Iran, North Korea and UN Sanctions

Last June, the UN Security Council imposed tougher sanctions on both Iran and North Korea. Following in the footsteps of sanctions imposed on DRC, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Somalia/Eritrea, and of course Al Qaida and the Taliban, the Council decided to appoint Panels of Experts for each of the new regimes (it's worth noting that the new sanctions on Libya also feature such a Panel).

Anyway, these Panels, the ones on Iran and North Korea, were a little different from their Africa-focused step-siblings. For one thing, they included a member who hailed from a P5 country (US, UK, France, Russia, China). Then they typically also had representatives from key regional countries or countries involved in high-level diplomatic initiatives. For another, they had more support staff and more resources.

Both Panels just submitted their final reports to the Council. It took 24 hours for the Iran Panel's report to be leaked to the press and 72 hours for the North Korea Panel's report to be leaked. As has been reported by Reuters, the experts have found that North Korea and Iran have shared nuclear missile technology and that they have received assistance, in violation of the sanctions, from China and Russia respectively. The reports also detail the evasive measures that North Korea and Iran have taken to avoid the sanctions.

Now why does this matter? Because China and Russia will be using the excuse that they were leaked, first to block their release, and second to either delay or prevent the sanctions renewal and of course the renewal of expert panels' mandates. China has of course blocked the publication of the North Korea report. This is not the first time this has happened, it took four months for the October report of the Sudan Panel to be released after China blocked it--they found evidence that China violated sanctions by providing ammunition to Sudan, for use in Darfur. Similarly, the May 2010 report on North Korea, wasn't released until November.

I think it's more likely that the panels' mandates will not be renewed. That's bad news because the panels are doing an important job and providing a useful service to countries who want to abide by the sanctions and don't have the intelligence capacity to monitor implementation themselves (and therefore be aware of potential illicit activity in their own jurisdictions). Second, there's also something to be said for putting a report out there that lays out the evidence and helps to hold countries, private companies, and of course international organizations accountable.

Finally, it would be a shame for these sanctions, which were seen as a loss by both Iran and North Korea, to lose some of their teeth or even for them to no longer have assigned monitoring. It's clear that would be a victory for both of them and it would be a shame for that to happen just because these reports are supposedly embarrassing to China and Russia.

SECDEF clarifies adjustment to Korea OPCON transfer

As I wrote about last week, Geoff Morrell's had a hell of a time dancing around the reasons why we've decided (mutually with our Korean allies) to delay the OPCON transfer from 2012 to 2015. Don't worry, Geoff, the boss has come in to bail you out, and I'm sure now that things are clarified, there won't be any more questions on the subject.

We were scheduled to transfer in April of 2012, but at the request of the Korean government, we agreed to slide the date to 2015 and also make the relationship more robust in terms of exercises, command and control, capabilities, and so on.

I continue to believe that the Koreans are fully capable and a professional military ready to lead the combined defense. But I think this additional time will allow us to make the eventual transfer more wide-ranging and more synchronized and ultimately better for the alliance.

Um, right. We're going to make the eventual transfer more wide-ranging and more synchronized. So there's that cleared up.

Some days, being the Pentagon spokesman really sucks

I pick on Geoff Morrell from time to time, and it's probably unfair. The man is passing up what must be some pretty lucrative opportunities in the media to serve his country in the Defense Department, and for that at the very least he's deserving of our thanks. To be honest about it, I think he has damned near the worst job in Washington: he has to get up there and talk his way around subjects on which he's not an expert, and to defend policies that he probably hasn't played a key role in determining. He has to cover his bosses while giving the media enough to keep them pliant, all the while spouting enough cliches and boilerplate to keep anyone from paying terribly close attention to the substance behind all this style.

No, seriously. It's a bad job.

Yesterday illustrated just exactly how terrible this gig can be sometimes. Usually Morrell's press conferences cover half a dozen or more discrete subjects, but yesterday's pretty much just drilled down on two: upcoming U.S.-South Korean naval exercises, and the announcement that the Karzai government has approved ISAF's initial plans to build up some kind of community defense initiatives.

The latter subject is the one that's getting all the press, and with good reason. I'm not going to spend a whole lot of time on this, but suffice it to say that Morrell's discomfort with the specifics of the issue seem to reveal a certain lack of clarity in the Department about exactly how this whole "local community policing" thing is going to go. The individuals are going to be locals, we're told. But they're going to be responsible to the government, and they're going to have uniforms. But no, NO!, they're not going to be militias -- they answer to the government, not a warlord.

This particular question and answer sequence really highlights what a difficult time Morrell had explaining this whole deal:

Q So this is going to be similar to the awakening councils in Anbar province in Iraq?

MR. MORRELL: Well, the difference -- the -- but, Joe, the difference between awakening councils, the awakening councils were militias. These were local tribal leaders who hired guns, you know, hired, you know, their guys to provide for their security and that of their families and their communities.

They were eventually, under General Petraeus's leadership, transitioned into a -- into a government force. You remember, the hiring of the Sons of Iraq was such a big issue. This initiative is one where it starts off housed within a government function. It is working for the government; it is not working for any local tribal leader. So I think there's a real distinction between what the Sons of Iraq started off as versus what he's proposing in this situation.

But also, the government isn't going to give them much of anything. Like, you know, guns, or training, or anything like that. (Morrell suggests that a whole lot of training is probably unneccessary, "in this culture at least, because there's such a prevalence of weapons.") So basically this amounts to handing out a bunch of uniforms and crossing our fingers that these fighters will observe some kind of innate loyalty to the GIRoA. Or something.

Like I said, I'm not gonna spend a whole ton of time on that subject, because I think the other one, while lower-profile, is even more interesting.

Since the end of the Korean War, the U.S. and South Korean governments have operated under an agreement that in the case of renewed hostilities, Korean forces would fall under the operational control (OPCON) of the American Combined Forces Command (CFC, a combo of ROK forces and the extant U.S. command in the peninsula, U.S. Forces-Korea (USFK, aka the 8th Army plus USAFK, MARFORK, and CNFK)). If you're unfamiliar with this subject, YES, you're reading that correctly: if a second Korean War broke out, U.S. officers would command both U.S. and South Korean forces in opposition to the North Koreans. [*While I'm in the business of editing for clarity, let me add this: U.S. officers wouldn't command Korean formations, like with American Army captains commanding Korean companies, or anything like that. But the entire Korean force would be placed under overall American command, much the same as allied units come under NATO command in ISAF.]

In recent years, changes in the security environment, U.S. force posture, and warming North-South relations helped spur the U.S. and its Korean ally to plan for the transfer of OPCON back to the Koreans, and the two sides agreed that this would take place in 2012. There were and are a lot of good reasons why this should happen, but I'm not going to get into the details. (Look here.) But then... To be brief and simple about it, one can fairly say that some in South Korea were starting to get nervous as that date approached. ROK forces have definitely improved when it comes to individual and unit capacity, as well as interoperability with U.S. forces, and Korea has an extremely advanced defense industry. Some concerns still remain over leadership, doctrine, and operational planning, the sort of "high end" things that armies master last.

Anyway, everybody got nervous enough that the deadline got changed just a couple of weeks ago (this in spite of the fact that successive CGs of USFK have been saying for years, "yep, right on track, OPCON transfer in 2012, everybody's gonna be ready, no problem!). Like I said before, things had been moving in that direction for a little while, but the sinking of the South Korean ship in March and the consequent Chinese and North Korean intransigence probably helped drive the nails in the coffin. So now the OPCON transfer is on for 2015.

I tell you all of this as prelude to yesterday's press conference, in which Morrell was put in the very uncomfortable spot of trying to explain how this had nothing at all to do with the Koreans' preparedness to take OPCON, but rather with a whole bunch of stuff that has basically nothing to do with that. Just watch:

Q Yes. Why is it that -- on the North Korean and South Korean issue right now, why do you feel that it’s productive to go forward with these and -- the main question -- I’m sorry -- is, what specifically do you feel the U.S. needs to work with north -- with South Korea on in -- during this delay in -- on transfer? What are some of the specific weaknesses that you see that they indicate they would not be ready at
the original date?

MR. MORRELL: Yeah. I mean, obviously, we think, from an -- from a warfighting control perspective, that the ROK military would be capable of taking over operational control at the original date, in 2012. That’s in terms of their development as a -- as a military force.

That said, we agree that there is utility in pushing this to the right -- further by about three years. And by doing so, we would be able to sort of broaden the scope of the -- of the -- of what is transferred, and we would be able to better synchronize sort of those transformation efforts.

So, for example, while they would be capable in 2012 of assuming operational control of the war -- of warfighting, should that -- should that become necessary, we will now work on, in the additional three years we have, force management, defense reform, ground operations -- their -- the ground operations command. There’s some movement and consolidation of bases and so forth. All of these things can be worked on during that time, so that more than just operational control of the warfighting responsibilities is transferred come 2015.

This will allow us to make sure that we are all synced up and, as a result, ultimately be stronger as an alliance for having taken the time to do so.

Q So U.S. will renegotiate with South Korea 2 plus 2 meeting in wartime command and control?

MR. MORRELL: We will renegotiate, you said?

Q Yes.

MR. MORRELL: I don’t think there’s a renegotiation. I mean, the president has made -- the two presidents have agreed to adjust the operational control transfer schedule from it commencing on 2012 to 2015. That’s been agreed to.

Obviously, when the two secretaries get together with their counterparts, they will talk about a range of alliance issues, beyond just this very limited who is actually running a war effort should one -- should war break out on the peninsula again, heaven forbid. So they’ll talk about a range of things. It will not be a negotiation about op-con transfer. That fundamentally has -- decided.

Obviously now this provides us with the opportunity to delve into a range of other things that can be transferred and moved along over the course of those additional three years. And those are things that will be brought up as well.

Um, riiiiiight.

Being mostly comprised of native English speakers with IQs over 60, the press corps didn't give up on this line of questioning. Later:

Q One more on this area. Last fall Secretary Gates said that he was pleased with the progress of the plan so far in terms of the transfer of OPCON. So what changed between then and -- (off mike) -- these other elements for consideration?

MR. MORRELL: Well, I think he’s still fundamentally pleased with the development of the Korean military, particularly when it comes not just to their fighting ability but to their warfighting management capabilities as well. And that’s evidenced by the fact that he believes fundamentally that they are in a position or will be in a position to assume those responsibilities on the original time schedule, the 2012 time schedule.

That said, the two presidents have come to an agreement that they’re -- that it is worth adjusting that timeline, pushing it three years to the right, to 2015, so that we can work on other issues as well, just beyond the day-to-day management of a conflict on the peninsula. And that’s what I referenced in my answer to Viola, that there are other areas that we are now going to focus on -- and those are just a few, and we can get you more, and more specificity -- in the additional time that we now have afforded to us.

Q (Off mike) -- added since then.

MR. MORRELL: Sorry?

Q (Off mike) -- since then.

MR. MORRELL: I’m not sure they’ve been added since then.

I think they are things that we are now going to take advantage of the additional time we have to deal with, rather than do OPCON transfer with regards to this narrow, limited function in terms of managing the day-to-day warfighting. And we’re going to do a broader transfer that involves a host of other areas, as well, is my understanding of it.

So let's see if we've got this straight: Korean forces are ready to take OPCON from an operational, warfighting perspective, which, after all, is what OPCON is all about, right? But there's a "whole host" of other stuff that we can use that extra three years to get up to speed on, like.... umm, well, we don't seem to be sure what other stuff. Or how the advancement of that other stuff is going to be facilitated by a three year delay in OPCON transfer. Oh, wait, no: force management, defense reform, and, uh, movement and consolidation of bases.

[After press conference, off mike] "I can't believe you guys sent me out there with this thin-ass explanation about moving bases and teaching them force management! WTF does any of that have to do with operational control of forces?! Jesus, this job sucks sometimes!"*

Seriously though, is there any reasonable explanation for this beyond capability? I know we want to express our confidence in the warfighting and command and control abilities of our close ally, but man, this is a pretty spare justification. I don't know how it would play in the media or with the regional power dynamics, but would it really be the end of the world to say something like "with the way the security situation has gotten a little more tense recently in the wake of the unprovoked sinking of our close ally's ship, both the American and Korean governments feel more comfortable retaining for the time being the OPCON arrangement we've functioned under for half a century. Hopefully tensions will relax and the North and South can return to a constructive path toward better relations; at such time we and our Korean allies will again engage in a conversation about the appropriate time to transfer OPCON"?

Instead, Morrell had to get up there and dance around the reality that everyone recognizes, which is that this has absolutely nothing to do with "force management, defense reform, and base consolidation" or whatever other nonsense he had to mumble about.

*Ok, he didn't really say any of that. As far as we know.

"We cannot continue to dismiss actions by North Korea as 'more of the same'"

So says Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK). The question that immediately leaps to mind is something like "ok, so then what should we do?"

The Washington Post is making a big production out of the fact that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen refused yesterday to call North Korea's sinking of a South Korean warship (which cost 46 sailors their lives) an "act of war." The Post's Anne Flaherty pressed the two on the subject during yesterday's press conference, using the words "act of war" in no less than three separate (leading) questions:

SEC. GATES: Anne.

Q Does the United States consider the sinking of the South Korean warship an act of war? And seeing as the United States has vowed to defend South Korea, what do you plan to do about it? What are your options?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, we certainly support the findings of the Korean -- the South Korean investigation. We obviously are in close consultation with the Koreans. The attack was against one of their ships. And we will -- naturally they would have the lead in determining the path forward. They've laid out some paths forward, and we will be consulting very closely with them as we move ahead.

ADM. MULLEN: I spoke to my counterpart yesterday. And we've been engaged with them since the incident, not just from here, but also Admiral Willard in PACOM, as well as, obviously, General Sharp. And we are all focused on that region, the stability in that region -- that needs to be sustained -- and at the same time very focused on supporting our strong ally in the Republic of Korea.

Q But could you say whether or not you agree that -- with the South Koreans that it is in fact an act of war? And can you go over some of the options that you have to
respond?

SEC. GATES: I think that -- I think basically what we've said is about all there is for us to say. We accept the findings and support the findings of the investigation. The Republic of Korea has outlined several paths forward, and we will be consulting very closely with them going forward.

Q Admiral, could you address that too, please? It's clearly an act of war, isn't it?

ADM. MULLEN: Again, I think the secretary -- we've said all we want to say on this right now. Certainly we're concerned about it. We've supported them. We've helped them in the investigation and we agree with the conclusion. They're a great friend and great ally, and we'll continue to do that.

Which makes one wonder exactly what the newspaper's trying to accomplish beyond getting a flashy headline like "SECDEF: KOREA SHIP SINKING 'ACT OF WAR'", right?

Leaving aside the pretty obvious answer to why the press would be interested in inflammatory, provocative, and frankly dangerous pronouncements from senior policymakers, what about the real substance of all this: how does this all shake out? Obviously the U.S. response is conditioned on what the South Koreans decide is necessary, but what would the Jim Inhofes of the world have us do?

How does South Korea defend itself against the aggressive actions of a nuclear-armed neighbor? Does anybody believe that a sort of tit-for-tat, you sink ours, we sink yours kind of reaction is going to accomplish a whole lot, or make something like this less likely in the future?

Seeing as we've all pretty much decided that the North Korean decisionmaking process and apparatus is entirely obscure to us, I'm not going to bother wondering out loud what the hell the DPRK gets out of something like this. Is retributive action necessary to avoid setting some sort of pussified precedent, to avoid emboldening Kim Jong Il and whoever else is running stuff up there to push even harder?

Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA) says "we cannot allow North Korea to take the lives of 46 South Korean sailors with a torpedo attack and pretend it didn't occur," and I'd tend to agree with him. But that doesn't get us any closer to figuring out what we do instead, and I don't have any bright ideas.

Where were the North Korean weapons headed?

You'll remember that Thai authorities seized a plane and its cargo on December 12. The reason: its cargo, 35 tons of weapons, came from North Korea, which is under an arms embargo. The flight manifest had all sorts of documents that said the cargo was oil-drilling equipment. The plane, an IL-76, was registered in Georgia and its crew was from Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Since then, there have been a lot of questions: Where was the plane headed? Did Victor Bout have anything to do with it (the crew has been jailed in the same prison as Bout who was convicted in a Thai court a few months ago and is fighting extradition to the US)? How does this type of trafficking actually work? What made the Thai authorities decide to search that plane (rather than others)?

Well, yesterday, the Wall Street Journal reported that the weapons were destined for Iran. Today, the Washington Post reported that Thai officials had denied that report and instead announced the plane was headed for Sri Lanka.

As the Post reports:
But according to a flight plan seen by arms trafficking researchers, the aircraft was chartered by Hong Kong-based Union Top Management Ltd. to fly oil industry spare parts from Pyongyang to Tehran, Iran, with several other stops, including Bangkok, Colombo in Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan and Ukraine.

Why does this matter? Because while we know a lot about weapons trafficking, we still need to learn more about how countries like North Korea and Iran trade weapons, the routes they use, the companies that agree to help (and for how much), and which other commodities are involved in the trade. Another thing that matters: this shows that sanctions can, in fact, work. So that's something we need to learn from as well: what made the Thai authorities suspicious, how did they deal with it, how is their legal system dealing with this issue, what are possible challenges to prosecution, should we be going after flight crews or the people who commission them?