Longer-term engagement in Haiti: Beware the Insta-Pundits

Revealing just how much our foreign policy discourse has changed over the last decade, the discussion of humanitarian relief for Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake has quickly turned to considering what if any form longer-term US engagement should take. This is a good thing, but a serious danger lurks as the denizens of security think tanks and policy shops try to quickly develop some expertise on a situation they have, for the most part, ignored. Although there are a handful of Haiti-hands scattered through-out the administration and the foreign-policy firmament, I worry that too many will succumb to the urge to fill in the gaps in their knowledge with what passes for 'received wisdom.'

What do I mean? Check out this briefing from the Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Not my favorite institution at the best of times, but to get this much wrong in only two and half pages is, well, remarkable. Aristide was removed in 2004, not 2006. Comparing Haiti today to Somalia in 1993 is absurd - I don't think I even have to explain why. And in claiming that the UN peacekeeping mission (aka MINUSTAH) has "been struggling to counter the activities of gangs and other armed groups—the primary power‐brokers in the embattled nation," AEI manages to simultaneously be several years out of date on the security situation, and unfairly dismissive of the UN's successes. I'm picking on AEI because Small Wars Journal linked to the article, but I suspect there are other examples out there.

Between 2005 and 2007, MINUSTAH broke the back of the gangs through intelligence-led joint military-police operations. Following a 'clear-hold-build' pattern, they expanded security bubbles into previously gang-controlled neighborhoods by targeting gang leaders for arrest, stepping up patrols, establishing new police stations and checkpoints, and introducing employment and essential services projects on the heels of security operations. While progress has been slow, the mission has also made important headway on reforming the Haitian National Police. This is not to gloss over the serious problems that persist (and there are plenty), but Haiti in 2010 is not Haiti in 2004, or 1994 for that matter.

Point is, if we want to help prevent Haiti from backsliding, we have to recognize what has changed over the last 6 years. MINUSTAH has had a hard time responding to the earthquake because it has effectively been decapitated by the collapse of its HQ and the death of a significant chunk of its senior staff. It's apparently hamstrung response is not reflective of its role over the last few years, or its potential going forward. Likewise, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada and CARICOM have all been seriously engaged in Haiti, and should be viewed as partners for the development of a regional strategy. While greater US engagement could be critical for re-energizing international efforts, in most cases it would be counter-productive to shoulder them aside.

Bottom line: beware the proliferation of insta-pundits peddling stale-dated information, anecdotes rather than careful assessments, and received wisdom that sounds a little too familiar. We get more than enough of all that on Afghanistan.

US Budget for Peacekeeping

US contributions for peacekeeping are funded mostly through two accounts within the 150 (Foreign Affairs/State Department) account; the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account and the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account. CIPA supports our assessed contributions to UN operations while PKO allows for voluntary contributions to peacekeeping efforts. Today, this includes (among other things) support for SSR in various African countries and the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

A couple important things are happening with the FY10 budget in this area. First of all, as the President requested, it looks like Congress is agreeing to pay the arrears we've accumulated on UN peacekeeping since the 1999 Helms-Biden Agreement. To cut a long story short, the UN assesses contributions to peacekeeping, the Congress didn't agree with the assessment for the UN and decided we should pay less. Well, if the Senate follows the House, we're paying that money back, all $721 million.

A second important change: because of differences in our fiscal year (or synchronization) vs. the UN's fiscal year, we've been late in paying our dues to the UN, whether for its regular operating budget or for peacekeeping. That's still under discussion since it looks like on the House side, $100 million was cut from the $175 million requested for synchronization.

Third, we're continuing to fund missions in such places as DRC, Liberia, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Haiti (through CIPA). On Somalia, it looks like the House decided that funding for AMISOM, which the President had requested be moved from PKO to CIPA, should in fact stay with PKO because we are not members of the African Union. The view is that contributions to such efforts should remain voluntary and therefore live in PKO. The House did recognize the (remote) possibility that AMISOM could become a UN mission and provided transfer authority, from PKO to CIPA, in case that does happen.

Finally, the President proposed continuing funding GPOI within PKO, to the tune of just under $100 million per year. That's good news. The program was created by President Bush in 2004 and aimed to train 75,000 peacekeepers, mostly in Africa, by 2010. We got (according to the Congressional Research Service) to roughly 58,000 as of early 2009 of which almost 50,000 actually deployed. Given how hard a time the UN has had in finding soldiers to send on its missions, continuing that program is very important. One of the challenges State faces: figuring out how effective that training is once the troops are on the ground.

So overall, it looks like the House will vote on this after it returns from its 4th of July recess. One problem: it's going in under an open rule, with a deadline for amendments early next week. On the Senate side, the Bill is in Committee and should move to a vote the following week.