Gaps

Farmers - Food Eaters

Bankers-Investors

Doctors-Patients

Energy Industry-Energy Consumers

Congressmen-Constituents

Retailers-Consumers

Diplomats-Citizens

Hollywood-Movie Goers

The fact of the matter is that many professionals, trade organizations, low-density occupations, etc. are all fairly removed -- geographically, intellectually, or mentally -- from the people they support. I don't understand the nuances of agricultural policies even though they probably affect me in many ways. I don't understand all of the regulations and decisions that bankers make that affect our entire economy. I don't live next door to diplomats, I don't know what they do every day, and they make decisions for our nation. Congressmen aren't usually like the rest of us and we don't have much contact with them either in spite of the major decisions they make for us every day. Frankly, I haven't heard a lot of complaints about this. There are divides between "the people" and nearly every group that ensures our society maintains itself and almost all of us are okay with this. We don't have the energy or time to really wade into the details of these policies to force ourselves and our ideas into these groups.

Which is why I often scoff at the Chicken Littles of the civil-military divide. To describe the gap between the military and the rest of the country as a crisis is just plain silly. No valid arguments have been put forward that show that this gap is worsening or has any worse effects than any of the gaps I listed above. To include the last one in many cases. Thoughts to the contrary, particularly of this form (which I won't waste any time dissecting because it really is that terrible), are exercises in egotistical scare-mongering.  So next time someone warns about our civ-mil crisis, ask them where the food they ate today came from and what was in it. Ask them when was the last time they had the influence to reduce risk in financial markets. Ask them when they last wrote to their representative to get them to vote for what's right instead of the party line. Yes, the military is as world apart. But this country is full of figurative gated communities along with the real ones. Until we expect our citizens to become experts on essentially ever major category of public policy (something that is not only impossible, but also probably unwise), we should stop beating the drum that our category of public policy is what will undo the Nation and then use the those threats to substantiate the abridgment of our fellow citizens' freedoms.

The G.I. Bill and the veteran gap in CMR studies

A few weeks ago I wrote a post disdainful of a new reality show that I felt was taking advantage of America's current love affair with its veterans. That same week, friend-of-the-blog Andrew Exum wrote his weekly column at World Politics Review on the unhealthy and dysfunctional relationship  between the American people and its military. The crux of the problem, as Exum sees it, is that too many Americans engage in hero-worship with regard to its military instead of dispassionately examining the society's transactional responsibilities to an all-volunteer force. This is an important issue that should be addressed, but I think the answer should be different than the one Exum comes to.

Exum compares the war zone risks and compensation of soldiers to diplomats, aid workers, and civilian contractors (his conclusion is that all of these have the same risks, but the military enjoys much better compensation) before posing the following option on the nature of the military: is it a public service or is it a profession? The former would limit military compensation to that of similar public services such as police officers. The latter would limit compensation to a contractual situation more similar to the private sector, which by my interpretation means that benefits afforded the military but do not have a private sector equivalent are probably in excess of what the contract should entail. Obviously, the U.S. has come to a hybrid solution to this problem since the advent of the all-volunteer force. The question then is how to compensate the military under this solution. This is where I think there are some flaws in Exum's analysis of civil-military relations.

Fundamentally, military service is not like other public services in one significant way. Yes, other forms of public service entail risk to individuals' lives, limbs, and eyesight. However, the functional imperative of military service is to inflict violence upon our enemies and this is unique to the military (the functional utility of the military, i.e., SFA, HA/DR, etc, is not the same as its functional imperative). This is true of military service whether you're a cook or an infantryman - the latter may use force much more often but the cook is trained and expected to at times as well (in other words, I don't buy this load of nonsense on two societies within the military). Police forces may be authorized to use force in the execution of their functional imperative (maintain law and order), but it is not their primary or most desired tool. USAID workers are exposed to the same (or at least similar) risks and traumas as soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan, but society not only does not expect them to inflict risks and traumas upon others, society forbids them from doing so by law.  This is not an insignificant difference in service as anyone who has had his enemy in his weapon's sights can tell you. So how do we compensate for this?

Before we begin to answer that question, we need to examine two more aspects of military service and civil-military relations. The first is the issue of professionalism and the two societies that do indeed bifurcate the military: officers and enlisted. For this, Samuel Huntington, in "The Solider and the State", a work that Exum himself called the canonical text on civil-military relations (and he's right), uses the term "professional" in a sociological sense (not in the "I do this well for a paycheck" sense): a vocation that requires expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. In Huntington's construct officers are professionals and enlisted are not according to the definitions he provides (which are much more involved than standard dictionary definitions - please read this section of the book before berating me for being an officer snob). Enlisted personnel are more like skilled craftsmen. There is a lot of merit to this argument, particularly around UCMJ authorities and the different education systems for officers and NCOs (although NCOs have made a lot ground in the past couple of decades in this regard). This important distinction is manifest in combat duties: officers are responsible for the management of violence and enlisted personnel are responsible for the acts of violence. Of course officers often pull triggers and enlisted NCOs independently manage violence, but these acts are borne of necessity on the battlefield and not their inherent responsibilities within the organization. The point of this discussion is that while military service is different public service because of the responsibility to commit acts of violence, society only expects enlisted personnel to commit those acts of violence. This must be a factor in calculating compensation for this unique public service.

The final issue we need to examine here is civil-military relations as it relates to veterans. Frankly, there is no "The Veteran and the State" (although I'd love to take a stab at it - hint, hint publishers...) to guide how society interacts with its veterans because of their previous military service. "The Solider and the State" deals almost exclusively with the interactions of the civilian government (and in a couple of places civilian society) and the military's officer corps. It was also written before our modern, all-volunteer force. Yet as it remains the capstone doctrine of civil-military relations, Huntington is our only guide.  We must infer civil-veteran relations based on our understanding of the nature of military service and how the military interacts with society. But that extrapolation can be difficult.

We have already established that the functional imperative of military forces is to exact violence on the country's behalf. We have an understanding of how civilian control, military expertise, and transactions between the two parties work in order to optimize military effectiveness for society. But we have no idea who owes what once these skilled craftsmen of violence are no longer in the military. Their very unique individual functional imperative for society no longer exists for them individually and their skills can translate very poorly to civilian society. Should society not be responsible for helping these men and women to essentially reprogram their functional imperative into an function that aids society in new ways? To reintroduce them into society where risks may exist, but the need to commit violent acts is not? Yes, they volunteered for this unique service, but military personnel cannot stay in service indefinitely (up or out!) or even until a natural retirement age in their 60s. Society does owe these men and women something to retrain them to again be useful to society.

The G.I. Bill is the most obvious example of reintroduction benefits for veterans.  Alex Horton of the Department of Veterans affairs wrote an excellent article this week in The Atlantic about the challenges of going to college after being in an Army at war. Horton focuses his article on the differences between war veterans and the "traditional" students who comprise the majority of the university body. But when I read his piece I was struck by how similar these two seemingly disparate groups are. They are starting from different points in life with different challenges, but they are all forging their minds and identities in ways that will define (in part) who they are and what they will do with the rest of their lives. In other words, how they will be useful to society for the remainder of their professional, productive lives. College is a moderately safe environment to acclimate to American society, for both 18 year-old kids and 32 year-old combat veterans. After what we've asked these service men and women to do - to commit acts of violence on our behalf - providing the opportunity to reintegrate into society in this way is a small price to pay to erase their previous utility (which obviously has no place in civilian society - and we should note that erasing utility is not the same as not recognizing their previous service) and create new utility, even if these types of benefits should not be unlimited. I'd rather it happen on the taxpayer's dime in a university setting than on the streets of some city.

And yet the G.I. Bill is a benefit that Exum seems to think should not be given to military veterans because no other public servants have the same benefit. As discussed, different service merits different benefits. Should the G.I. Bill be more limited than it is now? Probably, but not based on whether the veteran is a general's kid or not. Instead it should be freely given to our enlisted veterans - those whose purpose to society was violence - in order to reintegrate them into society. Former officers probably do not need it as their societal function was not committing acts of violence. They also probably do not need the G.I. Bill because they all already have a bachelor's degree, have more tangible civilian skills, and are at a social level that often negates the need for this type of societal reintegration.  The distinction is a bit academic of course, but we have little else from which to base our sense of fairness when determining the terms of compensation transactions.

With looming austerity all military benefits and compensation should be under scrutiny. Some benefits may decrease for future service members and veterans, remembering that our society has a contract with current members and veterans. When the public and our government examine these benefits in this understudied area of civil-military relations, they need to remember that military service is an unique form of public service that has no place in society after soldiers and Marines depart military service. They need to remember that the transactional costs and benefits are not just about fairness to the veteran, but the effects on society as a whole. Alex Horton and those he discusses in his article will most likely benefit personally from a G.I. Bill-funded degree. But society also benefits from paying for that degree because Alex Horton and his cohorts will probably be better integrated into society because of it. This is not about hero worship or praetorian guards. Veterans benefits are about taking care of individuals who fulfill a unique role in society and ensuring that they are able to provide new, useful roles to society.

Ohio and military votes: towards a warrior caste and unbalanced civil-military relations

The Ohio military voting issue that surfaced within the past week has raised some ugly politics and views. While reticent to wade into what is primarily a domestic political concern, this confrontation is pouring light into the dark corners of civil-military relations that we'll discuss shortly. But first a synopsis of the facts as they occurred.

Election Day in Ohio in 2004 was a disaster in that the state was obviously unprepared for the number of voters who came to vote. Some voting lasted until the early hours of the next morning and provisional ballots were improperly used, causing a significant number of them to be discounted. As a response (in part as well as for other reasons it seems), the State of Ohio opened up an early voting period for any voters in the days prior to Election Day in order to ease the burden on the big day and the potential for screw-ups (i.e., discounting valid votes). This option was used extensively since, particularly in the final three days before Election Day. However, this past year the Ohio House of Representatives passed a law that maintained early in-person voting rights in the final 3 days before Election Day only for Ohioans subject to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) - most of whom are military members and their families. This bill removed the right of all other Ohioans to vote early in person in the final 3 days running up to Election Day, cutting their early voting off on the Friday prior. To sum, every Ohioan had been able to vote early in person in the three days before Election Day until this year when the Ohio legislature changed the law so that only  military personnel and their families could do this. The Obama campaign, and others, have sued the State of Ohio to reinstate early in-person voting for all of Ohio, not just those subject to UOCAVA. Please read this, this, and this for more perspective (thanks to Hayes Brown - @HayesBrown - for providing the Slate link to get this started for me).

The response from Mr. Obama's political opponents can be most kindly described as misrepresenting the Obama campaign's lawsuit. The Romney campaign has billed it as an attempt to suppress military votes - suggesting that the lawsuit was attempting to remove military members' ability to vote early instead of reinstating all Ohioans' ability to vote early. The Romney campaign is supported on this position by a number of influential military-affiliated organizations, including the Association of the U.S. Army. Their argument is petty politics and they're using smoke and mirrors to attack the Obama campaign. Fine. There is a lot of political football in this, but that does negate the fact that the Obama campaign is in no way suing to prevent extra time for military personnel from Ohio to vote. It also has absolutely nothing to do with mail-in absentee ballots from overseas. This is the bottom line and these facts are not (should not be, rather) in contention.

At this point you're probably asking yourself why I'm going on about this on a relatively apolitical security blog. If you move beyond the pandering, obfuscation, and outright lying that passes for political discourse, this issue has given the darkest and most extreme voices of CMR a drum to beat upon. Congressman Allen West issued a statement in which he doesn't propagate the Romney campaign lie of disenfranchising military, but instead avers that what the President is trying to do is offensive:

how dare this President compare the service, sacrifice, and commitment of those who Guard our liberties not as special and seek to compare them to everyone else.

Poor use of the English language aside, a sitting member of the U.S. House of Representatives is saying the law in Ohio should stand as it is because those that serve our nation in arms are better than everyone else and should be given an edge. You can't even compare those in uniform to the rest of society. It seems that Mr. West believes service members deserve more rights, more democracy than those who do not serve. Don't think this is a prevalent viewpoint among many Americans, especially those who have or are serving? Right-leaning blog This Ain't Hell covered the Ohio voting issue along the same lines. This poem, ubiquitous among military/veteran Facebook pages and crappy PX art expos, explicitly states how much more important veterans are than other members of society. Or the old quote, too often mis-attributed to George Orwell:

People sleep peacefully in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.

Thank God for those rough men or the rest of you weenies would have a rough go of it. All of those policemen, firemen, engineers, architects, sewage maintenance types, water purifiers and others who contribute to our way of life should, in contrast, apparently keep me up all night. Still think I'm reading too much into this? The Stolen Valor Act was an attempt to criminalize a narrow band of lying to prevent people from pretending to be a decorated service member or veteran and that such lies somehow diminish the acts of valor that really occurred. Read commentary on the Supreme Court's decision to overturn the Act and tell me it doesn't reek of men and women offended that others deign to pretend they are in this elite and protected element of society (and then read the comments sections of those and similar posts). I ask: why was lying about having advanced degrees or sleeping with members of the opposite sex or about your personal wealth not also outlawed? The only conclusion I can come up with is that they aren't special like the military and therefore not worthy of special protection.

There are a number of reasons why the public treats current and former military members and family as special, including their very real sacrifices over the past 10 years of war and Vietnam guilt. Some of that is warranted. But this pernicious belief that these self-selecting members of society are better, beyond comparison to rest of the country, and thus deserving of greater helpings of democracy than the rest is anti-democratic and antithetical to any reasonable theories of civil-military relations necessary to keep our society safe. There is a reason they are called service members - their volunteering to serve our society does not grant them more rights and privileges. Some remediation is necessary to repair inequities created by their service (such as veterans' healthcare and jobs programs), but their rights as citizens are not impaired.  Embracing acts that go beyond correcting inequalities and that instead promote the creation of a special caste of citizens with more rights is exactly the kind of attitude that could help foment a warrior caste that would in actuality upend the balance of civil-military relations. Huntington weeps and our country hurts for it.

CMR: balance maintained by the divide

CMR is a multifaceted topic with issues at many levels, the major branches of which regard the military’s relationship with the civil population of the state, the military’s function within the state, and the military’s relationship with the civilian government of the state who in turn strives to manage the first two facets in accordance with the values and needs of the state. Often these facets are conflated in debate which in incorrect. Each has issues and solutions that interrelate in various ways but should be considered in turn. As such, I intend here to take a cursory look at the first – the military’s relationship with the civil population. I think we can generalize the second – that the military’s function is to leverage its capabilities to meet state objectives throughout the world – for our purposes here. This is a topic deserving of more depth later as the U.S. military struggles to find its place in the world for the coming decades. The third I’ll discuss at a later date.

CMR Basics

Huntington describes the CMR as the friction between the military’s function and society’s norms:

The military institutions of any society are shaped by two competing forces: a functional imperative stemming from threats to a state’s security and a societal imperative arising from social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations.

He establishes this interaction as the conflict of conservative Military Realism with society’s American Liberalism.  Military Realism encompasses a worldview of “permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature” and “stresses the supremacy of society over the individual and the importance of order, hierarchy, and division of function.”  American Liberalism is opposed to this Realism and is defined by five tenets (taken from both Huntington and Michael Desch’s chapter in American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era):

1. indifference to international affairs,
2. application of domestic solutions to international affairs,
3. objectivity in international affairs,
4. ambivalence about war, and
5. distrust of military institutions.

These were not meant to describe the differences between political parties (the only difference between the parties may only apply to the fifth tenet). Liberal versus conservative instead denotes the fundamental differences between the American society as a whole (and the philosophical foundations of the American government) and the institutional worldview of the military mind required to effectively wage wars. This is not unlike other dichotomies proposed by others such as George Lakoff, de Tocqueville, or Herbert Spencer. The “interaction of these two forces” is in reality the clash ideals of individuality and democracy against the ideals regimented and hierarchical life.  Huntington asks the million-dollar question (on page 346 of the Belknap/Harvard edition printed in 2003): “how can a liberal society provide for its military security when this requires the maintenance of professional military forces and institutions fundamentally at odds with liberalism?”

Most of Huntington’s work centers on how the government of the state balances its security with its philosophy. Writing in the mid-1950s, he provides three options to the question above:

1. Cut military forces to the bone, isolating military institutions from society, and reducing military influence to negligible proportions. This maintains the purity of an American Liberal society at the expense of national security.
2. Accept increased military authority and influence but to insist that military leaders abandon their professional outlook and that military institutions be reformed along liberal lines.  This is good for society at the expense of military effectiveness.
3. Society adopted a more sympathetic understanding and appreciation of the military viewpoint and military needs.  This is good for the military but drives society to abandon its liberal heart. 

Interestingly, over 50 years after this was written and following both the transformation to an all-volunteer force and over 10 years of war, America has essentially taken the path of all three options in part. A purely professional force is by nature small. It is a force isolated to garrisons located throughout the country in places where (generally) not a lot of civilians live. Military influence in both political life and international affairs has increased. Society has adopted a more sympathetic appreciation of the military need. And yet military influence has not been reduced to negligible proportions, military institutions and philosophy has not liberalized, and society has not adopted a more sympathetic understanding of the military viewpoint.   

The result of this amalgam solution is a highly professional and effective military that enjoys nearly extensive (if not unlimited) support of that all important element of the Trinity: the people. The military keeps its Realism and society keeps its Liberalism. The political power of military elites is certainly concerning and is no doubt at least partially a result of the support the military enjoys from the population in contraposition to the popularity of civilian government institutions. I think it is important to make the distinction that military elites have not sought out (as a rule) the power and influence they exercise but instead have filled a role they have been asked to fill. (Would retired generals publically support candidates if the political parties did not seek their support for the benefit of the candidate? I do not think so for the most part.) I firmly believe that if military elites are not asked to fill those roles in the future that they will gladly abdicate them to civilians.

What This Means Today

In summation, we are in a situation there is a general balance of the military’s function with society’s norms. In my mind any imbalance is correctable and within an acceptable order of magnitude.  In spite of this and with regard to the people’s relationship with the military, a number of pundits and officials have declared at civil-military challenge or even a crisis, centered upon society’s lack of understanding of the military and their non-participation in military affairs. For example, Admiral Mullen stated in September last year that the “eroding” connection between the military and the people is a “very bad outcome for America […] an outcome that this democracy could not [stand] to have its military essentially detached from its people.”  While not calling for a draft yet, Mullen suggests it may be required in the future to bridge this population-military divide. Similarly, in the past two weeks both Tom Ricks and Stanley McChrystal have made calls for a return to compulsory service and a draft, respectively. Without delving into the particulars and bureaucratic issues of Ricks’ proposal (another topic altogether), both men have argued that compulsory service or a draft would ensure all (or at least more) Americans have “skin in the game” when making decision of war and peace.

However, and it’s a big however, none of these three have explained the consequences of current system to society or the military. What is the effect on society and the military if there is a detachment between the two? What is the result of only having only 1% of the population with “skin in the game”? Most superficially it seems the answer is unfairness.  It is not fair that only a few are waging war for 10 years. It is not fair that, in spite of extensive support, civilians do not understand what the military goes through. But I ask again: what is the consequence of this unfairness?  How does fairness result in a more effective military? How does this perception of fairness interact with American Liberal mores upon which our society is built?

A draft, or compulsory service, may bridge this divide between the military and the people, but that divide may be natural and necessary.  Intermingling these two elements of American society more than they currently do could potentially result in fundamental changes to either element by which they would not benefit. American Liberal philosophy is one of the things that make America great in other endeavors (principally with regard to social and economic constructs). Adding conservative Military Realism has the potential to adversely affect the acceptance of this societal philosophy. A wider-ranging exposure and subsequent understanding of military culture could potentially increase the influence and power of military elites beyond current levels, creating a new (and real) crisis of CMR (See, WWII – which is also an example of the military ceding its influence when it wasn’t need anymore). Conversely, the forced infusion of Liberalism into Military Realism could potentially erode military effectiveness due to the extent that military effectiveness is dependent upon its conservatism (See: draft, Vietnam War).  It is possible that the two conflicting forces could reach equilibrium, but equilibrium in CMR is rarely realized historically and there is no reason to assume that it would in this case, especially considering the potential risks to society and the military.

Leaving aside such issues as what the draftees would do, how their services are paid for, the creating of large bureaucracies to manage the process, a draft or similar course of action threatens civil-military relations more than any existing divides between the people and the military. It would be great if the people understood the military or felt some of the pain the military has felt during the past decade (it would only be fair were it so…). Not only is this understanding or fairness not necessary, it has a greater potential to upend the relative CMR balance we currently enjoy instead of fixing a different “crisis” altogether. The divide that does exist serves a purpose: it maintains the integrity of society and the effectiveness of the military. Simply put, we can have a divide or we can have an imbalance.  I choose a divide because I can get over the “unfairness” of it. Society or the military may take a long time to recover from an imbalance created for ill-advised or unsubstantiated reasons.

Lesson number one on how to operate in the executive branch of a constitutional republic

If you're the Defense Department, don't tell your congressional paymasters that certain funding levels would be "completely unacceptable." (Or "clearly unacceptable," for that matter.)

We're all familiar with the Constitution, right? Article I, Section 8, in particular?

There's actually a Constitutionally-provided means for the executive branch to register its opinion that certain legislative initiatives are "completely unacceptable": it's called the presidential veto. Here's a not-exhaustive list of people who are not statutorily guaranteed veto power: the Secretary of Defense; "senior defense officials"; you (except you, Mr. President).

Is it any wonder that a world such as this, where appointed officials of the executive branch dictate to the elected representatives of the people what is and is not "acceptable," produces generals who believe Congress requires re-education in the national interest?

Is it any wonder that appropriate civil-military relations in this country, not to mention the clear distinction between the legitimate roles and missions of the various departments and agencies of the government, are so constantly and consistently eroded as to scarcely merit comment in some circles?

Is it any wonder that the unitary executive sees fit to wage war (under the guise of "kinetic military action") in Libya without legislative sanction, and in the face of popular opposition?

Is it any wonder that we're increasingly comfortable with the Jominian subversion of our domestic politics to the imperatives of forever war?

No, I think what's unacceptable is the Defense Department telling the Congress that there's a certain funding level at which it refuses to prioritize and make choices... that is, it refuses to do its job.

"The Pentagon cannot presume to exempt itself from the scrutiny and pressure faced by the rest of our government" on the matter of budgets. That's your predecessor talking, Mr. Panetta. That's a man who knew a little bit about what was and wasn't acceptable.

You're Welcome America

Making the rounds yesterday was this op-ed from West Point professor Elizabeth Samet in Bloomberg on the habit of civilians to say "thank you" to men and women in uniform. Samet attributes this to a number of possible reasons: they don't know what else to say, it's from guilt over how lousy Vietnam vets were treated, absolution from collective responsibility, and maybe something else I wasn't getting. My old friend, Captain Hyphen, adds some more thoughts and anecdotes to this very common occurrence that is definitely worth the read.

This happened to me a lot in uniform and still does now that I'm out and it comes up in conversation that I spent not a little amount of time in Iraq. Yes, it's somewhat awkward. No, I certainly don't expect to be thanked for my service. But the people who say it, whatever their reason for doing so, usually just don't understand what you've went through and just want to express that they care. It doesn't really matter why they do it. I have one piece of advice for those of you who deal with this: get over the awkwardness and simply say "You're welcome." It's the usually the proper and polite response when someone says thank you. If you don't feel comfortable saying that, then just say "thank you" back to them - as in "thank you for showing you care." Merely pick one and run with it. Everyone who says "thank you" to a veteran has their own reason for saying it and you're not going to figure that out in the space of a few seconds, so it just doesn't much matter, does it? Just don't be rude and stare back at them. Now we can all stop being awkward when this happens, because it's not going to stop any time soon.

The U.S. is not the new Prussia

Yesterday, the Small Wars Journal carried a post by Franz-Stefan Gady on the militarism of the United States, comparing this phenomenon to Prussian militarization. While not addressing every point in this piece, I do want to hone in on a couple of issues the author raised about the interaction of a nation with its military.

Politicians and the Military

To any observer it is fairly easy to see that the U.S. military has inequitable clout in U.S. foreign policy, the most recent review of our policy in Afghanistan being the shining light example. There is an imbalance that needs to be righted. What Gady doesn't discuss is a likely causation for this or how to fix it (save his comments later in the piece on the Defense budget, which I'll get to). Politicians defer to general and flag officers on matters of war too frequently, but the big question is why? I can't say for sure, but I've postulated before that the civilian leadership has abdicated there roll of military supervision because they don't really know what they're doing. Waging war, especially limited war, has become so complex that it requires special expertise often not found in career politicians. So they look for that expertise in those that have been conducting and training for war most of their lives (to include their former military, civilian advisors). As part of my grand strategy series, I pointed out the nature of U.S. military officership, which puts a high premium on initiative, nearly demands that officers fill in decision-making void created by civilian politicians. I don't see how this is done any differently with any highly specialized function of government. I'm not supporting this as something that should happen, just observing it.

One of the interesting aspects of the recent turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa is a reversal of militarization. Many politicians have been calling for military intervention, particularly in Libya, and it has been the military pouring cold water on great ideas. How does this phenomenon fit into our understanding of civil-military relations at the national government level? I'm not sure yet, but I think it speaks volumes against Gady's argument. It seems that in most cases civilian politicians will defer to defense officials on defense matters as a matter of course (let's face it, the Ike Skeltons of the world are few and far between). Because they are the experts, whether you like it or not. I believe that these uniformed experts do provide their advice, which more often than not lately have become policy, based on their understand of the nation's objectives and (almost always) not on how they see these decisions would affect their own prestige or sense of militarism. In sum, I don't see this as militarization as much as highly specialized functions of government wherein the politicians defer to those that have more expertise than they. Politicians shouldn't do this, but policy details don't win elections, popular stances do. Which brings us to the next topic...

The People and the Military

I'm not sure what Gady's point is about strangers buying drinks for servicemembers in uniform and that this wouldn't happen in Europe. Strangers buy drinks for servicemembers because in this age of limited war waged by a small all-volunteer military, it's about the only thing they can do to recognize the many sacrifices made by these men and women and their families. I have been fortunate to have been on the receiving end of this symbolic gesture and it was almost always accompanied by thanks for my service and/or sacrifice. I don't see this as militarization of the U.S., but instead as a sense of doing something for someone who does give a lot (not necessarily directly for the drink buyer) and is quite foreign to most of the population. I think a good question to ask is why doesn't this happen more in Europe? As much as the U.S. population's love for the military has been a knee-jerk reaction to Vietnam, Europe's apathy or disdain for its militaries are still reactionary from World War II (generally speaking - it obviously differs country to country but in the stated case of Germany...).

This sense of distant gratitude does not explain the recurring election or campaigning for office of former generals and admirals. Why do the American people put so much stock in military service when considering political candidates? I'd like to say that for a lot of the electorate it is the belief that officers have spent their lives in service to their nation and not themselves, they are proven leaders under difficult circumstances, they are proven executives, that they are honorable and truthful people, etc. I think we all know that's not the case for every retired officer who runs for office. There's also the idea that experience equals expertise and that an expert in defense issues would better protect the nation, also an erroneous idea. I think it's more of the former ideals of military service that people think so highly of former servicemembers when considering them for elected office. Maybe this is a sign of militarism in the United States and I for one would like to see more study on this topic.

The Defense Budget

Gady states that "[r]educing the defense budget would not threaten the security of the United States or lead to a decline in its international standing." His not being a paper on defense economics, that is quite a statement to make. In my opinion, should DoD make cuts? Yes, to improve efficiencies lost of the past forever years. But Gady seems to suggest that this should be done to decrease the militarism of the United States. I haven't read the Adams and Leatherman article referenced (I stopped my subscription to Foreign Affairs last year), but generically stating that we can maintain our security and international status is dubious at best. Even by taking the bloat out of the Pentagon's budget and stop paying the $100B or so for Iraq and Afghanistan, it still costs a lot of money to maintain and equip the world's most advanced military (in most regards at least) and to procure equipment needed for the future. Oh, and good luck telling Congress to make a ton of cuts. The recent budget battle has just reinforced the idea that Congress uses the DoD as a jobs program in manufacturing jobs, which has nothing to do with militarization.

Civil-military relations have been a hot topic lately and will continue to be one for the foreseeable future. I haven't covered nearly everything in Mr. Gady's paper here and do not intend to in the future. Suffice it to say that I think there is a tilting towards militarism in the United States in some of the ways that Gady suggests. I do not think many of the things he discusses are militarism, but instead are practical (if not necessarily correct) reactions to environmental stimuli as outlined here. While I've been thinking about it, I cannot begin to suggest how to correct for either actual militarism or reactions that resemble militarism. I do believe that Gady is way off on suggesting that the United States is the new Prussia. We may be on a path to such a state of affairs, but if we are we've only just begun and have time to turn back. Being stuck in two very long wars that will likely result in our achieving few objectives will most likely help us not to continue down such a path.

Inflated threat assessments and pro-military policy outcomes

This is from the introduction to Steven Blank's new U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute monograph "Civil-Military Relations in Medvedev's Russia":

This situation of inflated threat assessments leading to pro-military policy outcomes, even if they are only partially what the armed forces want, is a direct result of the enduring failure to establish democratic controls over the armed forces and the 18-year hiatus in defense reform since Mikhail Gorbachev's presidency in 1991.

So what's our excuse?

The Civil-Military Divide: Interesting but not Dangerous (UPDATED)

There has been a growing chorus that the divide between the U.S. military and the American people is widening and this is bad for our nation. Yesterday, Admiral Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added his voice to this cause as the keynote speaker for the National Defense University's Conference on Military Professionalism. The transcript is somewhat hard to follow - being quite literal - and it seems his remarks were driven by bullet points, not a script. But there is no mistaking his main point: there is a divide between the people their military, that divide is growing, and that is a bad and dangerous situation.

I would agree with the Chairman that there is a divide of sorts between the people and the military. The population of our all-volunteer force is a relatively tiny percentage of the nation's populations, a case made by ADM Mullen. This is exacerbated by the military's recent and intensive experience in combat in South and Southwest Asia. So yes, less than 1% of the population is bearing the brunt of these wars, often with extreme physical and mental damage to the participants. But the reality is that we couldn't afford to send more troops to these war zones, so what does it matter that only 1% experience them? This is the type of statistic where I nod my head and say, "Noted. So what?" There doesn't seem to be much of a solution there to rope in the rest of the populous into the effort, save a draft (which you know I'm against) and increasing taxes (a solution that rests with the Congress and is a hot political topic).

Is the divide growing? That is debatable, because it unmeasurable. Military posts are usually somewhat secluded from main populations centers (other than all the places in and around DC) - mainly because the land was cheap to purchase and not for security reasons. You can't physically move the military further from the population and in fact with overseas base closures, more will be brought back to the U.S. If the divide is measured by the percentage of the population in the military, in the course of force resizing, then the divide would grow. On the other hand, we'll begin to withdrawal from wars that have been the primary fissure between those under arms and those not, so that may stem any growth in the divide. I don't think that a growing divide has been or can be proven.

Which gets to my main point. If there is a divide and it is growing (or not), what makes that so dangerous to either the military or the nation? There are plenty of discrete populations of Americans who are essential to the maintenance of the nation who by the same standards of ADM Mullen would be considered divided from the nation they support. The first that come to mind are police (roughly the same percentage of the population as the uniformed services and charged with maintaining the law and order of a 300 million-person country) and the Congress. With a small share of the population and important and unique functions (often dangerous for the latter and apparently also for the former), why is no one talking about the divide with the police and Congress and how dangerous that is?

To me, there is a divide. It exists and it may or may not be growing. But I do not believe that it is dangerous for our nation or its survival. The military will always maintain its appropriate subordination to the government which is formed by the people. I do not see, nor have seen legitimate arguments, how a small professional military that does its job separate from the public at large will upset that arrangement. What other dangers could there be? I, for one, cannot identify any others. The military has always borne the brunt of wars - it is their job after all - and I've yet to see how that is dangerous for our society. It seems to me that it is as it should be.

UPDATE: While I've been thinking that isn't much recourse or point to connect the general population with military more than there already is, I left out the most important part of the discussion: the Guard and Reserves. True civil soldiers (and Marines/Airmen/Sailors/etc). And they're in just about every community in the country. For those of you that suggest that people need to be in touch with their military in order to be better informed on the conflicts in which the U.S. engages (the utility of which I do question for the most part), I come back to a comment I made yesterday. If you don't want to deploy the Guard and Reserve to a conflict, you shouldn't be in that conflict. To my mind, that's where the connection is: in the Guard, Reserve, and their communities - and I don't see how or much need to expand beyond that.

This is my current line of thinking. I need we to have a serious debate about this beyond the normal vacuous statements usually made and really think about what the problem really is (or if there is one), what can be done about it, what the aims of those actions would be, and if the costs are worth it. Otherwise, to be perfectly frank, I'm just hearing platitudes.

Dumbest idea of the day and why we should never, ever change our CO policy

I know I don't usually post twice in one day (or often in one week), but this article really fired me up. According to it, the Truth Commission on Conscience in War is lobbying to expand the government's definition of conscientious objection (CO) from objection to "war in any form" to allow service members to decline to deploy to wars they feel are immoral. By doing so, they feel that it "would allow for greater religious freedom in the military and improve morale among the troops."

Undoubtedly it would. But it's still so very wrong on two levels. At the lower level, how would the government be able to adjudicate a real, moral opposition to a particular conflict from a soldier that just doesn't want to go. The standards to obtain CO are high under the current definition and they should be. I realize I'm quite hawkish on this issue, but if you get through bayonet training during basic training (during which the answer to "What makes the grass grow?" is "Blood! Blood! Blood!") and you don't realize that maybe killing isn't your thing, I have a hard time believing that the time to realize it is when your unit is getting on a plane to go to war. Granted, it happens, but rarely and it's very hard to prove. Allowing soldiers to opt out of wars they don't like, but stay in the military or deploy to wars they do is so counter to the idea of good order and discipline that words could barely describe it. Soldiers don't get to vote on the wars they want to fight in or not. That is not how an all volunteer force works nor should it be the way that a non-volunteer force should work.

The second level is at a more strategic level. It's preposterous, but what if this definition existed in 2003 and every soldier in the Army decided that they were morally opposed to the Iraq War and refused to deploy. Readers know I don't feel that the rationale for war was made, but I also don't like the idea that the uniformed military could possibly decide which wars it should fight and which it shouldn't. That is antithetical to our understanding of civil-military relations. What would happen if high-ranking officers started applying for CO status because they felt a particular war was wrong. How many lower ranking officers and soldiers would follow suit, if only out of some sense of fairness? Our military has a contract with its government and citizens which does not allow for political opposition to wars. This expanded definition would allow for just that to occur.

This proposal doesn't seem to have much traction anywhere and thank goodness for that. This organization makes some highly dubious assertions and claims. I'm not terribly sure why the NY Times highlighted the cause in the first place. This is a terrible, terrible idea that would adversely affect our military services and its interaction with the nation it serves.

Morality and Dissent: Redux

LtCol Milburn sure has caused quite a stir with that article of his. The latest commentary is from Bernard Finel who believes that I (and Dr. Kohn) use the "Nuremberg Defense" by ignoring peremptory norms, the "I just followed my orders" defense. I don't think that was the argument I made.

I'll draw Bernard's attention to the final paragraph of my post where I write that "once legal orders are issued a professional military officer has the obligation to execute those orders regardless of his or her personal moral views." I'll highlight the term "legal orders" - which in present day (or at least late 1990s, early 2000s) military officer education includes peremptory norms as a basis for legal orders. So, no, I don't see that I'm using the Nuremberg Defense that allows military officials to say they were just following orders.

As for the examples he uses from the Milburn article, I think Bernard is correct. The military should have questioned the disbanding of the Iraqi security apparatus in 2003, but the order given was quite legal, if ill-advised. They had an obligation to enforce it - something Milburn seems to disagree with. The military likewise should have dissented from upholding many of the detainee policies under the Bush Administration as they were quite illegal. General Hayden's defense (trusting the legal interpretation of the Administration) was unfounded and there should have been legal repercussions to him and other uniformed personnel who broke the law.

Essentially, I agree with Bernard and I don't think my previous post was argued as portrayed. I didn't mention peremptory norms specifically because my education placed it under the penumbra of legal basis for orders. We both agree that Milburn's "negative consequences" test would create a new CMR norm that would give the U.S. military unprecedented, and unhealthy to say the least, power to buck the civilian leadership in its own interests. Where Bernard and I still might diverge, as far as I can tell from his post, is the role morality plays as a basis for officer dissent as I can't tell if he thinks that morality does have a role beyond non-statutory, peremptory norms. I still firmly believe that dissent can only be based on the legality of the order. Granted, there is always some interpretation of legality and organizations are prone to expand their legal maneuver-space, but the United States has plenty of precedence from which to draw upon to help adjudicate such matters. The controversial orders given in the wake of 9-11 seem, for the most part, to fall neatly into categories of legal and illegal. Too bad those who executed those illegal orders didn't dissent at the time, as was their obligation.

On the Genealogy of Morals and Military Dissent

Since I've been on a bit of a CMR kick lately, I could hardly pass up this softball tossed by JFQ. A few others have commented thus far - specifically at Small Wars Journal and at Best Defense (I know, I'm not really keeping to my resolution. But Tom has had some interesting stuff as of late - credit given when due and all that.). But on to LtCol Milburn's morality-as-basis-of-dissent argument.

It's crap, pure and simple. Read the other links to get an in depth look at why. Morality is subjective to the holder of moral views. And there is no room in the uniformed military to impose one's personal views on the execution of his or her duties. The only true and accepted basis for not performing one's duties is the legality of the orders given to the officer. You know who uses those excerpts from the USMC War College survey to determine if they're going to do their job or not? The Pakistani military. And that works so well for that nation.

Could you imagine if the United States was suddenly confronted with imminent nuclear war (unlikely, sure), that the commander of STRATCOM came to the conclusion that nuclear war was immoral? Or a young battalion commander found homosexuality immoral, even though the repeal of DADT is coming? According to Milburn's topology, these officers are duty bound to disobey their orders in one way or another. That is unacceptable. If these officers disobey and duly relieved, or they resign, the legal orders given by the civilians who rightfully control the military will still be executed by someone else. After a delay due to the change in personnel. If these are life and death situations, that delay and subsequent disruption may make all the difference in the world.

(And as a side note, I find it odd that while Milburn disavows Huntington's standards of civ-mil relations, he takes Huntington's ideas of officership as a profession to such extremes.)

Officers do have a duty to voice dissent to their superiors, but once legal orders are issued a professional military officer has the obligation to execute those orders regardless of his or her personal moral views. That goes for jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Any change to these norms would represent a shattering of our CMR construct that is essential to maintain the Constitutional obligations of our military. I find LtCol Milburn's entire argument absurd and scary. Better to be read and promptly ignored.

A Number of Voids Need to be Filled. With a New CMR Paradigm.

In a post this morning, Dr. Finel extrapolates upon my post yesterday and his own from the day before. Keeping this post from from Adam Elkus in mind, I have to say that I agree with everything Bernard has written in his latest. Except for one thing.

I am not making the Yingling argument from "Failure in Generalship." I was just noting that I see the nature of military culture filling the void of strategic incoherence. Where I disagree, vehemently, with COL Yingling is that in no way, shape, or form should generals fill that strategic void with operational art. Observing that this is occurring is not the same as endorsing this reality.

I stated that our civilian leaders need to provide the military with strategic leadership and I stand by that: it is how civ-mil relations should be balanced in our system and we're witnessing the repercussions of their failure to provide that leadership. Operational art is no substitute for strategy or grand strategy. But as this conversation has progressed over the past day or so, I agree with Adam that civilian leaders are unlikely to provide that strategic guidance any time soon. So now what?

Honestly, I have no idea at this point. But I think this should cause us to pause and think about what civ-mil relations should look like in an era of strategic uncertainty. Military officers dictating policy because civilians can't or won't is not a durable solution (especially in the arena of public lobbying for war support). A new paradigm must be created and new lines of responsibilities need to drawn, because the current system does not support the strategic realities we're facing now and in the foreseeable future. I don't know that Bernard would agree with me here, but I still see it as incumbent upon the civilian leaders to create the new rules or military culture will continue to expand and fill the strategic void. Where Bernard and I likely agree is that we can't continue to allow that expansion to happen.

Filling the Void and Re-balancing Civ-Mil Relations

Bernard Finel has a very good post on civil-military relations - a topic he's written very often on. His main points are concern over the politicization of generals driving policy, that blame doesn't really matter, that presidents can fire generals but doing so is tricky, and that presidents often use the uniforms to see wars. I have to say that I find Bernard's arguments compelling and on the mark.

Sure, generals are often over-political and too often drive policy and therefore there is an imbalance in what we should consider "normal" civ-mil relations. And he's right that everyone is to blame: the generals should know better and the politicians should have tighter reins. But I think he's leaving one point out: the nature of military leadership. U.S. military doctrine demands that leaders act based on their best interpretation of their commander's intent. If that intent is nebulous enough, subordinate leaders have wide flexibility of action. And that's where we've come to in Afghanistan.

Our Afghan strategy, if you could call it such, is horribly vague to the point of uselessness, which I see has a failure in leadership at the highest levels here in DC. Any general, with 30-plus years of leadership experience, will naturally fill that void with how he best interprets his commander's intent. In this case it seems to simply means: win in Afghanistan. So I think that is what Generals McChrystal and Petraeus were and are attempting to do. I don't see this as a power grab by the generals and I don't necessarily see the President as trying to use them to sell the war. Nor do I see it as a crisis - yet. But the civilians aren't providing the leadership they should and the generals are filling that void as their nature dictates they should. The only solution to this particular imbalance, in my mind, is not to fire generals, but instead create a viable strategy and policy and provide the generals the leadership they need and deserve.

UPDATE: Adam Elkus, via Twitter (@Simlaughter): "To some degree I think the scope of contemporary doctrine often reflects this strategic uncertainty" - This is quite likely. And if he's right, I think the probability of a civ-mil disaster is looming.

When did that happen?

I don't typically get a lot of satisfaction out of Robert Haddick's "This Week at War" columns at Foreign Policy. It may be that I spend enough time at SWJ that most of what Haddick covers amounts to a recap, or it may be a product of the lowest-common-denominator sort of writing that FP seems to encourage. Recognizing that "This Week at War" is expressly designed to deliver a dumbed-down summary of SWJ's original content to a more general audience -- as evidenced by the ludicrous subhead "What the four-stars are reading" -- I suppose I ought not fault either Haddick or the site for that.

But there are a couple of recurring themes that jump out at me and rub me the wrong way a bit, like the sort of low-grade, snide China hawkery or the off-putting suggestion that Haddick's got an exclusive handle on what constitutes "correct" civil-military relations. It's on this latter subject that this week's edition focuses.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced civil-military relations in the United States to grow up and leave behind a naive adolescence that prevailed at the start of the last decade. Before the wars began, the "normal" theory of civil-military relations, described in Eliot Cohen's book Supreme Command) still ruled. Under the "normal" theory, civilian leadership determines war policy and then leaves the generals and admirals alone to run the war. Thankfully those days are gone; hardly a month passes without the secretary of defense or some other senior figure heading out to the field, questioning not just generals, but also colonels and sergeants about their tactics. Likewise, soldiers now deeply immerse themselves in questions about the connections between policy objectives and military strategy, the evidence for which can be found every day at websites such as Small Wars Journal. By dropping the normal theory and letting policymakers and military officers into each other's "lanes," the result has been a generally smarter use of military power.

Really? When did that happen? I'm shocked by this assertion. What evidence do we have of any "smarter use of military power" over recent months or years? It's hard to believe that Haddick could be talking about the process through which President McChry... er, Obama arrived at his Afghanistan escalation plan. (Bernard Finel wrote extensively on this subject late last year. I don't want to suggest that I agree completely with Bernard on this subject, because I don't, but only to present the alternative case to what Haddick suggests is "mature" and "smart.")

Where else has the use of military power been "generally smarter"? Is it the fact that the Obama administration has wholeheartedly accepted the dictums of the COIN crowd in Afghanistan? Or the refusal to get directly involved in Yemen and Somalia? Or decisions about the withdrawal timeline in Iraq, which have been pretty well settled for a while now?

What evidence is there, really, to suggest as Haddick does that "U.S. civil-military relations are more mature" now than ten years ago?

For me, an advancement in U.S. civil-military relations would constitute the following: (1) politicians learning how and when the capabilities possessed by the military can be used to effect certain desired end-states, and taking the proper decisions with regard to funding and organization to facilitate the military bringing these capabilities to bear; and (2) military officers expressing an understanding for and appreciation of the ways that military action can effect these changes, that is to say, a better understanding of the linkage between the operational and the strategic, between design and result. I don't know how you measure these sorts of changes, but then, I don't know exactly on what basis Haddick asserts that positive change has already taken place.

Haddick cites Mackubin Owens in calling for a closer integration between policy and strategy, which all sounds good to me. Maybe we all agree and I'm just too dense to figure it out.

The Eikenberry cables

Apparently an unnamed official has decided that Ambassador "Eikenberry's detailed assessments be made public, given that they were among the most important documents produced during the debate that led to the troop buildup." Given that the debate within the administration is over for the time being, the President has decided on a policy, and the policy is being implemented - oh, and that the cables are, ya know, classified - this strikes me as a really bad idea at this juncture.

Really, other than undermining any residual trust among senior officials (especially between civilians and military) and pissing off the Commander in Chief, what exactly is this going to accomplish?

Given the, ahem, vigor of his disagreement with McChystal last November, I was dubious that Eikenberry was a real contender for the soon-to-be-created top NATO civilian in Afghanistan. This would seem to make it all the more unlikely, and maybe that was the real point of the leak.

I've yet to read the cables themselves carefully, but the NYT's summary of the arguments makes them sound pretty weak: dangers of Afghan over-dependency (reminiscent of Iraq under Casey, and someone forgot to tell the Brits in SL); and I believe Lil could write a short dissertation in response to Eikenberry's concerns about the ANSF on why the conventional wisdom about attrition rates in ANA don't capture the whole story...that said I'm going to reserve judgment until I've read the originals in full.

Larry Korb: YOU'RE DOING IT WRONG

"Generals should be guided by truth, not politics," he tells us. (Well, actually, the headline writers at the Washington Post came up with that, but I'm pretty sure that's how he feels.) The op-ed probably should've been titled "Hey Mullen, you're an asshole!", but I'm not sure he could get that past the editors.

In his Dec. 27 column, ["An admiral who found the center," op-ed], David Ignatius distorts the proper role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He glosses over Adm. Mike Mullen's professional failures, particularly on Afghanistan and his handling of the firing of Gen. David McKiernan.

Ignatius is wrong to argue that any military officer, especially a member of the Joint Chiefs, is supposed to find the center of the political spectrum. An officer has a responsibility to give the president and Congress his or her best military advice, whether that is embraced by the right or the left, whether it is popular or unpopular.

Ok, he's on reasonably safe ground so far. "Best military advice," free of ideological bias, etc etc. Agree with that, sure, but you're crazy if you think that four-stars can avoid politics all together: they'd cease to be effective if they didn't know how to handle Congress, the media, and the public. But yeah, the CJCS ought not be tailoring his military advice based on the ideology of the president, so we can generally agree here.

Things get dicey when Korb starts talking about Mullen specifically (and by "get dicey," I mean the op-ed turns into a hit-job):

What about Mullen? In late 2007, when Congress asked him about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, Mullen shrugged it off. "In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must," he told the House Armed Services Committee. Was that his professional opinion, or was it the policy of President George W. Bush, who gave short shrift to Afghanistan because of his obsession with Iraq? Is that what the combatant commanders were telling him? The answer is no.

About the same time, according to reports, Gen. Dan McNeill, then U.S. commander in Afghanistan, told President Bush in a videoconference that he needed at least 30,000 more troops to stem the advance of the Taliban, particularly in the south. This position was endorsed by Adm. William Fallon, chief of U.S. Central Command. Did Mullen support this? In fact, when the White House told McNeill not to go public with the request, Mullen did not complain, nor did he tell Congress. We learned about this because journalist David Sanger interviewed McNeill for his book "The Inheritance."

Ignatius wrote that Defense Secretary Robert Gates recommended replacing David McKiernan as U.S. commander in Afghanistan because McKiernan did not answer an important question during a video briefing for the secretary of defense. Really? What was the question? According to The Post's Rajiv Chandrasekaran," front page, Aug. 17, 2009], the questions concerned reconstruction and counternarcotics, and they were asked before the Obama White House completed its first review of the war in Afghanistan. How could McKiernan answer the question satisfactorily when he did not know whether he would receive the 30,000 additional troops he had first requested in April 2008 and did not know where President Obama was going to come down on the issue? Mullen wanted McKiernan replaced because he wanted someone to take the fall for the fact that he and Gates had been derelict in their duty on the situation in Afghanistan for several years.

Can we take a second to parse Korb's argument here? This seems to be the framework:

1. Generals should avoid being political and/or tailoring military advice to political trends
2. Adm. Mullen's "best military advice" should have included recommendations to shift resources from the Iraq campaign to Afghanistan
3. The relevant combatant commander (Adm. Fallon and then GEN Petraeus at CENTCOM) would have prioritized Afghanistan over Iraq
4. GEN McKiernan's "best military advice" was dependent on political decisions by the president in a way that Adm. Mullen's was not or should not have been
5. McKiernan was fired because Mullen was trying to cover for his own failures and those of Secretary Gates

This is roughly it, right? Well, it looks pretty stupid when it's laid out like that, doesn't it? Just in case it doesn't, let me elaborate.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense serve at the pleasure of the president, which is to say that they are responsible for formulating the plans and policies necessary to execute the president's overall foreign and security policy vision. The Constitution created a system of checks and balances on presidential power, but let's be clear about something: the Chairman is not meant to be a competing power base. He is not meant to be a check on the president. He's around to provide technical expertise in assisting the president in policy formulation. (If you don't want to take my word for it, go check out Title 10, Section 153 of the U.S. Code: functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Who's "distort[ing] the proper role of the chairman" now?)

The CJCS does provide an assessment of the risks associated with the current National Military Strategy, but this hardly seems like an opportunity (or especially a requirement) to say "Iraq is a bad idea, shift these troops to Afghanistan!"

It's also entirely possible that Adm. Mullen viewed successful prosecution of the war in Iraq as a higher priority than escalation in Afghanistan, difficult as that may be for Lawrence Korb to imagine! LTG McNeill may have wanted more troops -- as the commander of the Afghan theater, I have little doubt that he believed this was the most important mission and the best possible use for those soldiers. Adm. Fallon may even have agreed. But Mullen's job was not to transmit directly the opinions of COCOM or theater commanders -- lord knows those guys had plenty of access to the president -- but rather to provide his best military advice. Why should we believe that he didn't?

Meanwhile, Korb rips Mullen and the Secretary for being impatient with McKiernan's failure to address questions they asked about his plans for Afghanistan because a resource request had not been answered yet. So the theater commander is permitted to base his plans on the strategic decisions of the president (or, perhaps, only this president) but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense must offer advice that is willfully ignorant of or indifferent to that presidential guidance? That's pretty absurd.

And finally, Korb just goes balls-out and slanders Adm. Mullen: the latter was covering, Korb tells us, for "the fact that he and Gates had been derelict in their duty on the situation in Afghanistan for several years." Well, I think I've shown you that Mullen was not, in fact, "derelict in his duty" as prescribed by law. It seems manifestly irresponsible to accuse the president's senior military advisor of scheming and dishonesty, firing a respected 30-year veteran to distract from his personal failings. Seems like a dick move to me, not to mention being entirely groundless.

P.S. This is the same Lawrence Korb who I heard on NPR a few months ago ("now we bring you foreign policy expert..."!) repeatedly referring to the Iranian president as "Ah-ma-dee-ne-di-jad." That's one too many syllables, slick.