tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post3500034914578355911..comments2023-11-17T03:55:40.736-05:00Comments on Ink Spots: Debating the terms of the debate about interventionLilhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18373158801523577733noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-57025400436490975212011-03-02T09:30:32.087-05:002011-03-02T09:30:32.087-05:00Finally - agree that there are few parallels betwe...Finally - agree that there are few parallels between Libya and Sierra Leone. I only invoked it in reference to the wider argument.MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-57610659373527078502011-03-02T09:29:39.802-05:002011-03-02T09:29:39.802-05:00On definition: There are various definitions of va...On definition: There are various definitions of various terms, and none of them really work. Yes, it includes mass killing to counter an insurgency (Darfur being a prominent example). No, the UN does not have any agreed definition, or anything like a functional mechanism for determining whether its happening in any given case. Relying on it too heavily is a formula for inaction, and don't forget - the UN is primarily its member states. And the US is a leading member state that often sets the agenda.<br /><br />On division of labor: I'm not arguing that the US can or should always be in the lead. But US leadership is often critical to galvanizing action - seriously, look back at the hash the Europeans made of coordinating action in Bosnia. So while it might not be mainly US forces, US political leadership and enablers may be important.<br /><br />On the complexity of military operations: I think this a complete canard. Of course military operations are complex, but you don't hear this excuse trotted out in response from military analysts to any other kind of proposal. Want to launch punitive attacks on Somalia (as Bing West claims Mattis might do)? Launch covert or overt attacks on Iran? Run covert operations in Pakistan? Send USG personnel into the various drug wars in Latin America? Well, people may disagree with you - in fact, they may take your proposal to pieces - but you're probably not going to be patronized in the same way. <br /><br />And on the same note, I find it remarkable how much faith many military analysts have in the utility of force when it comes to achieving more conventionally defined national interests. But contend that military force might be part of a response to something beyond that narrow range, and suddenly force can't solve anything. It's beyond disingenuous.<br /><br />Gulliver - your questions about Libya are spot on. I can't answer them - again, I just don't know enough about the situation. But they're certainly among the questions we should be asking. Like you, I'm at the shallow end of the learning curve on Libya, and until I know more, I'm going to hesitate to dismiss anything out of hand. <br /><br />To be absolutely clear: I don't know whether we should intervene in Libya or not. I just want a serious conversation about it, instead of patronizing dismissal.MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-11908520797225587732011-03-02T09:29:19.877-05:002011-03-02T09:29:19.877-05:00Thanks for the responses. Excuse the brevity of my...Thanks for the responses. Excuse the brevity of my responses, as I am slammed at work just now.<br /><br />On interests: The causal path from episodes of mass killing to direct impingement on US national interests is often strong but circuitous. The impact on regional dynamics often reverberates for decades, and by the time the US has to engage, the problems have grown to enormous proportions, and are even harder to solve. <br /><br />The second way it impacts US interests is that every failure by the international security architecture to deal with an incident of mass killing undermines its credibility and legitimacy to enforce other norms. SImply put, hypocrisy makes it harder for the US to get what it wants. This isn't theoretical - this stuff shapes how the rest of the world states and societies alike view and interact with the US.<br /><br />Y'all are likely to dismiss these assertions out of hand, but ask yourself this: if you find it credible that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 had an impact on US interests across the Muslim world (and beyond, for that matter) - essentially, a normative impact - then why are you so quick to dismiss the impact of other normative breaches? Of course, some of you may count yourselves Realists, in which case you broadly dismiss anything but structural factors in IR and security. I think you're wrong, but I don't think anything will convince you.<br /><br />On other cases: Actually, Gulliver, there have been intense discussions in the US, Canadian and European governments - including military planning - for all those cases. And European forces have repeatedly deployed to Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, CAR...and of course, SL. And the Australians to East Timor and the Solomon Islands. Very small numbers of US personnel have also deployed to a number of these theaters, and there has been some substantial work by US planners on some of these cases, but I'm not going to discuss those in detail here. Admittedly not a broad-based discussion, but that's partially about how journalists - and analysts - frame the conversation.MKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09101668944584403261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-90355015183281981702011-03-02T06:54:43.069-05:002011-03-02T06:54:43.069-05:00First, there is a value in itself in making a stat...First, there is a value in itself in making a statement about the complexity of military operations--especially since, as Exum points out, it seems to consistently be forgotten. http://cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/03/and-todays-prize-biggest-cup-ice-water-goes.html<br /><br />Second, I can't add much to what Aaron and Gulliver have already posted--especially re: interests. There is an unspoken assumption that this is, in fact, a national security interest and that inaction has serious costs for the US. For some actors, yes, but us?A.E.http://rethinkingsecurity.typepad.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-72737802889673232892011-03-02T05:21:28.186-05:002011-03-02T05:21:28.186-05:00I think you're right about having an improved ...I think you're right about having an improved 'methodology' in the debate on Libya, but, like Gulliver, I don't see how the prevention of mass killing is a national interest/security threat. <br /><br />There are other countries with more of an interest in containing instability in Libya; the French, the Italians, neighbouring African states. If there is to be any military action, it should be them who take primary responsibility. Britain and the US, whose interests are partly affected, can do more on the diplomatic front (which ranges from UN resolutions to the darker side of diplomacy, arming rebels).Aaron Ellishttp://thinkstrat.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-25962856692918388692011-03-02T04:38:48.132-05:002011-03-02T04:38:48.132-05:00I think this is a really timely post.
Just as a p...I think this is a really timely post.<br /><br />Just as a point of pedantry, I think that Sierra Leone is a dodgy comparison to Libya. There were several pre-existing conditions that made an intervention by a well-trained foreign military force (be it the British or Executive Outcomes) 'tip the balance' in favour of stability. Namely:<br /><br />- The RUF were not a disciplined military force; although dangerous they stood little chance against well trained and well equipped forces. Not only that, but they failed to learn from their mistakes following EO's withdrawal, and thus were defeated by the British 4 years later.<br />- The Civilian Defence Forces/kamajors were instrumental in augmenting the interventions by EO and the British. I would suggest that the intervention forces and the CDF could not achieve victory without the other.<br />- EO and the British had legitimacy - Strasser had repeatedly asked for outside assistance from the US, France and the UK.Deskibelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05819263743003589799noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8755035051021414780.post-43811687602384742062011-03-02T02:44:51.531-05:002011-03-02T02:44:51.531-05:00I don't want to be excessively brief and dismi...I don't want to be excessively brief and dismissive when you've obviously put a good deal of effort into this, but it's 0230. So:<br /><br />1) I think the reason many analysts are reluctant to "treat the prevention of mass killing as seriously as you would any of the other goals that have to be considered in developing policy and strategy" is that they simply don't see sufficient justification for doing so, or the specific incidents to which you're referring seem sufficiently remote to U.S. interests as to be easily overlooked or dismissed. So why should they, really?<br /><br />2) I'm sure there's some specific technical definition for the term "mass killings," but I don't know what it is. Is it clear that this is what's taking place in Libya? What's the difference between "mass killings" and counter-rebellion/COIN that includes widespread violence against civilians?<br /><br />3) It seems plain that in many instances, we HAVE been able to simply ignore "prevention of mass killing" and haven't suffered terribly as a result. Why wasn't there a broad-based national conversation about how to prevent mass killings in Uzbekistan after the Andijan massacre? Why hasn't there been one about Darfur? Or Congo? In short, because our rhetoric does not match reality; prevention of mass killings is NOT a national interest in the same way that prevention of some specific instances of state-on-state aggression is, or "elimination of terrorist sanctuaries" (whatever that is), or any of the other interests to which we DO commit planning effort and resources.<br /><br />4) It seems to me that the real value of your point is this: the necessity of a mass-killing-prevention campaign is probably something that can only be determined by the UN or some other multinational body, but we all have a pretty good sense for where the enforcement responsibility is going to lie. If the world decides "Qaddafi must be stopped," then the U.S. should have a pretty good sense for how it would deliver on the objectives set out for the mission. On this point I suppose I agree with you: there could perhaps be some more serious discussion of "how do you actually pull this off?"<br /><br />5. That said, I'm not sure this is the point you're making. You talk about the costs of inaction, and our responsibility to be aware of risks and consequences, and so on, and this goes back to the question of intervention or non-intervention. So I just want to kick some questions back at you: <br /><br />- What are the risks of inaction?<br />- What is the worst-case scenario <em>for the U.S.</em> if we choose to remain militarily uninvolved?<br />- What is the worst-case scenario for the U.S. if we <em>do</em> get militarily involved?<br />- How best can the U.S. secure its own interests in the political and social environment that emerges in post-Qaddafi (or post-rebellion) Libya?<br />- Will possible U.S. action during the period of transition (i.e., now) impact our ability to secure those interests?<br /><br />Hell, more basically: can you outline in reasonably simple terms the way you perceive U.S. interest vis-a-vis the Libya situation (beyond the prevention of mass killing, presumably)?<br /><br />I know this was disjointed as all hell, but I'm going to bed.Gulliverhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12558335790019565924noreply@blogger.com