It's Not Over in Cote d'Ivoire

The arrest of Laurent Gbagbo today has finally brought the long crisis in Cote d'Ivoire to the front pages of US newspapers.

But,a s Beth Dickinson explains very well here,this doesn't mean that things are over in Cote d'Ivoire. Yes, the recalcitrant loser of November's election has finally been detained by the forces of Alassane Ouattara but it took four long months. Much has happened since Gbagbo refused to step down after the UN and the Ivorian elections commission declared Ouattara the winner of the runoff vote.

Just to give a brief list, the Security Council agreed in December to send two thousand extra troops (they still haven't arrived), the two attack helicopters did arrive (three months late). In January-February, the international community did its best to strangle Gbagbo's resources: ECOWAS cut off his signing authority (this matters because Cote d'Ivoire is a Franc CFA country and therefore partially controlled by the regional central bank) and Ouattara announced a halt to cocoa and coffee exports. This led prices to skyrocket for cocoa futures. Meanwhile, the EU and the US froze Gbagbo's assets. South Africa, whose President seems to call for power-sharing a la Zimbabwe/Kenya every time someone tries to steal an election, finally followed suit on the asset freeze, but only ten days ago.

Last month, the Security Council finally imposed an asset freeze and travel bank on Gbagbo (they had threatened before but not named him or his family/entourage to a list). And finally, the Council told UNOCI and Licorne to really "use all necessary means" to prevent violence.

Still, Gbagbo's arrest today took a lot of support from the French Licorne forces and UNOCI, in particular by responding to the use of heavy weapons in Abidjan. On top of that, Gbagbo has been using a lot of anti-French, anti-UN and anti-foreigner (that is anti-northerner) rhetoric. Many of his supporters are still armed--the Republican Guard in particular has long refused to comply with a UN arms embargo. Not only that but he (and the head of his Young Patriots, Charles Ble Goude) used the months of crisis to recruit more followers, and arm them.

Last month, several hundred people were massacred in Duekoue, which is inhabited mostly by Gbagbo supporters. If this headline didn't make you think "Rwanda", I don't know what will but about 30,000 people had taken refuge in a church compound. This kind of thing could happen again. There has been heavy fighting in Abidjan for days now so we should expect high casualty figures. On top of everything, one million people have fled the fighting and over 100,000 fled to Liberia.

So, it's nice that Cote d'Ivoire is finally getting some attention, it's nice that the Security Council finally did more than threaten sanctions and in fact threw its support behind UNOCI and Licorne (something that many UNOCI and Licorne officials felt had long been lacking) but don't count this one as over yet. Alassane Ouattara gave a nice speech (in French) on how he will work on reconciliation, but it will take a lot of work.

Oh and one more thing, the New York Times' coverage of this crisis, has been abysmal. Why is it that for the first time in months, Adam Nossiter, their West Africa-based reporter-- is actually in Abidjan? Until now, all his articles have relied on wire reports and the byline has been from the safety of Ghana. Why was no one from the times there when the BBC, Le Monde, Reuters, AP, AFP, and others were on the ground, in some cases making it to Duekoue to report on the massacre there?

Hundreds of years of animosity down the drain in one day

First, the Brits don't want their aircraft carriers. And this week we find out that the French can't get theirs to sea. These are dark days in the history of European hegemony.

I'm not going to add too much to the London summit on UK-French military cooperation (a good round up is here at SWJ). Both nations have proud histories of significant influence and this must be a tough reality to accept for both. Granted, without colonies their need for massive standing armies and navies isn't what it used to be. Couple that with fiscal realities and the events of the past couple of weeks is the result. As far as military cooperation goes, this move also seems to make sense since they have similar interests in the world and punch at roughly the same weight.

However, both countries still seem to have global ambitions. The NSS made that quite clear for the UK. I haven't read any similar documents from France (mainly due to my inability to read French - so if any of you have English translations that prove me wrong please send it along!), but they have deployed a large chunk of their forces to numerous places, mainly Afghanistan and North Africa. If both militaries are to be pooled, they'll have even less to use for their own purposes (a brigade contingent? - any support to that is a huge commitment for the UK these days).

So what does this mean? I don't know. I hope it doesn't mean an EU military organization. Such an organization would duplicate a lot of NATO's mandate, but would seemingly be more dysfunctional and factional. I think what it should mean is that these nations should begin lessening their strategic objectives. Their militaries should focus on security sector assistance, not large to medium sized direct-action interventions outside of coalition activities. While all nations have to weight risks and benefits, every battalion the French and Brits deploy significantly decreases their ability to respond to any new crisis that may arise.

And what does this mean for the US? Efficiencies are good for NATO. And we saw these cuts coming. I think what we should be taking of out of this to make sure when the time comes for us to have to make significant defense cuts (as I imagine it will come at some point), we're a little better prepared for it. You know, so we can get an aircraft carrier out of port at least. I'm going to qualify all of this above as initial thoughts (which usually has the accuracy of first reports) and continue to think about this. But I think we're witnessing some significant shifts in global power from what we've known.

Update: Maybe today's agreement is Applebyan diplomacy. Or the UK has dropped it's "divide and conquer" strategy...

France, the Burka Ban, and the Alleged "Roma File"

First the "Burka Ban"
Readers will recall previous discussions about French efforts to ban the public wearing of face-covering Islamic veils. You'll remember that the French National Assembly and the Senate passed a law to that effect earlier this year. The law wasn't applied because the Constitutional Court needed to determine whether it was constitutional.

Well, the Court handed down its decision today and it decided that the law is constitutional. The only caveat it stated was that it may not be legal to prevent such face covering veils within mosques (even if the mosques are open to the public). The penalty for breaking the law is a $200 fine for wearing one and a $42,000 fine for forcing someone to wear one.

The next step is to challenge the law in the European Court of Human Rights. The law is apparently very careful not to use any gender or specific references.

And Second, the "Roma File"
Le Monde's reported today that the Gendarmerie has been keeping a secret file, called MENS (Minorites Ethniques Non Sedentarisee or Non Sendentary Ethnic Minorities). The Guardian has a corresponding story on this. The file may be aptly named. It's unclear how recently it has been used (the article says that the Ministry of the Interior was "not aware" of a file of that name post the 1990s) but certainly, with France's recent expulsion of Roma, the discovery of such a file is extremely alarming. Roma advocates have filed a suit because such files are illegal in France (for rather obvious reasons). As the article points out, "this is not 1940."

It's clear that French policy in this area is more than problematic. It will be worth watching what happens, whether this file really does exist, what the domestic and international reaction is, and of course how this will affect President Sarkozy. His approval ratings are plummeting.

C'est le 14 Juillet: African Veterans to Get Same Benefits as their French Colleagues!

Over at Secret Defense, Jean Dominique Merchet reports that African veterans who served with French forces during WWII, Korea, Indochina, and Algeria will now get the same benefits as their colleagues. President Sarkozy (who is in need of some positive spin--have you read about the whole Bettencourt "affaire"? It's a trip), in honor of the Fete Nationale du 14 Juillet, has announced a 150 million Euro program to ensure that African veterans now receive the same level benefits, regardless of where they now live.

Why is this such a big deal? Because, as the BBC explains, until now, African soldiers were only payed a pension worth one tenth to one fifth of what their French colleagues got. Back in May, the Conseil Constitutionnel (the Constitutional Council) declared that practice illegal so now Sarko is presenting legislation to the Assemblee Nationale and the law should go into effect in January.

Oh, and did you see that soldiers from 13 African countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Sénégal, Tchad and Togo) joined French forces today on the Champs Elysees for the Annual Defile du 14 Juillet? It was apparently pouring rain most of the time but this created a lot of buzz too--not all of those leaders have the best human rights records and Sarkozy was criticized both for colonial nostalgia and for granting them the honor of parading.

Bon 14 Juillet les amis!

France to spend 300 Million Euros on training 12K African troops for peacekeeping (UPDATED)

At the 25th France-Africa summit, President Sarkozy announced that France would spend 300 million Euros to train 12,000 African troops for deployment to peacekeeping operations in Africa. He said the training would occur between now and 2012. Sorry all the links are in French--if you find something in English, I can update up here if you put it in the comments.

Now you might remember that back in 2004, at the G8 summit, the US had announced that it would train 75,000 peacekeepers, mostly from Africa, by 2010. GPOI (the Global Peace Operations Initiative), was supposed to be a G8 initiative and France and the UK had promised to help. As far as I know, that hadn't happened until now. Anyway, for the US, GPOI ended up costing about 90 million per year (if you want a breakdown on the numbers, Nina Serafino, from the Congressional Research Service has a nice chart here).

A couple questions: how does 300 million only pay for 12,000 troops to be trained--this seems way more expensive that US efforts (and don't get me started on how little the State Department knows about how well the training works or not)? Does anyone know how the training will be different? Does France plan on giving these troops a LOT more stuff than the US hands out as part of its own effort? Does that number include actually paying for these soldiers to fly to places and set up bases etc?

I understand that France sees providing this training as a way to decrease its own role in peacekeeping in Africa (which with ongoing withdrawal from Chad/CAR and a much small presence in Ivory Coast is already down a lot). Sarkozy also said the troops could help combat piracy (though how 300M gets you anywhere in terms of naval capacity I'm not sure). Anyway, given France's need for decreasing its deficit (and bailing out Greece...) what does this look like to all of you?

UPDATE: Gulliver reminds me that GPOI was renewed for another five years and that the initial effort exceeded the 75K goals and reached 85K instead. Friends at GAO who work on GPOI point out that GPOI hasn't been able to figure out how much impact the training has had on the performance of deployed troops.

New Issue of Doctrine (from the French Army) is out

In the email this morning, a notice from the Armée de Terre that Doctrine n. 17: The Commitment of French Land Forces in Afghanistan is out. Since I know there is interest out there on what the French are writing on all of this, I thought I would post a link. Obviously, I haven't read it yet (I opened it and it's clear they need an English editor) but this is the table of contents:

• Counterinsurgency and the Stabilization Phase
• The Role of Simulation When Preparing Task-Forces before Deployments
• IED Warfare Doctrine: an Ever Evolving Doctrine
• The Legal Bases for the Commitment in Afghanistan

I also found several articles on French forces and COIN over on the IFRI website. They look like they might be worth a read. This time they are in French (here and here, for example).

I have this sinking feeling

You know that scene from The Godfather after they've gone to the mattresses and Michael's exiled to Sicily, the one that's like a time lapse of the mob war where there's the kind of ragtimey piano music playing, and the newspaper keeps spinning out into the foreground with headlines like "POLICE HUNT COP-KILLER" and "CITY CRACKS DOWN" and "THIRD MONTH OF GANGLAND VIOLENCE" and whatnot? You see the same device used in like the Time-Life documentary series about THE RISE OF THE THIRD REICH, this foreshadowing with "HITLER ELECTED TO LEAD GERMANY" and "JEWS FORCED TO REGISTER WITH GOVERNMENT" and "WEHRMACHT ROLLS INTO SUDETENLAND" to build your sense of drama and anxiety about events you already know took place.

Am I the only one with the weird sense that we'll one day see this same sort of documentary montage, replete with headlines like "Sarkozy Says Burka 'Not Welcome' in France" and "Belgian MPs Vote to Ban Islamic Burqa in Public" and "French Parliament Codemns Full Islamic Veil" in the buildup of Time-Life's 2050 offering "THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: the European Tinderbox in the Great West-v-Islam Culture War"?

Oh, I am? Well, don't mind me.

(So long as we're on the subject, I should link to this interview in Globalia Magazine with the brilliant Olivier Roy. His first answer, which I'll reproduce here in full, deals with precisely this subject.)

The debate in Europe has shifted in some 25 years (a whole generation) between immigration and the visible symbols of Islam. Which creates a paradox: even people who were opposed to immigration acknowledge now that the second and third generation of migrants are here to stay and that Islam has rooted itself within Europe. So now the debate is about the status of Islam. And here we have a strange phenomenon: while anti-immigration feeling is mainly associated with the conservative right, anti-Islamic sentiment is to be found on both the left and the right, but for two very different reasons. For the right, Europe is Christian and Islam should be treated as a tolerated, albeit inferior religion. There is (unfortunately) no way to ban it (because of the principle of “freedom of religion”, inscribed in our constitutions, international treaties and UN charter), but there are means to limit its visibility without necessarily going against the principle of freedom of religion (for instance the European Court of Human Rights did not condemn the banning of the scarf in French schools). For the left, the issue is more generally secularism, women’s rights and fundamentalism: it opposes the veil, not so much because it is Islamic, rather because it seems to contradict women’s rights. Hence the debate on Islam
disguises a far more complicated issue: what is a European identity, and what is the role of religions in Europe; and of course, on these two issues the left and the right take very different positions. But we are witnessing the rise of new populist movements (like Geert Wilder’s In Holland) mixing both approaches, basically siding with the right but using leftist arguments.

Take a look.

De la contre-insurrection

Francophones interested in COIN should check the latest issue of Securite Globale (No.10, Summer 2009). Stephane Taillat, whose blog En Vérité still holds, to my knowledge, the monopoly over francophone COIN blogging, co-edits a series of articles on “contre-insurrection(s).” Among other contributions, David Ucko has an article on the dilemmas of the US COIN doctrine, Michel Goyat describes the British experience in Helmand, and Christian Olsson examines the link between COIN and the responsibility to protect. Not to surprise anyone, Gian Gentile has an article denouncing the “myths” and “dangers” of the COIN doctrine where he offers a “vision critique de l’US Army” (no translation needed for this one, I believe).

Gentile has found a new fan on the other side of the pond. Jean-Dominic Merchet from the (usually excellent) Secret Défense blog had a “Aha!” moment when reading Gentile’s contribution. In a post titled “To get down with the counterinsurgency dogma” (“Pour en finir avec les dogmes de la contre-insurrection”), Merchet marvels at Gentile’s revelations about the “mythification of the 2007 surge,” (apparently paying off the Sons of Iraq played some part in that success—oh, really?) and the fact that it is now “more important for the army to learn and adapt than to be capable of fighting” (what I usually read runs more along the lines of “it is important to learn and adapt to be capable of better fighting”, but I may be unnecessarily subtle here). Apparently unaware of the fact that Gentile has as much a vested interest as Petraeus in promoting his own Iraq narrative and interpretation of what worked or not there, Merchet concludes that the French army should learn from Gentile’s article and not get carried away by the COIN precepts.

I'd say that the French army will be just fine, thanks, but I may simply be blinded by the COIN dogma...

Turns out the SECDEF also thinks it's a bad idea for allies to sell advanced weapons systems to countries working at cross purposes to NATO

Remember how the French were gonna sell Mistral-class amphibs to Russia? (Perhaps surprisingly, the posts "Dirty French!" and "Dirty French pt 2" had nothing to do with this.) Yeah, I didn't think that was that cool of an idea when it came up three months ago, and now the deal has been inked. Turns out Secretary Gates agrees with me on the fundamental un-coolness of this.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told French officials Monday that he was concerned about their plans to sell Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia, although there is little if anything the United States could do to block the deal, officials said.

Russia has been engaged in negotiations for months over what would be the first significant purchase of advanced NATO weaponry since the collapse of communism. Each Mistral warship costs up to $750 million, and the vessels, which can launch helicopters and armored vehicles, would be viewed as a notable addition to the Kremlin’s rusting fleet.

Mr. Gates chose the well-known diplomatic code for disagreement in describing his discussion of the arms sale with his French counterpart, Defense Minister Hervé Morin.

“I think I would just say that we had a good and thorough exchange of views,” Mr. Gates said.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said later that Mr. Gates’s meetings here were “very amicable and positive” on issues that included the NATO effort in Afghanistan, but that Mr. Gates “made our concerns very clear” on the arms sale.

According to media reports, France has agreed to sell one Mistral to Russia and the sale of an additional three ships is under discussion. Information Dissemination, which can be a bit dense for this idiot non-engineer but ought to be your go-to blog for maritime stuff if you care about all that, expresses some confusion on this point. I've seen it reported elsewhere that only three Mistral-class ships exist: the one being sold to Russia, and two currently in the French fleet. That means that the three additional ships would have to be built to order, and some people are even speculating about a licensed production agreement with Russia.

Uh, what?

Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying that the U.S. should have veto power over anyone else's arms sales or other military contacts, but aren't we supposed to be on the same team here? Russia's certainly entitled to its own defense program, and I'll be the first to say that there are certain things we can do to give Moscow assurances about its own territorial integrity and security. But amphibious assault vehicles? Really? Where are these things gonna be based? And what missions are they gonna be used for? It seems clear to me that they'll go to the Black Sea fleet (if only because there aren't a whole ton of other warm-water ports), and that they'll be used to menace the Georgians (and perhaps the Ukrainians).

Dmitry Gorenburg of the Russian Military Reform blog does a good job of dissecting the rationale from a Russian perspective here in "Why the Mistral":

Whether this is the ship that should be built is another matter entirely. Various authors have made the case that the Mistral is not the ship that the Russian Navy needs. It may be that at least part of the reason for its purchase has to do with political factors, such as improving Russian-French relations. Or it may be that the Navy wants a versatile ship that can be used in many different ways.

While because of its versatility I don’t think it would be wasted in the Russian Navy, it’s probably not the best use of the limited procurement budget. It might make a good utility ship, good for “conducting independent amphibious operations in distant locales” but is that really going to be a primary mission for the Russian Navy in coming years? It seems to me that for the foreseeable future, the Navy’s main missions will consist of protecting sea lanes and showing the flag. The Mistral could be used for these kinds of operations, but they are not its primary purpose. Given the money that would be spent on this ship, it seems that the RFN might as well get exactly what it needs.

So is this some kind of malign action by the the Russians, or are they just being stupid? (Or, as I always ask in the case of U.S. defense procurement, is there someone with a significant stake in the successful conclusion of this deal exerting inappropriate pressure on the decision-makers?)

And perhaps the more important question, and the one over which the U.S. and other NATO allies should have more influence: WTF are the French doing? I've yet to see any explanation from the French side of things, any justification of how this advances French foreign policy or security objectives. So: anybody want to speculate? Any of our French readership (or authorship!) want to speak up in defense of the strategic calculus behind this decision, or try to explain to us exactly what that is?

Dirty French, pt 2: an update!

Remember that dirty Frenchman who gouged another dude's eyes during a rugby match and got suspended for 24 weeks? (You should! I wrote about it here.) Well, his little buddy has finally been sentenced for GOUGING THE EYES OF THE EXACT SAME DUDE DURING THE SAME GAME. The verdict? Fat Frenchman Timothy Attoub was slapped with a 70 week ban! Take a suck of that, cheating French!

The best part of the story by far is the reaction of Max Guazzini, the president of Attoub's club Stade Francais. The club first tried the "you've got us all wrong!" defense, insisting that that photographs of Attoub's fingers jammed into Stephen Ferris' eyes had been doctored. When that nonsense was dismissed, Guazzini told the press that the sentence was "excessive, very political, and anti-French." That may or may not be true of this judgment, but it's certainly true of my posting!

Hey France: stop cheating!

P.S. Again, nothing to do with war, but I thought this was an essential update to the original story. I promise to limit myself to like a dozen France-cheats-at-everything posts per year.

New French Spy School

Le Monde is reporting that a new school, in fact a "grande ecole," is being created for French intelligence professionals. This is part of ongoing reforms to France's national security structures, stemming from the 2008 White Paper on Defense.

As the article explains (second paragraph, loose translation/paraphrase):

Open to professionals (cadres are professional staff not support staff) this new school will be reserved to six specialized civilian and military services: the Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur (DCRI--National Directorate for Interior Security) - which reports to the Ministry of the Interior -, the Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE--the National Directorate for Exterior Security), the Direction du renseignement militaire (DRM--the Directorate for Military Security) and the Direction de la protection et de la sécurité de la défense (DPSD--Directorate for the protection and security of defense) - which report to the Ministry of Defense -, Tracfin - the Ministry of Finance's anti-laundering cell - and the Direction nationale du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières (DNRED--the National Directorate for customs investigations).

This represents over 11,200 people and the school will provide training and certification that is expected to be required for professional advancement. The creation of the school is also expected to help with mobility between the services, better integration of effort, etc. The challenge of course is that financing is uncertain: as a result, the article reports that certain branches have been excluded. In particular (last paragraph, loose paraphrase/translation again):

1,300 police officers from the under-director for general information, which is part of public security are not eligble. This was created in September 2008 when police intelligence was reformed and it includes a significant part of the personnel from the former General Intelligence service who after being unexpectedly separated from their colleagues chose to join for the National Directorate for Internal Security. In addition, the gendarmes, who are trying to develop their intelligence capacity (often causing friction with the police officers), and who have an antiterrorism liaison office are also excluded.

This creation is complemented by the official formation (just before Christmas) of two National Security Council type structures, both headed by the President: the National Council for Defense and National Security and its more specialized counterpart, the National Council for Intelligence.

So what does this all mean exactly? Well, first that President Sarkozy is creating in France some of the structures that we have here with respect to national security decision making. He's also trying to figure out ways to improve France's intelligence services. There's one thing I'm not sure about though: is it a good idea to exclude the gendarmerie from this, particularly given its increasing role to support police reform in other countries (and the ensuing intelligence collection/analysis requirements that such work entails)?

Dirty French!

To balance out some of the francophilia often found around here, I direct your attention to this:

France will be without Julien Dupuy for the Six Nations after the Stade Francais scrum-half was hammered with a 24-week ban for gouging Ulster flanker Stephen Ferris.

After considering the evidence, independent judicial officer Judge Jeff Blackett (England) found that the incident was at the top end in the level of seriousness for an offence of this type and imposed the six-month ban following a lengthy hearing in Dublin.

You know what's a bad idea? Sticking your fingers in some dude's eyes in a game that is televised. Bad idea.

I'm not sure which is my favorite part of this story: Ferris' reaction after the game (in which he said that if he'd been punched he'd just sort of accept it as part of the game, man up, and move on, but gouging was different), or Stade's insistence that a photograph capturing the image of Dupuy's teammate David Attoub also gouging Ferris had been doctored. Awesome!

So my Friday open question for everyone: why are the French such cheaters? (Ok, I'm mostly joking about this, but it's telling that the scourge of eye-gouging has mostly been eliminated from the game in Britain, while it continues to happen in France.)

And no, again, this doesn't have anything to do with war.

Why I don't work for a think tank

There are a lot of reasons, really. (One is that none of them wanted to hire me.) But this CNAS report, authored by Ethan Kapstein, reminds me of the most significant: think-tanks come up with ridiculous, impossible, never-to-be-implemented ideas all the time.

Now I understand the utility of dialogue, and that some ideas that seem ridiculous at the time eventually become mainstream. What are we to make, though, of a policy brief on defense acquisition reform when the suggestions in it basically amount to:

1. Find a way to make super-smart people work for the government instead of industry

2. Convince Congress to limit itself to an up-or-down vote on the entire defense procurement budget, thus denying itself one of the most effective vehicles for advancing profitable pork and ensuring re-election

3. Profit!

Oh yeah, and "the media, think tanks, and the administration should object strenuously when Congress channels unnecessary funds to procurement that should be going directly to our 'boots on the ground' instead." Uh, right. Problem is we've all got a different definition of "unnecessary," don't we?

I recognize that there's something to be gained from examining the lessons of other systems, and from imagining what benefit we might derive from dramatic change. But shouldn't we also consider just exactly how sodding unlikely these "reforms" are to to be implemented?

Hey France, I've got an awesome idea:

How about not selling expeditionary, offensive weapons systems to effing Russia?

ST. PETERSBURG, Russia -- A cutting-edge French warship sailed into St. Petersburg on Monday to show off its capabilities to potential buyers in the Russian Navy, whose pursuit of an amphibious assault capacity is frightening some neighboring countries.

Russia's once-mighty navy was severely degraded after the fall of the Soviet Union and it currently has no big ship with the power to anchor in coastal waters and deploy troops onto land.

Russian officials said this year that they were planning to make their first arms deal with a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by buying a French vessel like the Mistral, a 299-meter ship able to carry more than a dozen helicopters, which would in turn be able to haul hundreds of troops into enemy territory.

You know, enemy territory... like Georgia, or Ukraine, or Moldova or something.

Hey, you know I have no problem with the way you help yourself, France, but these guys are fast company. Seriously, WTF are they thinking? I'm sure they were just talking about pierogies and snow and shit, but let's cut that out. Make your money somewhere else, dude. The Georgians, of course, think this is awesome.

"We strongly oppose the sale of such ship to Russia," said Nika Laliashvili, a member of the Georgian parliament's defense-affairs committee. "It poses a serious danger to Georgia."

Oh, wait.

New French Brigade and Special Forces in Afghanistan

Over at Secret Defense, Jean-Dominique Merchet has news on the French deployment to Afghanistan. Since JDM is usually well-informed, I'm going to do my usual translation job (Alma might have to take over on this front for the next month though, since I'll be traveling for work).

Ok, here we go again.

Starting in November, the French deployment will be significantly reorganized, with the creation of a French brigade, which will be baptized Lafayette...The Americans will appreciate the recognition to a French hero of the American war of independence but the British might not feel the same [this is JDM not me! back to the actual point].

This La Fayette brigade will be responsible for Surobi and Kapisa districts, which are already under French responsibility. The brigade will be commanded by a General, with headquarters in Nijrab. The brigade will have two joint tactical groups. One will mostly be the 13th battalion of chasseurs alpins and the second will be the 2nd foreign parachutist regiment.

Each group, other than its command, will have support elements and three combat companies. In total, six combat companies were to be deployed. It was therefore necessary to find two more than we have today but without looking like we were increasing the numbers deployed.

The guard for Warehouse Camp in Kabul will be transferred to the Georgian Army which will free up the French company currently assigned there. For the second, the general staff will no longer count the sailors deployed in the Indian Ocean with OEF, thereby allowing the deployment of 150 men to the theater.

Similarly, the 150 gendarmes assigned to train the Afghan police will not be counted....because they are on a different mission. The ten helicopters will remain at the Kabul airport.

Second, still at Secret Defense, this time here, French Special Forces are returning to Afghanistan. Apparently, approximately 150 troops would be deployed. What would be their role? Merchet says this remains to be determined because it's hard to explain exactly what makes operations special in COIN.

In any case:

The special forces would be under commander of the Lafayette Brigade commander and would work closely with allied special forces, especially American forces...Since their return from Afghanistan [in 2007, French special forces were deployed during Operation Ares at Spin Boldak and briefly in Jalalabad], French Special forces suffer from not being used in what they view as the main operational theater for the French Army. General Georgelin, who leaves his post in February, was reluctant to send the forces to Afghanistan.

Ok, this time I'm done...

French Defense Minister: "Why We Should Not Leave Afghanistan"

French Defense Minister Herve Morin gave an interview to RMC earlier this week about France's involvement in Afghanistan and France's commitment to continued presence in Afghanistan. The minister doesn't often speak to the media (or at least not that I've seen) so this is interesting for several reasons. First it gives some insight into his thinking on the French presence and gives some idea of how he's selling it at home. Second, it gives at least a glimpse of the level of discourse and complexity of discussion on these issues (from what you'll see below, it doesn't seem like very much). So let's get to my quick and dirty translation of some key points:

"If we leave, there is a major risk of contagion in this crisis arc. Pakistan...has nuclear weapons. We must therefore revise our strategy, particularly by focusing less on the Taliban and more on the population. We must manage to create conditions of trust with the population so that the people cooperate with coalition forces and not with the Taliban."

And:

"If we leave, we make Afghanistan the base for terrorism. Our compatriots must keep in mind that, around the world, every day, thanks to cooperation between intelligence services, we stop terrorist plots and curtail terrorist networks. This is the main threat. "

In the interview, Morin apparently also discussed the need for benchmarks for withdrawal, casting them as a tool to educate the public (and presumably build support for continued support). Mostly though, he said that leaving would mean a lot of wasted effort. He specifically mentions the roads built, the children put in school etc and argues that if France leaves all of that would be for naught.

So it seems the Minister has the basics down on COIN but it's still not a terribly sophisticated discussion. An important thing to remember though is that French policy, until last year's Defense White Paper, (and ensuing legislation) did not mandate parliamentary consultation for deploying forces overseas. Indeed, that required a mere presidential notification to the lower house. What does that mean? That the French executive branch is still learning how to justify its decisions. It's going to have to get better at it though because the laws that were passed following the publication of the White Paper say that the lower house must periodically re-authorize deployments .

Public view of the war in Afghanistan: France vs. USA (updated)

Over at Secret Defense, Jean-Dominique Merchet points out the results of this new poll. It basically shows that 36% of the French and 57% percent of the American people interviewed favor the military intervention in Afghanistan.

Just to give some trends on French public opinion, a nice table (p.6) reminds us that 58% of French people favored intervention in Kosovo in 1999, 55% favored intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, 19% in Iraq in 2003, 55% in Darfur in 2007, and 45% in Afghanistan in July 2008.

The rest of the poll then provides data by political party, age, gender and profession (PS is Parti Socialiste, Modem is Bayrou's center right party and UMP is Sarkozy's party--one thing to remember on the French political spectrum, I view it as generally shifted left from the US spectrum so if you look at political platforms, the UMP and Modem would basically be the different factions within the Democratic Party here). It then does the same for US responders.

It's interesting and it shows clearly that the French public is increasingly oppposed to military intervention in Afghanistan.

So go take a look--I think even if your French is limited you should be able to get the gist of it.

Update: As John Henninger points out in the comments (I didn't get a chance to put it up last night so thanks for the reminder), the ABC/Washington Post issued this new poll yesterday.