Next you're gonna tell me the Pakistanis aren't planning to use those F-16s for COIN

Spencer Ackerman reports that he's shocked, SHOCKED to find that the Saudis are using military materiel provided by U.S. -- ostensibly for counterterrorism purposes -- to wage war against Shi'ite rebels on the Yemeni border. Similarly surprising is the U.S. ambassador's assessment that the Saudi campaign "was poorly planned and executed" and "embarrassingly long," despite a "massively disproportionate" array of forces and equipment. But wait -- there's more! In a startling turn of events that could never have been predicted, the Yemenis are also taking advantage of U.S. assistance to prosecute a CREB campaign (the French term -- contre-rebellion, usually translated as counterinsurgency so as to avoid doctrinal confusion -- seems more appropriate here, not to mention having that je ne sais quoi...) against the same Houthis rebels the Saudis are using our shit to kill. Foreign Policy's Ellen Knickmeyer reports that Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh assured Dave Petraeus that U.S.-provided helos wouldn't be used against the Houthis just months before insisting to John Brennan that "the Houthis are your enemies too" -- all while preparing to send his U.S. trained "counterterrorist" commandos to quell the northern insurgency. Oh, and just in case you forgot: we're about to ship $1.2 billion in hardware and training to Yemen... better to fight al-Qaeda with.

How 'bout the Saudis? Well, they're fighting the hell out of terrorists... or at least the guys that are terrorizing their border with Yemen. The USG seems to have pretty well given up the ghost on this one; here's Spencer again:

“Based on these assurances, the [U.S.] ambassador [in Riyadh] has approved… the provision of [U.S. government] imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government,” the February cable reads. Although the war on the Houthis was petering out, the imagery could enhance “Saudi capabilities against Al-Qaeda activities in this area.”

This would be hilarious if it weren't so sad. If I had more technical ability, I'd do one of those hilarious parodies of "Downfall" in which Hitler's disappointed words at the close of the scene were captioned with "...well, maybe the Saudis will use that IMINT against al-Qaeda."

What's the moral of the story? Despite the U.S. military's persistent use of the term "capability" as a synonym for a weapon system -- a semantic manifestation of wishful thinking wherein the provision of a piece of gear is the same as transfer of the tactical and operational competencies that equipment is meant to enable -- we all need to come to grips with the fact that absent the elaboration of very specific consequences for "bad behavior," partner nations are going to use the stuff we sell or give them for "counterterrorism operations" to do pretty much whatever the hell they want. There's two ways to handle this: 1) we can just figure out a way to have less heartburn about this disappointing reality, recognizing that some sovereign states are going to get theirs so long as we're asking them to take care of some housekeeping on our behalf, or 2) we can find a different way to execute a worldwide counterterrorism campaign than rushing materiel and training to every third-world backwater where al-Qaeda pops its collective head up, imagining as we do that the knock-on negative effects of this decision can't possibly outweigh whatever near-term operational and PR benefits we might gain.  Right now we're basically taking Option 1, which would be fine with me if it actually made for effective counterterrorism. But... well... you know (pdf), it's, uh... it's not (pdf). I'm sure it'll be better next time. Or we could be a little more patient, a little more comprehensive, a little less direct, and do a little more of Option 2. Just sayin'.

Can we just take a second to reflect on how freaking stupid this is?

Here's the Times yesterday on the debate going on in the USG about a military aid package intended for Yemen:

Senior State Department and American military officials are deeply divided over the pace and scale of military aid to Yemen, which is emerging as a crucial testing ground for the Obama administration’s approach to countering the threat from Al Qaeda.

As the terrorism network’s Yemen branch threatens new attacks on the United States, the United States Central Command has proposed supplying Yemen with $1.2 billion in military equipment and training over the next six years, a significant escalation on a front in the campaign against terrorism, which has largely been hidden from public view.

The aid would include automatic weapons, coastal patrol boats, transport planes and helicopters, as well as tools and spare parts. Training could expand to allow American logistical advisers to accompany Yemeni troops in some noncombat roles.

[. . .]

The Yemen quandary reflects the uncertainty the administration faces as it tries to prevent a repeat of the Dec. 25 attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner by a Nigerian man trained in Yemen. American officials say a central role in preparing the attack was played by Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born radical cleric now hiding with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the network’s branch in Yemen.

A dude tried to get on an airplane in the U.S. with a bomb in his pants, and this is causing confusion about whether to give a country on the other side of the planet ONE POINT TWO BILLION DOLLARS in helos, patrol boats, and small arms.

Let's just reflect for a second on the stupidity of this.

Ok, cool.

Now go read Paul Pillar on this. I was planning to write something a little more involved when I came across his post, and he's way smarter than me.

Pillar's use of the term "perfect security" made me think about a very brief essay David Foster Wallace wrote three years ago on the meaning of 9/11. James Fallows linked to it last week, and it's worth sharing again. Wallace made a point that I've often made over the last several years: perhaps exposing ourselves to the risk of personal harm or death at the hands of violent extremists is just one of the many uncomfortable trade-offs we're forced to make to enjoy the benefits of a free society. I'm going to reproduce his essay here in full, because it's worth reading and because I think excerpting him tends to rob the text of some of the je ne sais quoi that made Wallace perhaps the most enjoyable read in the English language.

Are some things still worth dying for? Is the American idea* one such thing? Are you up for a thought experiment? What if we chose to regard the 2,973 innocents killed in the atrocities of 9/11 not as victims but as democratic martyrs, “sacrifices on the altar of freedom”?* In other words, what if we decided that a certain baseline vulnerability to terrorism is part of the price of the American idea? And, thus, that ours is a generation of Americans called to make great sacrifices in order to preserve our democratic way of life—sacrifices not just of our soldiers and money but of our personal safety and comfort?

In still other words, what if we chose to accept the fact that every few years, despite all reasonable precautions, some hundreds or thousands of us may die in the sort of ghastly terrorist attack that a democratic republic cannot 100-percent protect itself from without subverting the very principles that make it worth protecting?

Is this thought experiment monstrous? Would it be monstrous to refer to the 40,000-plus domestic highway deaths we accept each year because the mobility and autonomy of the car are evidently worth that high price? Is monstrousness why no serious public figure now will speak of the delusory trade-off of liberty for safety that Ben Franklin warned about more than 200 years ago? What exactly has changed between Franklin’s time and ours? Why now can we not have a serious national conversation about sacrifice, the inevitability of sacrifice—either of (a) some portion of safety or (b) some portion of the rights and protections that make the American idea so incalculably precious?

In the absence of such a conversation, can we trust our elected leaders to value and protect the American idea as they act to secure the homeland? What are the effects on the American idea of Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, Patriot Acts I and II, warrantless surveillance, Executive Order 13233, corporate contractors performing military functions, the Military Commissions Act, NSPD 51, etc., etc.? Assume for a moment that some of these measures really have helped make our persons and property safer—are they worth it? Where and when was the public debate on whether they’re worth it? Was there no such debate because we’re not capable of having or demanding one? Why not? Have we actually become so selfish and scared that we don’t even want to consider whether some things trump safety? What kind of future does that augur?

FOOTNOTES:

1. Given the strict Gramm-Rudmanewque space limit here, let's just please all agree that we generally know what this term connotes—an open society, consent of the governed, enumerated powers, Federalist 10, pluralism, due process, transparency ... the whole democratic roil.

2. (This phrase is Lincoln's, more or less)

Re-reading this last week made me feel sad, both at the way our politics make Wallace's point fundamentally un-sayable for those from whom it would be most meaningful, and for the fact that last weekend marked the two-year anniversary of the virtuoso's suicide.

Yemen's accidental guerillas?

I've noticed a trend in the Yemen stories lately: there's almost always mention of someone -- putatively anti-extremist, often associated with the government or other traditional power structures -- saying that all of this trouble could be spared if we'd just let them bring the bad guys in peacefully, just have a chat with them and get them to stand down. Here are a couple of examples, first from an article entitled "Yemen's President Says Government is Willing to Talk to Disarmed Qaeda Fighters" from Monday's New York Times:

In the interview with Abu Dhabi TV, [Yemeni president Ali Abdullah] Saleh, 67, vowed that his security services would hunt down those Qaeda members who refused to renounce violence. But “dialogue is the best way,” he insisted, “even with Al Qaeda, if they set aside their weapons and return to reason.” He said that Yemen is “ready to reach understanding with anyone who renounces violence and terrorism.”

While apparently anodyne, Mr. Saleh’s comments were viewed with some skepticism by Western diplomats here. He has run Yemen for more than 30 years, and he has remained in power by balancing tribal, religious and political powers and often buying their loyalty — and that includes radical Islamic leaders as well as Al Qaeda.

The United States has complained that Yemen struck deals in the past with Qaeda followers and released them from prison for promises of peace, while some have returned to terrorism or later traveled to Iraq to fight against American forces. A large group involved in Al Qaeda’s attack on the American Navy destroyer Cole in 2000 escaped from a high-security prison in February 2006, reportedly with help from the security services. Two of them who evaded later government raids against the group have become key figures of Al Qaeda, including its leader here, Nasser al-Wuhayshi.

And another mention in an article today about the killing of a suspected al-Qaeda fighter in a raid by Yemeni security forces:

In a sign of the sensitivities such operations raise, the tribal chief of the Maysaa area complained about the raid, insisting that Mihzar and the others were not "active members" of al-Qaida. He warned that the use of force in tribal regions could spark a backlash.

"They were young men who went astray but I don't think they were really members of al-Qaida," Sheik Atiq Baadha told The Associated Press. "The authorities should have contacted the families and local leaders so we could hand them over. ... We're ready to talk to the government about this."

"If things continue like this, other tribes might become sympathetic with these people" against the government, he said of the raid.

We've gotten accustomed to talk like this in Afghanistan and Iraq, understanding that victory in counterinsurgency campaigns will almost always involve convincing a significant portion of the bad guys that continued resistance is a bad idea, and that they should integrate into mainstream society. But what about when we're talking about al-Qaeda? What about the one group that we all unashamedly and unequivocally call "terrorists," that we tend to identify as America's number one enemy right now? Can we talk to those guys? Can we bring them in?

This is where things start to get sticky, and why I think it's so important to be precise in the way we use language (particularly words like "terrorist"). No one is interested in dialogue with Osama bin Laden, that much is clear, and we're probably not going to have a conversation with anyone associated with "AQ Central." But what about these Yemeni guys, who -- if they were in Afghanistan or Pakistan -- would probably be considered Taliban rather than al-Qaeda? Who are most likely the sort of "accidental guerillas" that are attracted to the cause by myriad material grievances (perhaps with a little religious fundamentalism mixed in) rather than the animating spirit of Wahhabism and rejection of the modern global power structure? It's probably worth considering, as the tribal leader in the second article suggests, the impact of our actions on the appeal of al-Qaeda to an even larger segment of the population in Yemen and elsewhere.

The first article brings up a good point, too: the political leadership in many of the places from which al-Qaeda threats could emanate will often have risen to and maintained power through their ability to balance threats and concessions among a wide range of interest groups, including violent ones and those with which the U.S. will have no truck. If we're to base our foreign and security policies on a construct in which foreign governments are held responsible for securing their own territory, political maneuvering of this sort is often going to be essential. Can we hold it against a Yemeni president, for example, if he wants to negotiate? Can we draw a red line and say "no talks with anyone who calls themselves al-Qaeda," even if it advances our aims?

I guess the question is this: where do you draw the line between reconcilable and irreconcilable, or rather between those who we would be willing to reconcile and those who we're only interested in killing or imprisoning?

Sorry for all the question marks, but I don't have this one close to figured out.

"Somalia for Yemen is becoming like what Pakistan is for Afghanistan"

This according to Saeed Obaid, a "Yemeni terrorism expert who wrote a book on al-Qaeda's Yemen affiliate," quoted in Sudarsan Raghavan's piece in today's Washington Post.

Thousands of Somali boys and teenagers fleeing war and chaos at home are sailing to Yemen, where officials who have long welcomed Somali refugees now worry that the new arrivals could become the next generation of al-Qaeda fighters.

As the United States deepens its counterterrorism operations in Yemen, officials are concerned that extremists could find growing Somali refugee camps fertile ground for recruiting. U.S. and Yemeni authorities also fear that Islamist fighters from Somalia could slip into the country among the throngs of refugees, deepening ties between al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen and the particularly hard-line militants of Somalia.

Fleeing a failed state for a failing one, the Somali youths arrive daily in this refugee outpost, which is filled with rickety tents and tales of misery, in the vast desert of southern Yemen. They bring stories of brutality and forced conscription by al-Shabab, an Islamist force battling Somalia's U.S.-backed transitional government.

Considering the national media's Yemen-gasm over the last couple of weeks, I suppose it's about time we linked to something on the subject. Here's a start.

Yemen: Operation Scorched Earth failing to scorch earth, defeat insurgents

Not many people noticed, but the Saudi air force blew up 40-odd Houthi rebels inside Yemen last week. Now Sana'a is telling everyone to mind their own business (and the Iranians agree).

Yemen told outside powers Wednesday to stay out of its battle with a Shiite rebel group in its northwest amid concerns that Iran and Saudi Arabia are being drawn into the conflict.

The statement, carried by the state news agency Saba and attributed to a Foreign Ministry source, followed a statement of concern for Yemen's "national unity and territorial integrity" by Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki on Tuesday.

"We welcome what Mottaki affirmed about Iran's position towards Yemen's unity and stability, and Yemen reaffirms that it definitely rejects the interference in its internal affairs by any party," the statement said. It said Yemen's battle with the Houthi, a Shiite Muslim rebel movement, is "an internal Yemeni affair, and Yemen can solve its issues without any interference from others."

Here's the basic story: Yemen was ruled for a millennium by adherents of the Zaydi sect of Shi'a Islam. A 1962 revolution changed that, and the government has been Sunni-majority -- and according to some, anti-Shi'a -- ever since. (Greater Yemen would not be united as one country until 1990: South Yemen remained an independent, Soviet-aligned state from the time of the British departure from the region through the remainder of the Cold War.)

When civil war broke out in 1994, the northern government was aided by Saudi Wahhabis in its efforts to quell the southern rebellion. Yemeni Zaydis accuse Sana'a of snuggling up too closely to the Wahhabis as a result, which is a problem for them for pretty obvious reasons. Since then, a succession of Zaydi religious and political leaders have railed against alleged anti-Shi'a discrimination by the government. This resentment boiled over into insurgency in 2004, when Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi -- leader of the Zaydis, hence the "Houthi insurgency" -- mobilized an armed group called Shabab al-Mumineen. He got got later that year, but his brothers have picked up the banner.

Now as you might imagine, there are outside players that have an interest in how this whole thing turns out. Yemen is a U.S. ally, however weak, and we're dependent upon that government to secure its own territory, aid in the fight against global terrorism, etc etc. (The more you learn about the specifics of the Yemeni situation, obviously, the less sensible it seems to consider insurgency and civil strife there as just another manifestation of some kind of global jihad. Not that any sensible people still look at the world that way anyway, but I digress...) The Saudis support the Yemeni government against the rebels for the same reason they're uncomfortable with Shi'a sectarians and revivalist movements in other neighboring countries: the monarchy fears anything that may inflame its own Shi'a minority and destabilize the Kingdom. And then there's Iran (and allegedly Hizballah, maybe?), which is thought to provide some support to its Shi'a co-religionists.

So now you've got a sort of surprising turn of events: Sana'a is getting bent out of shape at the Saudis, who support the Yemeni government, for going vigilante on the Houthis -- that is, for killing their shared enemy. But there's the whole sovereignty and territorial integrity thing, and it's bad PR for the world to see that Yemen is incapable of handling its own business. Ironically, in the long term the Saudi military might be negatively impacting the Yemeni government's ability to maintain whatever scraps of legitimacy it still holds on to and thus to effectively deal with its own insurgency. (Sound familiar, Pakistan watchers?)

Of course you've probably already picked up on the biggest irony of all of this, as far as U.S. policy goes: we support the Yemeni government, which in the past has received support from Saudi Wahhabis, in its efforts to quell a Shi'a insurgency (aligned with Iran and perhaps Hizballah) and secure its territory against al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorists... who are fundamentalist Sunnis (and sometimes maybe even Wahhabis).

If you're not with us, you're against us!

Oh yeah, and then there's this (since we're supposedly a COIN blog and all):

"This gets played off as Sunni-Shia, and it's wrong," says Hiltermann of ICG. "The Shia of Yemen are more Sunni than any other Shia in the world. And the Sunni of Yemen are more Shia than any Sunni in the world."

Despite some boilerplate anti-Western and anti-Israeli statements, the Houthis "don't have any serious ideology or set of grievances, for that matter," argues Hiltermann.

"It was just a few angry guys who in 2004 stepped out of the political process and started a little rebellion."

But the government response has aggravated matters. "Due to the heavyhanded techniques of the government, over time, this has grown into an entirely different thing," he adds. "Now the population has been bombed into a major grievance. Their houses are gone and they have no compensation, so now you have a real conflict."

But none of this is our problem, right? Proxy war in the Arabian Peninsula always goes down smooth!