tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post6511923620377420325..comments2023-11-17T03:55:40.736-05:00Comments on Ink Spots: A question for those who think the Afghan war is essential to maintaining stability in PakistanLilhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18373158801523577733noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-2192296028708460702009-12-17T12:34:32.694-05:002009-12-17T12:34:32.694-05:00SNLII - If your point is about the potentially cou...SNLII - If your point is about the potentially counter-productive effects of US 'help,' I agree: clearly the involvement has to be of a form and degree that doesn't exacerbate the situation. I wasn't suggesting (I don't think anyone is suggesting) a large scale US presence. <br /><br />Two responses to your second point. That the West arrived on their doorstep in force shortly thereafter suggests that those Generals' their assessment was wildly off base. Secondly, there's not turning the clock back. The neo-Taliban and associated groups are (broadly speaking) not the same in form, ideology, or ambitions as they were on 10 Sept 2001, so it's moot.MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-62865008957096759922009-12-17T10:44:07.557-05:002009-12-17T10:44:07.557-05:00There seems to be some assumption, MK, that US &qu...There seems to be some assumption, MK, that US "help" would turn the tide in NW Pakistan. I'm not sure Islamabad believes that.<br /><br />Indeed, most Pakistani generals, should you corner them, would ask how "destabilized" Afghanistan and much of their Pasthun provinces were on Sept. 10, 2001.<br /><br />SNLIIAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-27591695676874060742009-12-17T08:53:39.532-05:002009-12-17T08:53:39.532-05:00Because a) our ability to do FID in Pakistan is hi...Because a) our ability to do FID in Pakistan is highly constrained by Pakistani popular antipathy to the West, and b) just as we can't make lasting progress in Afghanistan without addressing the part of the problem across the border in Pakistan, likewise we can't stabilize Pakistan next to an unstable Afghanistan. <br /><br />As I've argued before, instability flows both ways across the Durand Line, and while Pakistan has a stronger institutional structure to withstand its undertow, a fully destabilized Afghanistan would produce some awfully strong currents.MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-33821223062554100452009-12-17T08:15:51.057-05:002009-12-17T08:15:51.057-05:00HA! great question, and I would venture to say tha...HA! great question, and I would venture to say that this was Plan B offered by the Biden/Krulak crowd - more CT in Pakistan, lesser COIN in Af. Are we doing both? sure, but let's not kid ourselves about the Pakistani side. They're doing it under duress, because the US money was going to be turned off (or maybe just reduced) if there was no sign of progress in Pakistan. But Gulliver's observation there is pretty insightful - if the COINdanistas give us this argument about Pakistani nukes, then maybe we need to do more in Pakistan, make it the main effort. <br /><br />But alas, the decision has already been made to ignore this wisdom.Jasonhttp://armchairgeneralist.typepad.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-29251106771596827082009-12-16T20:16:43.556-05:002009-12-16T20:16:43.556-05:00Aren't we doing both?Aren't we doing both?Schmedlaphttp://www.schmedlap.com/weblognoreply@blogger.com