Two quick things on Afghanistan

Two quick things to report on Afghanistan. First, over at the Cable, Josh Rogin is reporting that Swedish diplomat Staffan di Mistura has been offered the post of Special Representative of the Secretary General for UNAMA.

Richard Holbrooke was interviewed by the Cable and said he had discussed the assignment with the Ambassador. The article adds the following:

From 2007 to 2009, di Mistura was the U.N.'s special representative in Iraq. He left Iraq last July to become deputy executive director of the World Food Programme.

Holbrooke said that during his time in Iraq, di Mistura earned the respect of leading U.S. national security officials including National Security Advisor Jim Jones and Central Command head Gen. David Petraeus. Di Mistura also has experience working with Karl Eikenberry, the current U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Holbrooke remembered.

Di Mistura has served in Afghanistan before, as the director of fundraising and external relations for the U.N.'s office in Afghanistan from 1988 to 1991. He has also worked for the organization in Sudan, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Sarajevo, and several other places, in addition to Iraq.

Next, Anthony Cordesman has a new report out: The Afghan War at the End of 2009. I haven't read it yet but this is what the website explains: "The report focuses only on the fighting, and not on the full range of issues that must be addressed to win the war." It discusses six additional areas that are essential for success including ISAF's structure, the structure of the international aid effort, effectively integrating civil and military efforts, building civilian Afghan capacity to govern (rule of law, essential services etc), building an effective ANSF, and linking all these efforts to work in Pakistan.

As if on cue...

...Dave Kilcullen gave a talk in Australia today and repeated the same talking points that he gave at USIP last month, and to which I referred in this morning's metrics post.

Kilcullen said hard fighting in Afghanistan would likely last another two years, after which insurgents would hopefully believe it was better to negotiate than continue combat with international and government forces.

That would be followed by a three-year transition to effective Afghan government and five-year overwatch period involving international forces as back-up, he said.

Tony Cordesman also has an op-ed in the Post today, entitled "How To Lose in Afghanistan."

McChrystal has not announced a need for more U.S. troops, but almost every expert on the scene has talked about figures equivalent to three to eight more brigade combat teams -- with nominal manning levels that could range from 2,300 to 5,000 personnel each -- although much of that manpower will go to developing Afghan forces that must nearly double in size, become full partners rather than tools, and slowly take over from U.S. and NATO forces. Similarly, a significant number of such U.S. reinforcements will have to assist in providing a mix of capabilities in security, governance, rule of law and aid. U.S. forces need to "hold" and keep the Afghan population secure, and "build" enough secure local governance and economic activity to give Afghans reason to trust their government and allied forces. They must build the provincial, district and local government capabilities that the Kabul government cannot and will not build for them. No outcome of the recent presidential election can make up for the critical flaws in a grossly overcentralized government that is corrupt, is often a tool of power brokers and narco-traffickers, and lacks basic capacity in virtually every ministry.

Unfortunately, strong elements in the White House, State Department and other agencies seem determined to ignore these realities. They are pressuring the president to direct Eikenberry and McChrystal to come to Washington to present a broad set of strategic concepts rather than specific requests for troops, more civilians, money and an integrated civil-military plan for action. They are pushing to prevent a fully integrated civil-military effort, and to avoid giving Eikenberry and McChrystal all the authority they need to try to force more unity of effort from allied forces and the U.N.-led aid effort.

If these elements succeed, President Obama will be as much a failed wartime president as George W. Bush. He may succeed in lowering the political, military and financial profile of the war for up to a year, but in the process he will squander our last hope of winning. This would only trade one set of political problems for a far worse set in the future and leave us with an enduring regional mess and sanctuary for extremism. We have a reasonable chance of victory if we properly outfit and empower our new team in Afghanistan; we face certain defeat if we do not.

Cordesman: up to nine additional brigades needed in Afghanistan (UPDATED)

Anthony Cordesman suggests that we need between three and nine additional brigades in Afghanistan. The London Times, reporting on an editorial that appears in its own pages, somehow figures that this could mean up to 45,000 new troops. (I usually base calculations on an estimated BCT size of 3,500; I'm not sure where this 5K-to-a-brigade is coming from.) Here's part of his list of what needs to be done to shift the tide of the war:

Second, to be effective, [ISAF] must eliminate as many national caveats and restrictions on troops as possible, and add a substantial number of additional US combat brigades. Experts differ, but this could mean anywhere from three to nine brigades above the 21,000 additional forces that President Obama approved in the spring of 2009.

Third, it must create a larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Many experts believe this means roughly doubling the targets from 134,000 men for the army to 240,000, and from 82,000 to 160,000 for the police by 2014. Equally important, member nations must provide the trainers, mentors and money to make this force effective. They must put them in the lead as soon as possible to show the Afghan people that security has an Afghan face, that it can last, and that every step is being taken to limit civilian casualties.

There's some other stuff about aid effectiveness and corruption, which is worth reading if only to say "who cares how much money Oxfam is spending on security when the Afghans are going to waste some significant chunk of what they DO get through corruption?"

Anyway, worth a look.

UPDATE: Today's Times includes a letter from Cordesman disputing the 45K number the paper assessed as his recommendation in the headline. I like to pretend like he was made aware of the whole deal by this post. Let me have my moment!

London Times

August 12, 2009

US Army Manpower

Afghanistan, military manpower, figures and speculation

Sir, You claim in a news story that my article for your Comment section (“More troops, fewer caveats. Let’s get serious”, Aug 10) called for 45,000 more US troops in Afghanistan, and you speculate whether I might be speaking for General McChrystal. As the disclaimer to my piece made clear, the views I expressed were completely my own. They in no sense reflect the views of General McChrystal.

Moreover, while I referred to a range of three to nine brigades, I deliberately did not make any estimate of manpower. There are many types of brigades and many ways they can be deployed. The lower end of the range in my article could easily amount to a quarter of the total you suggest.

Anthony H. Cordesman, Washington