MONUC's new mandate and directive on cooperation with the FARDC

Several important things have happened in the last few weeks with regard to MONUC's mandate and its role in supporting the FARDC.

But first, some background. As you might remember, just before the mandate was renewed on December 23, the New York Times ran this story, with links to relevant memos, about recommendations the UN's Office of Legal Affairs had made concerning MONUC's support to Kimia II, the operation the Congolese Army (FARDC) had been prosecuting against the FDLR. Basically, the memos cautioned MONUC against supporting FARDC units if these units were suspected of or known to have committed human rights abuses.

Next, Human Rights Watch issued its latest report, criticizing MONUC's support to the FARDC and recommending that clear conditions be set for continuing support, in particular that no support be provided to units known to abuse human rights. Next, the Congolese authorities, after seeing a draft of the resolution, threatened to kick out senior MONUC staff because such a mandate would impinge on DRC's sovereignty and violate the SOFA the UN has with the DRC.

Then, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Alan Doss (whom more people than I can count have said should resign for reasons ranging from not being tough enough with the Congolese authorities to just being a pain to deal with because he won't take any criticism or advice), reported to the Security Council on his work and announced the end of Kimia II operations.

On December 23, the Council passed a resolution, here, extending the mission but only for 6 months. Second, it ranked MONUC's priorities starting with protection of civilians, and moving to implementing effective DDR(RR) (that Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation, and Resettlement in case you get lost with your Rs, like I do), and finally coordinating SSR (Security Sector Reform) between donors and the Congolese authorities.

Finally, the Council provided conditions under which MONUC can support ongoing FARDC operations:

...the support of MONUC to FARDC-led military operations against foreign and Congolese armed groups is strictly conditioned on FARDC’s compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and on an effective joint planning of these operations, decides that MONUC military leadership shall confirm, prior to providing any support to such operations that sufficient joint planning has been undertaken, especially regarding the protection of the civilian population, calls upon MONUC to intercede with the FARDC command if elements of a FARDC unit receiving MONUC’s support are suspected of having committed grave violations of such laws, and if the situation persists, calls upon MONUC to withdraw support from these FARDC units.

Yesterday, MONUC outlined the new conditions under which it will provide support to FARDC's successor to Kimia II, Amani Leo. According to a press release:

The Operation’s principal objectives are to protect civilian populations, clear strategic areas of negative forces, hold territory liberated from FDLR control, and assist in restoring State authority in these zones. The Special Representative also informed the Council that Operation Amani Leo would include preventive interventions aimed at stopping the FDLR from regrouping and attacking civilian populations and re-occupying major mining areas...

The FARDC and MONUC will concentrate on controlling strategic areas in order to ensure that armed groups, notably residual FDLR elements, will not be able to retake territory and inflict reprisals. The Operation aims at creating conditions for stabilization and re-establishment of State authority. Coordination between civilian and military components will be strengthened to stabilize these areas and create conditions for the safe return of civilian populations.

The FARDC and MONUC Force commands are engaged in intensive joint planning down to the tactical level in order to improve communications, liaison and planning throughout the Operation.

At the FARDC’s request, MONUC will provide rations and other essential support to those FARDC units carrying out protection and preventive operations provided that they are jointly planned and conducted in accordance with international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law...

As you can tell, MONUC is making an effort to abide by the Council's conditions but I have a couple questions. Doesn't Amani Leo look exactly like Kimia IIb or maybe Kimia III? Second, what constitutes joint planning? How is this being done down the tactical level? Finally, since when does the UN do clear, hold, and build? I kept being told--both in Goma and Kinshasa, "we're fighting an insurgency here but no one will use the word or actually behave like this is the case." Has this changed or is this just a not so great PR stunt?

MONUC 10 Years Later: Anything New?

MONUC's mandate is up for renewal in a couple weeks and there's lots of discussion now about what needs to change and what MONUC should do differently. The discussion is also occurring in the context of MONUC's 10th anniversary and a strong desire, both at the UN and of course within the Congolese government, for the mission to begin drawing down. There's also much controversy over MONUC's support to the Congolese Army (FARDC) as it attempts to get rid of the FDLR.

Given this context, I thought that what the Force Commander, General Babacar Gaye, told the Congolese paper, Le Potentiel, in an interview was interesting. He explained his evolving strategy in DRC. It's in French--the link is to Relief Web.

The General said:

It would be pertinent to evaluate the situation and put in place new modes of action rather than launch counter-guerilla operations which requires capacities and means that the FARDC does not have have. This is why it's better to control the zones where the FDLR usually came to stock up on resources.

He adds that this effort needs to happen alongside better support to security sector reform, in particular for the Army and National Policy, and capacity building for Congolese institutions.

Does this seem a little confused to you? I'm not sure I get it because so far the only thing that's happened is that ongoing operations have pushed the FDLR deeper into Congo but without protecting populations from reprisals. They have also not completely cut off the FDLR from their mineral resource funding bases, and finally security sector reform efforts right now are not much beyond really intent prayers. So I'm curious, what are your thoughts on a strategy for MONUC and how should its mandate change?

African Union Soldiers and Killing Camels

This story is either funny or not, depending on your perspective. Maybe some readers can shed some light on whether this is unusual or not.

Anyway, here's the story:

African Union soldiers shot dead 11 camels in the Somali capital on Saturday night, mistaking the galloping animals for an insurgent attack, residents said.

Al Shabaab rebels sometimes use passing civilians and vehicles to give them cover before attacks, police said, and the peacekeepers from AMISOM mission thought they were behind the camels which ran past the entrance to Mogadishu's airport.

"We thought Islamists and AMISOM were fighting last night, but this morning we just saw 11 dead camels," resident Farah Aden told Reuters. "Each camel had at least 10 bullet wounds -- the whole area was covered with blood."[...]

"It was our new forces and they were not aware of the camels' movements. They say they were attacked, and so opened fire," [an AMISOM spokesperson] told Reuters.

Are these the preemptive/offensive operations that follow the change mandate we discussed recently? Is it easy or not to mistake camels for insurgents? It just strikes me as weird.

Important Change in Mandate for AU Force in Somalia

The African Union's mission in Somalia (AMISOM) will apparently be working with a new mandate.

A Ugandan official told journalists:

..the earlier mandate constrained the UPDF [the main troop contributors are Uganda and Burundi] and was deadly as it demanded the peacekeepers to fight back only if they were attacked first.

The new mandate now means that the UPDF can carry out pre-emptive attacks on the insurgents in the war tone Horn of Africa country.

I wonder how much this will help given that the 4,000 strong contingent is undermanned, insufficiently equipped etc. Does this really mean that the peacekeepers will start operating differently? It will be interesting to see what happens and how these "pre-emptive" operations actually go.

Meanwhile, government and insurgent forces clashed in the capital, killing 6 civilians.