Thanks, that was useful

Maybe it is a natural backlash after years of over-dramatic reporting on the then-called Global War on Terror, or the sign that John Mueller is winning hearts and minds, but there have been an interesting number of articles out there on how the terrorist threat is largely overestimated. It certainly is in some cases, but pushing this point to the extreme makes for rather absurd articles. a Foreign Policy blog post on “Drugs, Failed States, and Terrorists. Oh My” on the Foreign Policy blog criticizes United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa for stating that:

“‘There is more than just spotty evidence’ indicating a link between drug traffickers and terror groups.”

The post’s author goes on to add that:

“There seems to be an awful lot of hand-waving happening here. What we know is that drug smugglers are moving cocaine through West Africa, including regions where Al Qaeda linked militants also operate. This, in itself, may be cause for concern. But many, including prominent politicans, seem to be assuming that an established link exists when the only reported case of a suspected al Qaeda affiliate making a coke deal --again trotted out as evidence in this article -- was with someone who turned out to be a DEA agent. Until there's some more evidence, a little more cautious reporting might be in order.”

More cautious reporting is always welcome, but I fail to see why it would be needed here. It is an established fact that the FARC engages in, and benefits from, cocaine production and trafficking in South America. It is equally established that a number of AQIM members, particularly in its cells of Southern Algeria and Northern Mali, are as much traffickers as they are terrorists, and make a living of convoying cigarettes, arms, migrants, and drugs through the Sahara.

Now if cocaine trade has increased in West Africa as much in the past six years as UNODC reports, is it that much of a stretch to conclude that these two groups have financially benefited from at least part of this increase? Costa is stating the obvious here. The story that came out last December about the DEA investigation is interesting to get the details of how some deals are done, and what type of intermediaries get involved, but it does not teach us anything we did not know regarding the fact that a number of terrorist groups, in West Africa and elsewhere, gets funded through drug trafficking.

Oh, and one last sentence from this FP post:

“if al Qaeda is getting into the cocaine business, it would seem to suggest that the organization is moving outside its core competency in order to raise money”

This completely neglects the fact that there is not one Al Qaeda in this part of the world. AQIM is remotely linked to AQ central, and is itself largely divided between competing cells and leaders with different levels of ideological commitment and strategic priorities. Trafficking all sorts of goods, including drugs, has always been a core competency of some of AQIM southern cells.

Déjà vu in the Sahel

The kidnapping of a French aid worker in northeastern Mali last Wednesday, as well as three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania on Sunday, bring AQIM—the most likely culprit at this stage— back to the fore.

Let’s just hope that these two tragic events will garner better analysis on security in the Sahel than this recent Newsweek article, which goes to great pain demonstrating that 1) the situation in the Sahel is nowhere near as bad as the situation in the Af-Pak border region (no kidding), and 2) that it is wrong to believe that the Sahel is the next hotbed of terrorism (good news: few people believe this, and are more worried about places like Yemen and Somalia). Kal from The Moor Next Door does a great job at tearing the article apart and providing rebuttal to most of its flaws, misjudgments, and blatant omissions.

And as Kal underlines, nothing in this article is new. How too much of a Western presence can backfire was raised by ICG in 2005. Even the State Department got the memo: two weeks ago, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson emphasized to Congress the need for a limited US footprint in the Sahel region:

“The United States can play a helpful supporting role in the regional effort, but we must avoid taking actions that could unintentionally increase local tensions or lend credibility to AQIM’s claims of legitimacy.
[…]
The countries in the region continue to demonstrate the political will to combat terrorism and trans-national crime. They have explicitly stated that the Sahel’s security is the responsibility of the countries in the region. They have not asked the United States to take on a leadership role in counterterrorism efforts and have, in fact, clearly signalled that a more visible or militarily proactive posture by the United States would be counterproductive. We fully concur that the appropriate roles for the United States and other third countries with even more significant interests in the region must be to support regional security efforts while continuing to provide meaningful development assistance to the more remote areas. Moreover, we have emphasized that while the United States will do its part, the burden must be shared.”

Granted, this may be nothing more than a way to keep DoD out of the way. But at least, and in contrast to Newsweek, Carson also offered a rather nuanced view of the threat, underlining for instance how the Malian situation differs from the one prevailing in Mauritania with regards to AQIM.

Am I being oversensitive here, or is it really a sad day when one finds more analytical nuance in a political statement than in a press article?

Mauritania's first suicide bombing, targeting the French embassy in Nouakchott

A quick reaction to the suicide bombing that took place today against the French embassy in Nouakchott. According to the AP, a man detonated the explosive belt he was wearing outside of the French embassy (the local media is more vague about the location, saying it was a little further down the road). Two security guards and a woman were lightly injured, while the kamikaze was killed.

Mauritania’s first experience of terrorism on its soil is recent. In 2005, the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), which rebranded itself Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in early 2007, attacked the Lemgheity military post. In 2007, four French tourists were killed in Aleg, in the south of the country. In early 2008, shots were fired against the Israeli embassy, and in September of that same year, 15 soldiers were taken hostage and beheaded near the town of Zouerate. Finally, in June, an American aid worker was killed in what appeared to be an attempted kidnapping. AQIM claimed responsibility or was found responsible for all of these incidents.

Today’s event represents the first occurrence of a suicide bombing in Mauritania. There had been warning signs. When the first Mauritanian blew himself up in Bouira (Algeria) during the summer of 2008 as part of an AQIM operation, this triggered a fear that his example may inspire other extremists recruited in Mauritania. Over the past year and a half, the Mauritanian police has raided several AQIM safehouses in Nouakchott and found arms and explosives, including explosive belts—suggesting that one or more people were already, at the time, willing to blow themselves up.

The suicide attack before the French embassy today represents the realization of this worrisome prospect, and follows the line of attacks targeting either the Mauritanian army or Western expatriates. This attack is also, in all likelihood, a strong message sent to the newly-elected (and already contestated) President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who has sworn to rid Mauritania of terrorism. This new incident--which has not yet been claimed by anyone--also suggests that the terrorist threat, although recent in Mauritania, may be there to stay. The dismantling of the Mauritanian branch of AQIM and the numerous arrests in early 2008 did not prevent the group from reforming.

It will be interesting, in the next few months, to observe how the recent surge in the Malian army’s effort to go after AQIM on its territory (with the help of the Tuareg community who knows well the terrain and is well versed in the art of guerilla warfare) will impact on neighboring countries. The area of the Sahara between Mauritania, Algeria and Mali has long been a lawless zone and a sanctuary for AQIM’s southern cells. If Mali is successful in chasing AQIM out of its territory (and assuming they can keep that territory clear), and if the Algerians are able to do the same on theirs, will these cells relocate to Mauritania ?

Location, location, location

To those who say that Rory Stewart is pessimistic about Afghanistan, he has this to respond:

"[…] the Taliban are very unlikely to take over Afghanistan as a whole. Their previous administration provided basic road security and justice but it was fragile and fell quickly. They are no longer perceived, as they were by some in 1994, as young student angels saving the country from corruption. Millions of Afghans disliked their brutality, incompetence and primitive attitudes. The Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek populations are wealthier, more established and more powerful than they were in 1996 and would strongly resist any attempt by the Taliban to occupy their areas. The Afghan national army is reasonably effective. Pakistan is not in a position to support the Taliban as it did before. It would require far fewer international troops and planes than we have today to make it very difficult for the Taliban to gather a conventional army as they did in 1996 and drive tanks and artillery up the main road to Kabul.

Even if – as seems most unlikely – the Taliban were to take the capital, it is not clear how much of a threat this would pose to US or European national security.

Would they repeat their error of providing a safe haven to al-Qaida? And how safe would this safe haven be? They could give al-Qaida land for a camp but how would they defend it against predators or US special forces? And does al-Qaida still require large terrorist training camps to organise attacks? Could they not plan in Hamburg and train at flight schools in Florida; or meet in Bradford and build morale on an adventure training course in Wales?"

So there is optimism about Afghanistan, but not so much about the rest of the world, including Yorkshire. Or about the US/NATO effort, for that matter:

"It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. Is a centralised state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values? And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives? Afghanistan is starting from a very low base: 30 years of investment might allow its army, police, civil service and economy to approach the levels of Pakistan. But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan."

His last point is a rebuttal to the whole idea of systematically seeing in “ungoverned territories” potential sanctuaries for terrorists. As Stewart points out, terrorist groups seeking refuge in such areas are vulnerable because no one will complain too loudly about infringement on state sovereignty if they end up getting Predatored.

Ungoverned territories also have serious disadvantages for the functioning of any organization. They lack communications, banking systems, infrastructures. Areas where state control is lax or inexistent may make it possible, for a group, to train a few people to the use of small arms and the assembling of IEDs, as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) does in the stretch of the Sahara desert between Mauritania, Algeria, and Mali. But the major AQIM attacks that took place against Algerian security forces, civilians, and foreigners have largely originated from the cells located near Algiers, not the southern ones. Saharan cells have mounted attacks against isolated military outposts, in 2005 and 2008, kidnapped tourists (one of which they killed last month), and, over the past two years, killed four French tourists and an American aid worker: tragic events, to be sure, but not destabilizing ones. These cells' biggest potential for harm lies in the (few) people and the money (provided they do not decide to keep all the ransom money for themselves) they send to the northern cells. There is only so much one can do in the middle of the desert…