhu. The lesson from Vietnam and other interventions is that no matter how hard we try or how much we theorize about it, re-engineering foreign societies doesn't work.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-32085645870290552082011-08-11T09:32:27.349-04:002011-08-11T09:32:27.349-04:00What this should tell us is that historically, cul...What this should tell us is that historically, culturally, institutionally, and emotionally, we are not good at this sort of thing and ought not to continually try and re-engineer entire societies in our own image, whether through the State department/World Bank/UN/IMF-ish route - or the military route.<br /><br />But that is no comfort to those ordered to do such things. Good luck.Madhunoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-81042952067016667292011-08-11T09:15:41.717-04:002011-08-11T09:15:41.717-04:00The Human Dimension of Advising:
An Analysis of In...The Human Dimension of Advising:<br />An Analysis of Interpersonal, Linguistic, Cultural,<br />and Advisory Aspects of the Advisor Role<br /><br />Michelle Ramsden Zbylut and Kimberly A. Metcalf<br />U.S. Army Research InstituteAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-85157748686705702072011-08-11T09:07:19.696-04:002011-08-11T09:07:19.696-04:00(might as well get the whole book, oliver)
"...(might as well get the whole book, oliver)<br /><br />"Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present" <br /><br />From Lawrence of Arabia to Operation Desert Storm, this authoritative new anthology presents 14 insightful, first-person accounts and valuable lessons from the soldiers who have advised foreign armies in various times and places over the last 100 years. Each article presents valuable lessons, insights, and suggestions from the author’s firsthand experiences, allowing readers to make their own judgments and analysis in support of their unique requirements. The articles are presented without editing or commentary, providing unvarnished lessons fresh from the combat zones where they were learned. Military professionals and history buffs alike will find much interest in this unique official publication.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-17356336934993802452011-08-11T08:57:28.534-04:002011-08-11T08:57:28.534-04:00the FAO program allows 1 yr or so for the particip...the FAO program allows 1 yr or so for the participating officer to "acquaint" himself with the country, culture and people by giving him/her free reign during this period to basically backpack and tour around meeting people of various status in the country. This is the most "anthropological" program since understanding of a country means to becoming familiar with the various levels of a particular society.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-30497131328506539702011-08-11T07:00:46.140-04:002011-08-11T07:00:46.140-04:00Ooh, this is good stuff. One of my long held conce...Ooh, this is good stuff. One of my long held concerns has been how to do proper COIN/SFA with a big conventional army that doesn't train organically for it. From oath of enlistment to unit ascension, not much is done to prepare the 19 year old 11B who joined to blow things up (nothing wrong with that) for COIN/SFA. COIN/SFA are additional things you learn and train up for. As in "I am an infantryman, but I have to do this COIN/SFA thing for awhile, I guess." The main identity is still 11B, and that wins at the end of the day.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com