MONUC's new mandate and directive on cooperation with the FARDC

Several important things have happened in the last few weeks with regard to MONUC's mandate and its role in supporting the FARDC.

But first, some background. As you might remember, just before the mandate was renewed on December 23, the New York Times ran this story, with links to relevant memos, about recommendations the UN's Office of Legal Affairs had made concerning MONUC's support to Kimia II, the operation the Congolese Army (FARDC) had been prosecuting against the FDLR. Basically, the memos cautioned MONUC against supporting FARDC units if these units were suspected of or known to have committed human rights abuses.

Next, Human Rights Watch issued its latest report, criticizing MONUC's support to the FARDC and recommending that clear conditions be set for continuing support, in particular that no support be provided to units known to abuse human rights. Next, the Congolese authorities, after seeing a draft of the resolution, threatened to kick out senior MONUC staff because such a mandate would impinge on DRC's sovereignty and violate the SOFA the UN has with the DRC.

Then, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Alan Doss (whom more people than I can count have said should resign for reasons ranging from not being tough enough with the Congolese authorities to just being a pain to deal with because he won't take any criticism or advice), reported to the Security Council on his work and announced the end of Kimia II operations.

On December 23, the Council passed a resolution, here, extending the mission but only for 6 months. Second, it ranked MONUC's priorities starting with protection of civilians, and moving to implementing effective DDR(RR) (that Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation, and Resettlement in case you get lost with your Rs, like I do), and finally coordinating SSR (Security Sector Reform) between donors and the Congolese authorities.

Finally, the Council provided conditions under which MONUC can support ongoing FARDC operations:

...the support of MONUC to FARDC-led military operations against foreign and Congolese armed groups is strictly conditioned on FARDC’s compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and on an effective joint planning of these operations, decides that MONUC military leadership shall confirm, prior to providing any support to such operations that sufficient joint planning has been undertaken, especially regarding the protection of the civilian population, calls upon MONUC to intercede with the FARDC command if elements of a FARDC unit receiving MONUC’s support are suspected of having committed grave violations of such laws, and if the situation persists, calls upon MONUC to withdraw support from these FARDC units.

Yesterday, MONUC outlined the new conditions under which it will provide support to FARDC's successor to Kimia II, Amani Leo. According to a press release:

The Operation’s principal objectives are to protect civilian populations, clear strategic areas of negative forces, hold territory liberated from FDLR control, and assist in restoring State authority in these zones. The Special Representative also informed the Council that Operation Amani Leo would include preventive interventions aimed at stopping the FDLR from regrouping and attacking civilian populations and re-occupying major mining areas...

The FARDC and MONUC will concentrate on controlling strategic areas in order to ensure that armed groups, notably residual FDLR elements, will not be able to retake territory and inflict reprisals. The Operation aims at creating conditions for stabilization and re-establishment of State authority. Coordination between civilian and military components will be strengthened to stabilize these areas and create conditions for the safe return of civilian populations.

The FARDC and MONUC Force commands are engaged in intensive joint planning down to the tactical level in order to improve communications, liaison and planning throughout the Operation.

At the FARDC’s request, MONUC will provide rations and other essential support to those FARDC units carrying out protection and preventive operations provided that they are jointly planned and conducted in accordance with international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law...

As you can tell, MONUC is making an effort to abide by the Council's conditions but I have a couple questions. Doesn't Amani Leo look exactly like Kimia IIb or maybe Kimia III? Second, what constitutes joint planning? How is this being done down the tactical level? Finally, since when does the UN do clear, hold, and build? I kept being told--both in Goma and Kinshasa, "we're fighting an insurgency here but no one will use the word or actually behave like this is the case." Has this changed or is this just a not so great PR stunt?

DRC Group of Experts Report Leaked

The DRC Group of Experts' Report, which is due to be discussed by the Security Council today, was, it seems, pretty systematically leaked to the media. Usually, that means that it's extremely controversial and that there's concern that it might get watered down by annoyed member states. Leaking it like this basically forces the Secretariat and the Council to discuss the report and its findings.

Anyway, you can read the stories about it in the following outlets: Reuters, BBC, New York Times, and Associated Press.

Finally, Jason Stearns, over at Congo Siasa, has excerpts of the report itself. I've pasted the Summary below and I will provide the link to the full report once it's out.

Summary

This report concludes that military operations against the FDLR have failed to dismantle the organization’s political and military structures on the ground in eastern DRC. The increasing rate of FDLR combatant defections and the FDLR temporary removal from many of its bases are only a partial success considering that the armed group has regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and continues to recruit new fighters. This report shows that the FDLR continues to benefit from residual but significant support from top commanders of the FARDC, particularly those officers in the 10^th military region (South Kivu), and has sealed strategic alliances with other armed groups in both North and South Kivu. External support networks, both regional and international, have been used by FDLR in the field to counteract the effects of Kimia II, for instance networks in Burundi and Tanzania. [...]

The Group investigated the FDLR’s ongoing exploitation of natural resources in the Kivus, notably gold and cassiterite reserves which the Group calculates continue to deliver millions of dollars in direct financing into FDLR coffers. This report illustrates how FDLR gold networks are intertwined tightly with trading networks operating within Uganda and Burundi as well as the UAE. The Group also documents that a number of minerals exporting houses, some of whom were named in the Group’s previous report in 2008, continue to trade with the FDLR. This report shows that end buyers for this cassiterite include the Malaysia Smelting Corporation and the Thailand Smelting and Refining Company, held by Amalgamated Metals Corporation, a UK entity.

The report analyzes the integration of non-state armed groups into the FARDC through the rapid integration in January 2009; as well as prior and during the FARDC/RDF joint operation Umoja Wetu and Kimia II. In this context, the CNDP officer class, in particular General Bosco Ntaganda, has continued to retain heavy weapons acquired during its period of rebellion in spite of its official integration into the FARDC and still controls revenue generating activities and parallel local administrations. The Group also presents documentary evidence showing that Gen Ntaganda continues to act as Kimia II deputy operational commander.

CNDP military officers deployed as part of FARDC Kimia II operations have profited from their deployment in mineral rich areas, notably at the Bisie mine in Walikale, North Kivu, and in the territory of Kalehe, in South Kivu. In both these areas, the FARDC commanding officers on the ground are ex-CNDP officers. The Group includes evidence in the report showing direct involvement of CNDP military officials in the supply of minerals to a number of exporting houses in North and South Kivu, some of which also supply the same international companies mentioned above. [...]