tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post5909210002050554817..comments2023-11-17T03:55:40.736-05:00Comments on Ink Spots: R2P is NOT the new COIN, but Ulfelder is just as wrong as Safranski about why*Lilhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18373158801523577733noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-62138671344839247122011-09-24T15:29:34.272-04:002011-09-24T15:29:34.272-04:00Whatever R2P is I don't like it....Whatever R2P is I don't like it....Madhuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17198241208223203425noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-23811816514880391782011-09-21T15:51:43.382-04:002011-09-21T15:51:43.382-04:00(2) In terms of military doctrine, you're corr...(2) <em>In terms of military doctrine, you're correct in thinking that the tactical tasks required to carry out an R2P operation are largely the same basic range of offense, defense and stability. However, at the operational/theater level, it does require a somewhat different paradigm to develop a 'theory of the conflict' and therefore a coherent plan to attain strategic objectives. Put simply, the dynamics of conflicts are somewhat (not entirely) different when one or more belligerents view mass or systematic violence against civilians as either a key tactic to achieve their goals, or as intrinsic to those goals.</em><br /><br />I take your point here, and this is the issue I meant to clarify with my bracketed edit about policy directives. Part of my frustration with the Libya operation stemmed from the tension between the vaguely-articulated mission ("protect civilians from regime forces") and the need for military commanders to create campaign plans with concrete objectives. To put it simply, the commanders of maneuver formations and strike assets are going to interpret that mission through the lens of the tools they have available to them -- men and materiel that constitute combat power -- and determine that for them, "protect civilians" means "destroy the enemy forces that threaten civilians." Which brings us to this...<br /><br /><em>some of the key stability tasks on the AUTL that will in many cases be critical for R2P ops remain vaguely or badly defined.</em><br /><br />Truth. But here's the challenging reality: many of the stability tasks on the AUTL are vaguely or badly defined because military forces are unsuited to perform them by organization, temperament, training, core competency, etc. They're badly defined because the military doesn't know how to do them or how to train on them. (We're talking institutionally here; there will of course be units and individuals that have figured things out in exigent circumstances.)<br /><br />I don't want to sound like Gentile here, but when you start creating tasks that are not fundamentally and foundationally related to the basic competencies of the forces being asked to perform them -- i.e. in most instances, combat actions -- you can run into some serious trouble both doctrinally (because your doctrine-writers can end up just making shit up) and operationally (because small-unit leaders are in a sense forced to just wing it).<br /><br />All of which is a bit of a tangent, because I think the truth is that "R2P"-oriented military missions are probably much more firmly centered on the basic offense/defense/stability tasks (or even really just the offense/defense tasks) than are COIN missions, in which military forces are basically expected to conduct whole-of-government operations/functions.Gulliverhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12558335790019565924noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-71506633869565184142011-09-21T15:30:53.381-04:002011-09-21T15:30:53.381-04:00MK -- Appreciate your comments. A few in return:
...MK -- Appreciate your comments. A few in return:<br /><br /><em>It is a blatant myth that the USG has institutionalized COIN. It has occurred to some limited degree in the military (obviously the Army, USMC and joint SOF community than USAF and USN), but barely at all among civilian agencies.</em><br /><br />You're right, but I'm not sure that observation is terribly helpful. And that's my fault, because I was the one who used the word "institutionalization," which doesn't have a clear meaning or common understanding. What I meant is that the military has adapted somewhat for the COIN mission while the political class has adopted the buzzwords and basic cause/effect narrative of COIN. It's true that there hasn't been widespread reorganization or reorientation to accomplish the COIN mission -- especially not outside the military -- but it seems clear to me that "COIN" isn't a worthy organizing principle for the entire national security apparatus.<br /><br />To tie this back in with the thrust of the post, I think Safranski meant to suggest that R2P could or would become a sort of hip concept for commentators and policy folks to line up behind, as so many did with COIN -- a "policy doctrine" (the expression is like fingernails on a chalkboard for this lexicon nit, but I know what you mean and don't have a better alternative) that facilitates ostensibly increased influence and a rapid professional rise for those who are closely associated with it.<br /><br />I'm not sure Mark thought this through very well, though, before he made his glib assertion. Like you said, there aren't many people going around advocating for the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy around the principle of preventing mass atrocities; it could never happen, simply because such a simplistic and narrow principle could never hope to account for the broad range of American interests.<br /><br />I think what Safranski is REALLY concerned about is the potential for Slaughter's rather radical ideas about sovereignty to strongly influence the way international relations are conceived in the future by the U.S. government -- not just on atrocity-prevention but across the board. That's a reasonable concern when you consider how thoroughly the "weak states are a greater threat than strong ones" paradigm has infiltrated U.S. military thinking about the threat environment over the last decade, but to characterize that fear as "R2P is the new COIN" is reductive, inaccurate, and insensitive to the way that bureaucracies actually change.Gulliverhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12558335790019565924noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-25895452243365068242011-09-21T09:12:42.334-04:002011-09-21T09:12:42.334-04:00If R2P became a driving force in US foreign policy...If R2P became a driving force in US foreign policy, it would have three primary effects:<br /><br />1 - More fully integrating the issue of atrocity prevention into information gathering, analysis and reporting processes for all relevant agencies (obviously would primarily affect the DOS, USAID, and the IC - especially Defense Attache Offices). This would involve a little bit of extra training, and one additional factor for field personnel to keep an eye on.<br /><br />2 - Incorporating a consideration of how US actions can be shaped to reduce the likelihood our outright prevent mass or systematic violence against civilians where the threat of an atrocity is not immediate (e.g. how do we shape SFA to both instil a stronger respect for LOAC - beyond a 3 hour module in a weeks-long training cycle - and achieve our other goals?)<br /><br />3 - Where a threat of mass or systematic violence against civilians become acute, considering the range of options to prevent or respond, and whether the cost/benefit calculation justifies those responses. In other words, not that much different than what we do on any other issue, except that we won't prima facie dismiss atrocities as none of our concern. On the other hand, just because something is our concern doesn't mean we're going to action, military or otherwise.<br /><br />In other words, I seriously doubt it would radically alter US foreign policy except in the relatively rare and extreme cases where the need for intervention intersects with US interests and available resources to create an opportunity to prevent or halt atrocities. And even then, a multilateral approach may leverage key US capabilities in support of the main effort executed by other forces.MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-32628838170247105292011-09-21T06:10:57.599-04:002011-09-21T06:10:57.599-04:00I think you're right that I overstated the deg...I think you're right that I overstated the degree of deference to military leaders' concerns in policy choices about R2P situations. I also pointed to a couple of other factors, though: the military's fatigue from Iraq and Afghanistan, and the U.S.'s larger financial woes. I didn't say so as clearly as I should have, but I expect the *combination* of these forces will prevent the U.S. from taking on many more military operations in the name of civilian protection in the next few years.<br /><br />As to MK's point that no one is advocating for R2P to be the central pillar of U.S. foreign policy, of course that's right. Still, I gather there are influential people looking for ways to push liberal global governance forward, and I think they see application of R2P as an important instrument to that end. If that's right, then it's not silly to talk about the possibility of R2P becoming a driving force in U.S. foreign policy.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-51667208861531851062011-09-21T01:04:16.183-04:002011-09-21T01:04:16.183-04:006 - For the sake of clarity, there is a difference...6 - For the sake of clarity, there is a difference at the policy level (and throughout relevant guidance, where it exists or is under development) between 'civilian protection', 'protection of civilians', and R2P. 'Civilian protection' generally refers to actions by civilian (usually humanitarian actors, although sometimes the civilian staff of PKOs) to protect civilians, and obviously doesn't involve military action. <br /><br />'Protection of civilians' is a wider category that encompasses 'civilian protection' efforts, as well as both political and military action by PKOs or PSOs, but generally in a semi-permissive environment (or at least one in where the operation has strategic consent from the host nation). The use of force is generally envisioned as somewhat politically constrained, but still potentially far higher than in 'traditional' peacekeeping.<br /><br />Although the R2P policy doctrine originally laid out in 2001 (and certainly as elaborated by the Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General for R2P) envisions a wide array of responses including many non-military prevention and recovery efforts, for the purposes of this discussion (and in common parlance) R2P operations presume a non-permissive environment, in which the intervenors may or may not have the consent of the host nation.<br /><br />Yes I realize the language is a bit of a maze, and that at the end of the day we're talking about protecting civilians from mass or systematic violence in each of these categories. I didn't invent it, though, and the distinctions matter to many who are involved in shaping both the agenda and the responses to these situations. Don't shoot the messenger.MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-50068850755680773502011-09-21T01:03:59.179-04:002011-09-21T01:03:59.179-04:004 - R2P does not always entail or require a milita...4 - R2P does not always entail or require a military response. As policy doctrine, it is intended to guide and shape a response - including the selection of the appropriate tools - which will vary according to the circumstances. <br /><br />5 - In terms of military doctrine, you're correct in thinking that the tactical tasks required to carry out an R2P operation are largely the same basic range of offense, defense and stability. However, at the operational/theater level, it does require a somewhat different paradigm to develop a 'theory of the conflict' and therefore a coherent plan to attain strategic objectives. Put simply, the dynamics of conflicts are somewhat (not entirely) different when one or more belligerents view mass or systematic violence against civilians as either a key tactic to achieve their goals, or as intrinsic to those goals. <br /><br />Secondly, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, TTP will need to be adjusted, and transmitting the commander's intent to all echelons becomes critical. That doesn't mean that those slightly adjusted TTP can or should be codified - they'll vary according to the situation.<br /><br />I would note though that some of the key stability tasks on the AUTL that will in many cases be critical for R2P ops remain vaguely or badly defined. FM 3-07.5 does not address the gaps that Szayna, Easton and Richardson pointed out in 2007.MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-50774125917174961522011-09-21T01:03:39.290-04:002011-09-21T01:03:39.290-04:00Interesting post - I agree with a lot of it. A few...Interesting post - I agree with a lot of it. A few quick points:<br /><br />1 - It is a blatant myth that the USG has institutionalized COIN. It has occurred to some limited degree in the military (obviously the Army, USMC and joint SOF community than USAF and USN), but barely at all among civilian agencies. There has been far greater institutionalization of CT than COIN.<br /><br />2 - As you point out, COIN wasn't an answer in search of a question. It came to the fore as a proposed response to a deteriorating situation, having tried a number of other approaches that didn't work.<br /><br />3 - The vast majority of advocates of R2P are not arguing for it to become the central guiding principle of all US foreign policy. In fact, I can't think of any who do. If you find one, knock some sense into him or her. The R2P 'doctrine' (here not used in the military sense) is actually an extremely cautious one firmly founded in just war theory's consideration of moral hazards and perverse consequences. It's designed for relatively rare and extreme circumstances. For example, as tragic as the situation in Syria is, given the loss of life that would likely result from an attempt to intervene militarily, it wouldn't seem to be justified based on currently available information (just as Samantha Power argued against invading Iraq in 2003).MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.com