tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post1629603466202416946..comments2023-11-17T03:55:40.736-05:00Comments on Ink Spots: GeneralsLilhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18373158801523577733noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-37131115440814432192012-12-12T17:22:07.433-05:002012-12-12T17:22:07.433-05:00One quick example of what I mean by the spinning:
...One quick example of what I mean by the spinning:<br /><br /><i> That's not remotely close to "everyone gets promoted". </i><br /><br />In the part you quoted, Filkins says "With even the most mediocre generals moving upward" which translates directly as "everyone [got] promoted." So, again, I'll stick with my previous outline of Filkins' argument.<br />Totalnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-72504711116453001062012-12-12T16:31:17.326-05:002012-12-12T16:31:17.326-05:00So, your last reply was your last reply except for...So, your last reply was your last reply except for this one? I'll stick with what I said above; your response here is just spinning things further away from what Filkins (and Ricks) actually said.Totalnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-7041981633102092832012-12-12T14:59:57.611-05:002012-12-12T14:59:57.611-05:00If Filkins is saying what you claim he is then I s...If Filkins is saying what you claim he is then I should have ignored the piece entirely for being even more unserious than I thought it was. How the hell can everyone get ahead in an organization structured (graphically) like a triangle with a very, very small top. That egregiously defies logic that if he believes that he's an idiot. And I don't think Filkins is an idiot. <br /><br />Which is why I firmly believe you are incorrectly reading what he writes. Both Filkins and Ricks are surely saying the Marshall leadership model is the one to use (fire people who don't succeed on the battlefield). They both attribute the lack of firings as a cause for our mediocre generals. But there's more to it than that.<br /><br /><i>Ricks argues, convincingly, that what changed in the military was the practice of firing commanders who failed to deliver results. His starting point is General George Marshall, the Army chief of staff during the Second World War, who culled underperforming generals and promoted the better ones, constructing a ruthlessly efficient fighting force. The practice withered during the Vietnam War, replaced with micromanagement by civilian leaders. (Recall photographs of Lyndon Johnson choosing bombing targets.) With even the most mediocre generals moving upward, the Army ossified at the top. Sanchez was not the exception; he was the rule. </i><br /><br />Look, if Marshall was great because he fired people who didn't perform and the Army today allows people to not only keep their jobs, but promotes them if they don't perform, logically it means that not performing was valued and rewarded at worst (or at the least, ignored). That's not remotely close to "everyone gets promoted". <br /><br />Read more: http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/12/17/121217crat_atlarge_filkins#ixzz2ErwEhNXN<br /><br />I suggest you read this from Tom Ricks: http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/20/what_lessons_will_the_army_take_away_from_petraeus_my_fear_is_the_wrong_ones<br /><br />He's talking about how officers move ahead of their peers - that's what he's talking about when he talks about mediocrity. Because it's so narrow at the top, the only way to get those top slots is by being average and a company man. He's talking about how you get to be in the 230 from one of the 10K. This is not a strawman, this is what he is saying. So when Filkins writes something laudatory of Ricks' thesis including both Marshall's leadership and the mediocrity of the general officer corps, I can only assume Filkins is on board with what Ricks saying in this regard. <br /><br />If you read the piece Filkins explicitly states that to get ahead, to become part of the 230, an officer needed to be mediocre, along with the same sentiment in different by synonymous terms. He used that one 84% promotion rate stat as an "everyone gets ahead" data point - one point on that - but uses mediocre or similar terms throughout the piece as describing those that want to and did get ahead. I completely and utterly reject your notion that I am not describing what Filkins wrote.Jason Fritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18335313679058470722noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-43460179872802630172012-12-12T14:23:04.206-05:002012-12-12T14:23:04.206-05:00was a sclerotic institution that rewarded mediocri...<i> was a sclerotic institution that rewarded mediocrity and punished innovative thinking.<br /> </i><br /><br />Or by promoting everyone and making it difficult for anyone to do anything innovative, thus creating a mediocre officer corps. That interpretation has the advantage of being what Filkins actually says, rather than what you impute to him.<br /><br /><i> As for the LTC promotion rates, maybe you should read the whole paragraph I wrote on the topic. 10K LTC. 230 generals. Yup, sure sounds like EVERYBODY makes to general. If by everybody you mean just over 2%. I think any statistician would buy that 2% and 100% are actually the same thing </i><br /><br />I understand that Filkins is <i>wrong</i> about that fact, but that doesn't change that that is what he's arguing, not what you construct for him.<br /><br /><i>. I can't even fathom how you think Filkins is talking about generals compared to greater society or to generals from WWII. That's a whole level of different analysis that hasn't been done by either writer.<br /></i><br /><br />Well, work harder at fathoming, because Filkins explicitly (in the part I quoted) invoked the World War II model as creating a "ferocious fighting force." And, in fact, it's the argument of Ricks' book.<br /><br />Filkins is paralleling Ricks' argument that the Marshall model (lots of people fired) is better than the current model (everyone promoted, no one fired). <i>That's</i> his point, not the strawman you've created. It doesn't mean that I think Filkins is correct, but you should argue with his actual point, not your reimagining of it.Totalnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-76725682339727267052012-12-12T13:15:50.389-05:002012-12-12T13:15:50.389-05:00This is going to be my last response on this becau...This is going to be my last response on this because I'm not even sure we're reading the same article. <br /><br /><i>In Ricks’s telling, the American military, by the time of the attacks of September 11, 2001, was a sclerotic institution that rewarded mediocrity and punished innovative thinking.</i><br /><br />And how do you think Filkins and Ricks think that you do that? By promoting the mediocre ahead of those that aren't. I can't even fathom how you think Filkins is talking about generals compared to greater society or to generals from WWII. That's a whole level of different analysis that hasn't been done by either writer.<br /><br />As for the LTC promotion rates, maybe you should read the whole paragraph I wrote on the topic. 10K LTC. 230 generals. Yup, sure sounds like EVERYBODY makes to general. If by everybody you mean just over 2%. I think any statistician would buy that 2% and 100% are actually the same thing...<br /><br />Jason Fritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18335313679058470722noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-40101498751128563152012-12-12T13:04:05.379-05:002012-12-12T13:04:05.379-05:00Sure you are. Filkins doesn't specify that th...Sure you are. Filkins doesn't specify that the generals were mediocre compared to others who weren't promoted, he just says that they were mediocre.<br /><br />From the article<br /><i>With even the most mediocre generals moving upward, the Army ossified at the top. Sanchez was not the exception; he was the rule.</i><br /><br />The explicit comparison is with the officer corps created by Marshall in World War II:<br /><br /><i>Ricks argues, convincingly, that what changed in the military was the practice of firing commanders who failed to deliver results. His starting point is General George Marshall, the Army chief of staff during the Second World War, who culled underperforming generals and promoted the better ones, constructing a ruthlessly efficient fighting force.<br /></i><br /><br />That's who they were mediocre compared to, not current (unpromoted) officers. (In fact, another point he makes contradicts your summary even further--that little nugget about everyone getting promoted to Lt-Colonel reiterates Filkins' argument that *everyone* makes it to General, not that only the mediocre ones)<br /><br />That's a different argument that the one you attribute to him, and you concede the argument he's actually making. Totalnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-37582772606525461872012-12-12T12:36:23.165-05:002012-12-12T12:36:23.165-05:00Sorry, should read that to succeed an officer cann...Sorry, should read that to succeed an officer cannot make waves and that if they stick out too far ahead of their peers they won't get promoted. Jason Fritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18335313679058470722noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-3300334744998857932012-12-12T12:34:27.936-05:002012-12-12T12:34:27.936-05:00Not even close. Ricks and Filkins are arguing that...Not even close. Ricks and Filkins are arguing that to succeed within the Army, an officer need to not make waves. Their argument is not that generals are mediocre compared to the rest of society, but rather that they are mediocre to the officers they were promoted ahead of. So I'm not remotely conceding Filkins' point. Jason Fritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18335313679058470722noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-67786839105192937842012-12-12T12:28:04.496-05:002012-12-12T12:28:04.496-05:00While there were some very fine officers commissio...<i> While there were some very fine officers commissioned in this era, I would suggest that these gentlemen were actually representative of the some of the best officers eligible for general rank. Smart guys did generally did not want to go to Vietnam. Or to an organization as broken as the U.S. Army after Vietnam. <br /> </i><br /><br />Being the best the Army could manage is not the same thing as not being mediocre. In fact, you're conceding Filkins' point that the generals <i>were</i> mediocre, if only because non-mediocre people didn't want to go to Vietnam or into a "broken" institution.Totalnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-21177066197900628972012-12-12T05:13:54.356-05:002012-12-12T05:13:54.356-05:00It's a shame because Filkins is usually EXCELL...It's a shame because Filkins is usually EXCELLENTRyannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-7734060219620619832012-12-10T18:02:12.424-05:002012-12-10T18:02:12.424-05:00I was showing the two ends of opinion people seem ...I was showing the two ends of opinion people seem to have on Petraeus and speaking somewhat hyperbolically. I probably should have said, to paraphrase this particular opinion, "who fooled the public" - there are plenty of people who have been vocal about this for years. Such as yourself and many others.Jason Fritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18335313679058470722noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-34971362349042504522012-12-10T15:16:26.372-05:002012-12-10T15:16:26.372-05:00"...who fooled us all..."
Careful, care..."...who fooled us all..."<br /><br />Careful, careful. Not "all" were fooled - you project too wide.<br /><br />To me, he was first and foremost a show person as were Rommel and MacArthur before him.<br />I happen to know I wasn't alone with my sceptic view on Petraeus.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.com