Uh, yeah. Probably.Q The -- early on, was there ever any -- and you may have just answered this -- any consideration to jumping the 82nd itself in; they then set up -- you know, you're clear, you got a landing zone, and then vehicles and supplies come in?
SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL 1: I would have to, you know, defer to the commander on the ground out there. I don't think at this -- from my point of view right here, I don't believe there was a conscious decision to do that, because we didn't think that was a -- the prudent thing to do. It was a --
Q It wasn't really considered?
SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL 1: No. And it's -- and there's also an issue of optics here, because we are there to assist and enable. This is not a jump into a combat zone; this is not a jump.
So we're there to assist and enable. It's a peaceful nation. It's a very dramatic and, as General Keen said, epic proportions, the disaster there. And we're there to get there quickly and to help. And to parachute in or to drop in, it was not required and would have probably sent the wrong message.
Showing posts with label Haiti. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Haiti. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
It ain't exactly Operation Market Garden
If you were wondering why the brigade from the 82d Airborne that's doing HA/DR in Haiti didn't arrive by parachute, anonymous "senior military officials" addressed that question during a background briefing with the press this morning.
Monday, January 18, 2010
Longer-term engagement in Haiti: Beware the Insta-Pundits
Revealing just how much our foreign policy discourse has changed over the last decade, the discussion of humanitarian relief for Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake has quickly turned to considering what if any form longer-term US engagement should take. This is a good thing, but a serious danger lurks as the denizens of security think tanks and policy shops try to quickly develop some expertise on a situation they have, for the most part, ignored. Although there are a handful of Haiti-hands scattered through-out the administration and the foreign-policy firmament, I worry that too many will succumb to the urge to fill in the gaps in their knowledge with what passes for 'received wisdom.'
What do I mean? Check out this briefing from the Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Not my favorite institution at the best of times, but to get this much wrong in only two and half pages is, well, remarkable. Aristide was removed in 2004, not 2006. Comparing Haiti today to Somalia in 1993 is absurd - I don't think I even have to explain why. And in claiming that the UN peacekeeping mission (aka MINUSTAH) has "been struggling to counter the activities of gangs and other armed groups—the primary power‐brokers in the embattled nation," AEI manages to simultaneously be several years out of date on the security situation, and unfairly dismissive of the UN's successes. I'm picking on AEI because Small Wars Journal linked to the article, but I suspect there are other examples out there.
Between 2005 and 2007, MINUSTAH broke the back of the gangs through intelligence-led joint military-police operations. Following a 'clear-hold-build' pattern, they expanded security bubbles into previously gang-controlled neighborhoods by targeting gang leaders for arrest, stepping up patrols, establishing new police stations and checkpoints, and introducing employment and essential services projects on the heels of security operations. While progress has been slow, the mission has also made important headway on reforming the Haitian National Police. This is not to gloss over the serious problems that persist (and there are plenty), but Haiti in 2010 is not Haiti in 2004, or 1994 for that matter.
Point is, if we want to help prevent Haiti from backsliding, we have to recognize what has changed over the last 6 years. MINUSTAH has had a hard time responding to the earthquake because it has effectively been decapitated by the collapse of its HQ and the death of a significant chunk of its senior staff. It's apparently hamstrung response is not reflective of its role over the last few years, or its potential going forward. Likewise, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada and CARICOM have all been seriously engaged in Haiti, and should be viewed as partners for the development of a regional strategy. While greater US engagement could be critical for re-energizing international efforts, in most cases it would be counter-productive to shoulder them aside.
Bottom line: beware the proliferation of insta-pundits peddling stale-dated information, anecdotes rather than careful assessments, and received wisdom that sounds a little too familiar. We get more than enough of all that on Afghanistan.
Labels:
complex operations,
corruption,
decision making,
expertise,
Haiti,
opeds,
peacekeeping,
PKO,
policing,
strategy,
think tanks,
UN,
US support
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Haiti
As you all know, a major earthquake has devastated the country and its capital, Port-au-Prince. It looks like relief work will be all the more difficult since the UN mission's (MINUSTAH) headquarters have apparently been destroyed, as have the facilities of most assistance providers.
I can't think of anything meaningful to add beyond what any normal person would say in response to such a tragedy so I'll leave it at that.
I can't think of anything meaningful to add beyond what any normal person would say in response to such a tragedy so I'll leave it at that.
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