A "hollow force": what it is and isn't

It is almost literally impossible to read an article or essay on the subject of imminent defense budget cuts without coming across expressions of concern about the potential "hollowing of the force." Bob Gates warned about it before he left the Pentagon, and Secretary Panetta's been on the same talking points. Journalists and bloggers sprinkle the term liberally throughout their prose. But it seems that somewhere along the way, nearly everyone stopped paying attention to just what the heck the term "hollow force" actually means. I've been ranting and raving about this (to myself, mostly) for months, so it's time to get this straight once and for all.

This post was prompted by Walter Pincus's column today, in which he at least concedes some uncertainty about the precise meaning of the phrase:

A repeated fear is that defense cuts will result in a “hollowing-out of the military.” As best as can be pinned down, that means reductions, whether in numbers or pay, that would leave the services without the experienced noncommissioned and mid-level commissioned officers who actually run things.

So that's one version: reductions in staff NCOs and field grade officers proportional to the size of the force. Let's look at some other representative examples. (The italicized bits indicate my emphasis.)

Here's Benjamin Friedman writing at The National Interest's blog:

The more substantive claim wielded by Pentagon boosters is that cuts would produce a hollow force, a military overburdened with missions that it is too small to perform and thus unable to protect Americans. These claims exaggerate both the damage cuts would do to our military’s ability to perform current missions and the damage not performing those missions does to our security.

(UPDATE: See Ben's comment below. I understand that Friedman was making an effort to characterize the views of people with whom he disagreed, and I probably should've noted this in the first place. I actually very much agree with the substance of his essay; this was just a clear example of the sort of misimpression that I'm trying to correct with this post, so I had to draw it out -- whether it was his or someone else's.)

Now the "Defending Defense" people at Heritage, AEI, and FPI:

This backgrounder describes the likely results of the significant defense spending reductions now being considered: a “hollow force” characterized by fewer personnel and weapon systems, slowed military modernization, reduced readiness for operations, and continued stress on the all-volunteer force.

Here's how an un-bylined Fox News piece described it (hilariously, this warning came in 2003):

Overdeployment may threaten recruitment and retention for the entire military, particularly the National Guard and Reserve, presenting the risk of a "hollow force" — a military that suffers dramatic drops in volunteers willing to join or stay in the armed services.

Now here's Air Force Chief of Staff GEN Norman Schwartz (via Phil Ewing at DoD Buzz) coming closer to the point:

My pledge for the coming year is to strengthen unit readiness and avoid a creeping hollow force that proves only the illusion of global vigilance, reach and power.

But what about the SECDEF -- what does he mean when he says it?

"Very simply, it results in hollowing out the force," Panetta said during an Aug. 16 event at National Defense University in Washington. "It would terribly weaken our ability to respond to the threats in the world, but more importantly, it would break faith with the troops and with their families."

So we've seen a litany of references to the "hollow force," some of which are vague and ill-defined (like Panetta's), others of which are more specific (like the Fox News/Pincus version). Many suggest that the expression fundamentally has to do with the size of the force and related issues like recruitment and retention.

Now let's check out this excerpt from a 1996 Center for Naval Analyses paper called "Avoiding a Hollow Force" (pdf), which really nails -- with a bit of maritime flavor -- what the expression is actually all about:

[Budget cuts since the end of the Cold War] have raised fears that the Navy may once again be on the verge of a hollow force. Our review of the readiness literature suggests that hollowness is a condition that keeps ships from living up to their design potential. It is the general state that persists whenever maintenance problems dominate a force; when poor quality sailors seem the rule rather than the exception; and when meaningful training is both scarce and questionable.

This explanation is consistent with the way I'd always understood the term and heard it used before the recent glut of references. If you think for a second about what hollowness evokes, this use of the term makes perfect sense: you're talking about an apparently intact form that gives the illusion of completeness and authenticity, but lacks robustness -- lacks real substance.

What "hollowing the force" means is that you keep force structure, you keep major platforms and weapon systems, you keep personnel numbers up, but you start to skimp on the things that make all of that useful -- the money that you spend to translate equipment and units and personnel into effective warfighting capability. A hollow force is one that keeps up the appearance of capability but shorts those things that make the difference between a shiny, impressive garrison army and a world-class fighting force.

What are those things? Realistic, tough, meaningful training. Flight hours. Regular preventive and corrective maintenance. Spare parts and similar contributors to sustainment. Ammunition. Exercises.

Hollowing isn't just about spending less money, but about allocating money improperly. If Congress cut the defense budget by half tomorrow and said to DoD "make it work," there are two basic ways the Pentagon could execute that tasking: 1) by slashing force structure, aircraft, vehicles, and personnel numbers and then training and maintaining that smaller force to accomplish a smaller range of missions; or 2) by keeping all those airplanes, never taking them out of the hangers, and saving money on jet fuel; keeping all those brigade combat teams, never turning a wrench on Strykers or Humvees, and spreading your non-broken down vehicles thinner across the formations; keeping all those personnel but cutting down on their expensive professional military education and realistic live-fire training. (Incidentally, the defense industry doesn't much care whether the force is hollow or not -- they'll happily sell you vehicles and planes for your last dollar, whether or not you've got the cash left over to put gas in them and take them out of the garage.)

A smaller military that does less accordingly is not a "hollow force," even if it's a less capable one. A large, apparently "world-class" military that fights poorly because of insufficient training, low morale, broken vehicles, and a lack of ammunition -- that's a hollow force. So if we know now that a hollow force is a specific type of bad military, one that's bad for a specific reason, can we all agree to stop using the term as a general synonym for "bad military"?

Thoughts on Gates

As Bob Gates readies himself for retirement, you're going to see a whole bunch of valedictory profiles and sum-up pieces in defense media and mainstream outlets alike. One of the first ran today in Politico under the byline of Mike Allen, who is, for me, the best in the political news business. (He's an incredibly curious, interesting, and genuinely nice guy, to boot. I once had a half-hour conversation with him -- at his insistence, honest! -- about what defense blogs he ought to be reading. Alas, it was pre-Ink Spots.)

It's been interesting to track the evolution of both Gates's personal views and of the media's coverage of those views over the course of the last several years. I have no doubt that many journalists will seek to tie a neat little bow on the SECDEF's tenure with lessons learned and best-of/worst-of listicles; even your humble Playbooker fell victim.

As Gates heads out of the nation’s capital for the last time, his reminiscing included several tips for D.C. success:  

*Don’t condescend: “At Texas A&M [G here: whoop! Other brackets in this quote-block are Allen], I would … go in front of the student senate for an hour, hour and a half, and answer questions. And I treated those kids as though they were peers – as though they were state senators. And if they asked a foolish question, or a question that was kind of off the mark in some way, I’d try and figure out what they were getting at, and answer that question respectfully.”  

*Sometimes the press is right: “Giving credit where credit’s due never hurts … The Walter Reed wounded [The Washington Post’s expose on scandalous conditions at the military hospital] is the first example of that. The MRAPs [USA Today coverage of a shortage of mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles in Iraq] is a second.”  

*Be blunt: “Even when I was at CIA, I’d go to visit foreign leaders and I’d say, ‘You know, I’m not a diplomat. I’m just an old CIA guy. … I said, ‘If I wanted to be diplomatic, I’d have been a diplomat.’ ”  

*But not too blunt: “When I have my preparatory sessions [before Hill testimony], I answer the questions the way I’d like to answer. And then I get it out of my system.”

If you've paid any attention to what Gates has said and written over the last four and a half years (or really over the last 25 or so), then you can likely add another: tell your boss the truth, even when you know it's not what he wants to hear.

The SECDEF's consistent refrain on this point is why I've found one of the recent staples of the Pentagon rumor mill so troubling and difficult to imagine: that Gen. Cartwright's candidacy for Chairman was submarined by Gates and Mullen over the Marine general's "refusal to be a team player" on Afghan escalation. Here's a bit from an AP interview story on Wednesday:

Gates was adamant that news reporting on the process for selecting a successor to Navy Adm. Mike Mullen as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was flawed. He cited specifically reports that Marine Gen. James Cartwright - long considered the leading candidate to replace Mullen when he retires Sept. 30 - was damaged by offering independent advise [sic] to Obama during a decisive review of Afghan war policy in late 2009.  

"I will tell you that some of the negative things that have been reported as influencing the decision - for example the Afghan piece - are completely wrong," he told reporters traveling with him from Hawaii to Singapore, where he will attend an Asia security conference Friday and Saturday.

This made me think back to one of the many times when Gates advised young and aspiring leaders to do exactly what he's accused of punishing Cartwright for: giving an honest assessment o the facts as you see them, then trusting those senior to you to make the correct decision. This article in a 2008 issue of Parameters (pdf), entitled "Reflections on Leadership," was adapted from a speech the SECDEF made at West Point in April of that year.

[I]f as an officer one does not tell blunt truths or create an environment where candor is encouraged, then they have done themselves and the institution a disservice. This admonition goes back beyond the roots of our own republic. Sir Francis Bacon was a seventeenth-century jurist and philosopher as well as a confidante of the senior minister of England’s King James. He gave this advice to a protégé looking to follow in his steps at court: “Remember well the great trust you have undertaken; you are as a continual sentinel, always to stand upon your watch to give [the king] true intelligence. If you flatter him, you betray him.”

Does this seem like the sort of man who would pass over an otherwise qualified candidate for being too candid?

What Allen called "the secretary's newsiest, and most introspective, comment" came when Gates' averred that "one of the reasons it's probably time for me to leave is that sometimes too much experience can get in the way, and you can get too cautious... It may be making me more cautious [than] I ought to be." Maybe. But it's also worth noting another excerpt from the same Parameters piece of three years ago before we grant Gates' self-effacing criticism:

That one should only go to war as a last resort has long been a principle of civilized people. We know its horrors and costs. War is, by its nature, unpredictable and uncontrollable. Winston Churchill wrote in January 1942: “Let us learn our lessons. Never, never believe that any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter . . . . Once the signal is given, the statesman is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”

Robert Gates has made mistakes during his tenure, just as every Secretary of Defense before him has done and as every successor will do. He promises to recount some of them with the benefit of hindsight in a forthcoming memoir (just not before the next election), and I'm looking forward to that. But I feel confident that Gates's measured blend of decisive action and thoughtful restraint -- Afghanistan 2009 aside, and that is a big one -- will be largely vindicated, and that history will look back on his time in charge of the Pentagon more charitably than will the man himself.

Did the SECDEF do a 180 on COIN?

The SECDEF made a speech at West Point on Friday about the future of the Army. You should read it. What you shouldn't do is read the bulk of the context-free misrepresentation currently passing for news analysis of the speech. Friend of Ink Spots David Ucko is an exception to this trend, and in fact does a great job of describing exactly how much of the media gets it wrong.

There has been ample coverage of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ final speech to the West Point cadets last Friday, with much of the attention focusing on an apparently growing disenchantment with counterinsurgency, a theme previously touched upon on this blog. 

For obvious reasons, the quotation that got the most play in the press was Gates’ quip that any future sec-def who advises the sending of ‘a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined”’. This sentence has been picked up upon as a candid admission by a straight-talking and possibly repentant Secretary of Defense, wishing to use his last appearance at West Point to highlight the folly of ongoing campaigns. In reality, the statement has been taken out of its context and therefore risks being misinterpreted, along with the rest of the address. 

I've got basically nothing to add, so go read David at Kings of War.

Why can't we do math AND strategy?

By now everyone's familiar with the dismissive turn of phrase Bob Gates used to blow off the recommendations of the Simpson-Bowles deficit-reduction commission: "In terms of the specifics they came up with, that's essentially math, not strategy." The defense-defenders love this one, and they've deployed it aggressively: basically every recommended cut to a defense program or the defense topline is derided as "math, not strategy."

Hey, it's a good line. It's probably the same thing I'd say if I were the SECDEF. But it's wildly irresponsible for the Pentagon to say "hey, it's not us, we're doing our part!" as Gates did back in November:

"If you cut the defense budget by 10 percent, which would be catastrophic in terms of force structure, that's $55 billion on a $1.4 trillion deficit," Gates said. "We are not the problem."

(By that logic, shouldn't GE be saying "if you cut the F136 engine, which would be catastrophic in terms of Ohio jobs and the assured reliability of the Joint Strike Fighter, that's $2.9 billion (pdf) on a $553 billion defense budget. We are not the problem"?)

Secretary Gates wants to have his cake and eat it, too: he wants to dismiss critics of his cuts by saying the recommendations are based on strategy, but push back on those calling for deeper cuts by talking about math. But a responsible defense budget and a responsible federal budget must take both considerations into account: math and strategy. If ADM Mullen is right and the national debt really does pose the greatest threat to national security, then isn't the "math" part really, really significant? Strategy, after all, is inseparable from math: strategy is fundamentally about choices, about maximizing benefit with limited resources. The SECDEF said it himself just two years ago!

The United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.

Gates's defenders -- and I'm one of them -- will say "but the Department already has set priorities, and this budget request is based on the real requirements of supporting our national security strategy!" And when it comes down to it, I probably agree with him on this one. Beyond this justification, Gates has to defend the requested figure out of simple adherence to his word: he told the service secretaries and chiefs that they'd get their savings back if they found fat to cut; if those dollars instead come out of the topline, just wait and see the foot-dragging when the next round of service-identified "efficiency" cuts comes around.

But just as expected, people aren't happy: conservative commentators, China hawks, the defense industry, and most of their buddies on the Armed Services committees think that $553 billion is just an irresponsibly paltry sum, while peaceniks, budget hawks, and proponents of other vulnerable spending programs are tearing their hair out at the seeming invulnerability of the defense budget. Add to that latter group the New York Times editorial board, which yesterday did its level best to oversimplify the issue and generally aid confusion and misunderstanding. On the subject of the EFV's termination, they wistfully bemoan the $3 billion already wasted -- as if anything the SECDEF might do could get it back. On the Joint Strike Fighter, they note a doubling of per-unit cost while arguing vaguely that "it should be cut back" -- apparently failing to absorb the irony of recommending action that will further increase cost-per-plane. And on the Osprey and Virginia-class sub, they argue for program cuts or cancellations based on oversimplified and outdated operational rationales.

And that's not even the worst part. Try this one on for size:

The Pentagon needs to jettison the ancient formula that guarantees each service its accustomed share of taxpayer dollars. Air and sea power that can be readily mobilized are vital to American security. But for a decade, the Army and the Marines have been pushed to their limits while the Navy and the Air Force have looked for ways to stay useful and justify their budget shares. 

Updating the formula to reflect a more realistic division of labor would wring significant savings from the Air Force and the Navy while protecting the Army and the Marines from the multiple combat tours that have strained service members and their families over the last decade.

I hear a lot about this "ancient formula," but I've never had it adequately explained to me. That said, let's stipulate that there is such a formula for ensuring each service gets its annual share of the budgetary pie; might it not be the case that this makes good sense? After all, you can't turn the entire Defense Department around on a dime, as Secretary Gates has learned, nor should it be easy to do so. This isn't just a matter of institutional interests and inertia  (though those are at play, too), but of preventing the crises of today from fundamentally destabilizing the kind of steady-state modernization that underpins the U.S. military's global freedom of action and deterrent functions.

But back to the editorial -- let's look at exactly what the two paragraphs above really say: "Air and sea power that can be readily mobilized are vital to American security... [but] a more realistic division of labor would... protect the Army and Marines from... multiple combat tours." Uh, what? This is really almost impenetrable. Presumably the writers mean to say that budget shares should more realistically reflect the actual intra-Departmental division of labor over the last several years (not "a more realistic division of labor"), and that cuts to the Navy and Air Force's budgets would allow for an increase in land forces end-strength and result in extended home-station dwell-time for Army and Marine units. But there are a number of very significant problems with this line of reasoning.

1. The suggestion that the Navy and Air Force have had to "look for ways to stay relevant and justify their budget shares" is based on two serious misunderstandings: the first is that air and sea forces' true value should be found in tactical utility in combat rather than strategic deterrent and guarantor of access, and the second is that "looking for ways to stay relevant" is a bad thing rather than an important driver of institutional adaptation. 
2. Calls to shift funding from expensive, sophisticated, long lead-time weapon systems to personnel accounts and other investments in land power force structure fail to acknowledge that high-end technical solutions cannot simply be purchased when needed, but are the end-result of sustained investment in the defense industrial base and commitment to developmental technologies.
3. Further end-strength increases will put additional strain on an already troubled recruiting base and increasingly challenge the Army and Marine Corps to build soldiers and Marines from suboptimal raw material. On top of that, absent significant reform to Tri-Care and military benefits, expansion of the active-duty rolls will carry with it the very same long-term fiscal commitments that are helping to cripple serious efforts at deficit reduction in the domestic portion of the federal budget.
4. If you listen to senior leaders in both the Defense Department and the broader United States government, manpower-intensive land wars aren't on anybody's top-five list of efficacious foreign policy solutions. U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan are about to start coming down, so what sense does it make to start budgeting for a larger Army and Marine Corps?

This editorial exhibits the very worst tendencies of both budget-cutters and budget-growers: bath math, bad reasoning, and an absence of strategic judgment.

Things aren't as simple as any of the factions in the budget debate want to make them. Beware of those who bring math or strategy, but not both.

Bill Gertz: Terminally dishonest, analytically handicapped, or just a really bad writer? (UPDATED)

You guys do know that -- despite all evidence to the contrary -- I don't actually go out looking around on the internet for stuff to get pissed off about, right? (You: "Then why do you follow Bill Gertz on Twitter?" Me: Touche.) Really, I don't. And sometimes I even beat myself up about how negative I get on the blog, how it seems to be so much easier to criticize other people's work and call my e-nemeses dummies than to write something original and constructive and pioneering.

But seriously: my e-nemeses are dummies. 

So here I am last night just trying to mind my own business and get some work done (on Twitter? Shut up) when I see this:

@BillGertz: State Dept. report confirms secret missile defense deal with Russia http://tinyurl.com/3ah4ktw

Well! That sounds interesting! Let's go read about a secret missile defense deal! And so I follow the link. There I am: the venerable Washington Times, home to venerable "geopolitics editor" Bill Gertz and the best damned China-hawkery you'll find this side of Air Combat Command. The same "news"paper that referred to Armenia as a "small Central Asian state" in an article last night until I childishly taunted the writer into fixing it with nary an acknowledgement of the mistake in the original, you ask? Yep, one and the very same. 

So what's all this about a secret deal with the Russians? I wish I could say it was easy to sort the whole thing out, but Gertz's prose is damned near impenetrable, what with his tenuous hold on grammatical convention, artless overuse of generic identifiers, and general inability to construct clear and meaningful English sentences free of loaded, leading pre-judgment. Here's the lede, largely (and mercifully) free of the sort of advocanalysis and debatable-contention-disguised-as-conventional-wisdom that fills the rest of the piece:

The Obama administration, despite public denials, held secret talks with Russia aimed at reaching a ballistic missile defense agreement that Moscow ultimately rejected in May, according to an internal State Department report.

Disclosure of the report to The Washington Times comes as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Tuesday pressed for a new anti-ballistic missile treaty, warning that a failure to reach an agreement would trigger a new strategic arms race.

The four-page document circulated on Capitol Hill stated that administration officials held four meetings with the Russians and last spring presented a draft Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement (BMDCA) to Russian negotiators.

The internal report contradicts congressional testimony by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in June denying a missile defense deal was in the works.

I'm not sure about you, but it seems to me like this would be a good time to introduce some kind of concrete detail about the aforementioned report, right? But there's perilously little of that, aside from those few excerpts you'll see quoted here. In case you're confused already (and I was -- it took me three readings to sort through the whole thing), the "report" seems to be some kind of internal State Department communication referencing a proposed BMDCA that was discussed with the Russians. Gertz elaborates... sort of:

As part of the U.S.-Russia talks, the State Department submitted to Congress on May 5 a legal memorandum called a Circular 175 report that is required before reaching treaties and agreements.

"The BMDCA was designed to be a framework agreement under which the United States and Russia could begin missile defense cooperation while not limiting either party's missile defense capabilities in any way," states the report, which is labeled "sensitive but unclassified."

The draft 10-year agreement would have set up a BMD Cooperation Sub-Working Group. The Circular 175 was "approved by Under Secretary [of State Ellen] Tauscher on May 5, 2010," the report said.

Presumably the Circular 175 report to Congress is not the generically-titled "report" to which Gertz continually refers, and we're actually dealing with a completely separate document that communicated details about the Circular 175 from one part of the State Department to another. (I think.) Still with me? So this communication outlines the basics about the proposed BMDCA: "framework agreement... begin missile defense cooperation... not limiting either party's missile defense capabilities...", etc. What else does it say? Well, it tells us that "the Russian Government indicated... that they were not interested" in a BMCDA. So the USG wanted to talk to Russia about working together on missile defense in a way that wouldn't place any limits on American defenses, but Moscow decided to pass. Simple enough. Case closed.

Not so fast, says our intrepid correspondent!

The draft missile defense agreement was first reported in The Times on June 16, noting that U.S. officials feared it would limit defenses.

A day later, Mrs. Clinton was asked about The Times report and dismissed the idea of any secret draft agreement to limit defenses. "No. 1, there is no secret deal. No. 2, there is no plan to limit U.S. missile defenses, either in this treaty or in any other way. And No. 3, on that score, the story is dead wrong," she said.

Mr. Gates, appearing with Mrs. Clinton, also denied any draft agreement was being negotiated, stating that "whatever talks are going on are simply about trying to elicit [Russian] willingness to partner with us along with the Europeans in terms of a regional missile defense."

When asked whether the draft agreement was public, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley told The Times on June 18 "there is no draft agreement to provide you."

Gertz modestly fails to mention that when "the draft missile defense agreement was first reported in The Times," it was in the June 16th edition of his own weekly "Inside the Ring" column. (Editorial aside: when he says "...noting that U.S. officials feared it would limit defenses," Gertz is presumably making a grammatical mistake. That is, he means to say that his column noted purported U.S. fears, and that wacky participial phrase in the latter half of the sentence isn't intended to indicate that the "draft missile defense agreement [noted] that U.S. officials" had fears. But I digress. Fears were noted!) So here's where we are now: Gertz has quoted from the Senate Armed Services hearing on START and has affirmed that Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates both denied any talks with the Russians related to limiting missile defenses.

Because Gertz -- surely limited by space considerations and not tempted in the least to make questionable editing decisions out of bad faith or a desire to mislead -- only quoted part of Secretary Clinton's comments before the committee, it's probably worth referencing the transcript (pdf). Here's the first mention of "secret deals" -- the very first question out of the gate (p. 13) after Clinton, Gates, Energy Secretary Chu, and CJCS ADM Mullen have delivered their prepared statements:

[Senator LEVIN, Chairman:] Secretary Clinton, let me start with you. During the course of the negotiations on the New START, were there any side agreements, any informal agreements, any secret agreements with Russia that are not included in the treaty relative to any limitations on U.S. missile defenses or any other subject?

Secretary CLINTON. No.

There we are, right off the bat: no secret agreements. The next time this comes up if a few minutes later (p. 19-20).

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Clinton, you were very clear in answering the chairman’s first question about whether there was any secret agreement or side deal associated with the negotiations of the New START Treaty that would affect missile defense. And you were very clear in saying that, no, there were not.

There’s a press report that came out last night that claims that the administration is secretly working with the Russians to conclude an agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses. It goes on to say that the administration last month presented a draft agreement to the Russians. Is this report accurate?

Secretary CLINTON. No. I’m not aware of the report, Senator Collins, but, as Secretary Gates said, we have consistently told the Russians that if they wish to work with us on missile defense we are open to working with them. So maybe there is something lost in the translation here, because we have consistently reached out to them. We would like them to be part of a broad missile defense system that protects against countries like Iran, North Korea, both of which they border, by the way, so it is in their interest.

But Secretary Gates mentioned that in his opening remarks, so if I could ask him to just perhaps add onto what I said.

Senator COLLINS. Yes.

Secretary GATES. Well, I have seen—I have just seen a reference to the newspaper story that you described, and what I emphasized, what I added, frankly, in my opening statement was that whatever talks are going on are simply about trying to elicit their willingness to partner with us along with the Europeans in terms of a regional missile defense.

But there is nothing in the approaches that have been made to the Russians that in any way, shape, or form would impose any limits whatsoever on our plans.

Again we have Secretary Clinton responding to Gertz's assertion that "the administration is secretly working with the Russians to conclude an agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses," and his further assertion that a draft of such an agreement had been presented to the Russians in May, with a firm denial. Both Clinton and Gates emphasize the administration's interest in working collaboratively with the Russians on missile defense while repeatedly insisting that any such cooperation would not place limits on American missile defenses. This point is made very clear.

Secretary Clinton must have sensed how eager critics of the treaty were to focus on this bogus "secret negotiations" bugaboo, because she came back to it of her own accord later in the hearing (p. 36). This part's important, because it fleshes out the excerpt that Gertz provides in his piece.

[Secretary CLINTON:] Mr. Chairman, if I could, just on a follow-up to your last questions, which I very much appreciate. I want to ensure that the record is clear on one additional point. Senator Collins raised a certain press report about a U.S.- Russia deal to limit U.S. missile defenses and I want to be as clear as I possibly can. Number one, there is no secret deal.

Number two, there is no plan to limit U.S. missile defenses, either in this treaty or in any other way.

Number three, on that score the story is dead wrong. I want to be very clear about that because I don’t want anyone using what is yet again another inaccurate story to argue against this treaty. As Secretary Gates and I have both said, we will continue to explore missile defense cooperation with Russia, but the talks are not secret and there is nothing on the table or even in the wildest contemplation that would involve any limits on our missile defense. Instead, we’re seeing to see whether they can be expanded with additional capabilities for our security.

So here we are yet again: a firm denial of any "secret deal"; a firm denial of any agreements that would limit U.S. defenses; and an elaboration of the administration's consistent position that missile defense collaboration with Russia is a desirable opportunity to increase European and global security. Clinton notes that "on that score" -- that is, on the subject of possible limitations on U.S. missile defense -- "the story is dead wrong." Dead wrong. No two ways about it. It's very clear: there is no secret agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses. Simple as.

Where could the confusion be coming from here? How is it that Gertz is now claiming a win, telling "arms control wonks who argued my June 16 scoop was wrong: you're wrong," arguing that the newly-revealed "internal State Department report" shows that "Hillary misled Senate"? Well, yet again we're going to have to dig around and speculate; it's not easy to do in a 1,000-word article in a publication that one would assume has editors, but Gertz steadfastly refuses to apply clear thinking and narrative structure to make his point in any kind of meaningful way. So let's go back to the original piece that asserted secret negotiations, the one published the day before the hearing, and see how Gertz characterized the matter:

The Obama administration is secretly working with Russia to conclude an agreement that many officials fear will limit U.S. missile defenses, a key objective of Moscow since it opposed plans for a U.S. missile defense interceptor base in Eastern Europe, according to American officials involved in arms control issues.

According to the officials, the administration last month presented a draft agreement on missile defenses to the Russians as part of talks between Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for international security and arms control, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov.

The secret talks and possible agreement have triggered alarm among pro-missile defense advocates who are concerned that the administration, in its effort to "reset" ties with Moscow, will make further concessions constraining current and future missile defenses.

Ok, now we might be on to something. "many [unnamed, obviously!] officials fear" that a BMDCA "will limit U.S. missile defenses," Gertz asserts, while also tacking on the misleading suggestion that Russia had made such limitation a priority in its negotiations with the U.S. (If that were the case, one might reasonably ask, then why wouldn't the Russians insert ANY limitation language in the actual text of the treaty -- beyond a mutual prohibition against modifying ICBM and SLBM launchers to host missile defense components instead -- rather than working to that end by negotiating a similarly non-binding informal arrangement, ironically one that focused on cooperation rather than limitation and reduction, as the treaty's main text does?) Senator Collins read the statements like the preceding as "claims that the administration is secretly working with the Russians to conclude an agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses," which is perhaps a slightly misleading formulation if only because it implies that Gertz was suggesting the "secret" agreement would include concrete limits rather than simply limiting missile defense as a matter of uncharitable interpretation.

Let's try to sum this up, shall we? On June 16th, Bill Gertz writes that the U.S. and Russia are working toward a "secret agreement" that he alleges has some U.S. officials worried about possible limitations on missile defense. On June 17th, Secretaries Clinton and Gates both deny that any secret agreements to limit missile defense have been negotiated, and assert that while the U.S. seeks to cooperate with Russia on this matter, the administration will not accept any provisions that limit missile defense. (Oh yeah, and the U.S. side decided unilaterally to insert a statement in the treaty's preamble that yet again insists that missile defenses are not subject to the treaty, and also to include more than $10 billion for missile defense in its FY11 budget request.) On June 18th, P.J. Crowley responds to Gertz's question about whether the "secret draft agreement" is public by telling him that there is no such agreement. Then at some point in the intervening months, it emerges that there was in fact a draft agreement on missile defense cooperation that was not secret, was not concerned with limiting missile defense, and was not ultimately agreed to -- a draft agreement that seems instead to have been focused on precisely what the SECDEF stated before Congress was the object of ongoing discussions with Russia, which was to "elicit willingness to partner with us as well as the Europeans in terms of a regional missile defense" --  and somehow Gertz claims that this revelation "contradicts congressional testimony" by Gates and Clinton "that a missile defense deal was in the works" and feels vindicated for his earlier assertion that there was a "secret draft agreement to limit defenses." Except that 1) THERE STILL IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS EVER A "SECRET DRAFT AGREEMENT TO LIMIT DEFENSES," 2) BOTH SECRETARIES INSIST THAT THERE NEVER WAS SUCH AN AGREEMENT, AND 3) THEY EACH TESTIFIED TO THAT EFFECT. Neither even briefly addressed the existence of a possible missile defense cooperation agreement except to indicate that such an agreement would be consistent with the administration's overall goals and policy.

So I am being totally serious when I ask: is Bill Gertz a liar, or is he just incredibly stupid?

UPDATE: Courtesy of Blake Hounshell on Twitter, here's the fact sheet the State Department issued this morning on the subject of Missile Defense Cooperation with the Russian Federation. Some highlights:

There are no “secret deals” with Russia on missile defense.

The Administration has repeatedly communicated to the Russian Government at the highest levels that the United States will not agree to any limitations or constraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses, and that the United States intends to continue improving and deploying BMD systems to defend the U.S. against limited missile launches, and to defend our deployed forces, allies, and partners against regional threats.

The Administration has repeatedly made clear that it is pursuing missile defense cooperation with Russia. As one example, at a June 17 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Gates stated: “Separately from the treaty, we are discussing missile defense cooperation with Russia, which we believe is in the interests of both nations. But such talks have nothing to do with imposing any limitations on our programs or deployment plans.”

The Obama Administration believes that missile defense cooperation with the Russian Federation is in the national security interests of the United States, as did the Bush Administration. Restrictions or limitations on U.S. missile defense capabilities are not under discussion in any forum.

So yeah, pretty much what I said (/boom).

What's in it for Russia? (UPDATED TWICE)

Russian defense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov met with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Pentagon last week. Gates devoted more than four hours to his Russian counterpart; suffice it to say that it's unusual for the SECDEF to spend half a working day on a senior leader engagement.

That said, the time seems to have been well spent. Just today, the Russian government announced that President Dmitriy Medvyedev has cancelled a proposed sale of S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Iran, a development that will come as a pleasant surprise to American and Israeli military leaders. The S-300 is "a system that scares every Western air force," according to defense analyst Daniel Goure (via Spencer Ackerman), and Medvyedev's decision flies in the face of recent Russian insistence that the S-300 deal would go ahead.

So why the sudden change of heart? It's difficult to say. Gates' meeting with Serdyukov also apparently emphasized American gratitude for Russian assistance with the Northern Distribution Network, a logistics line that has become increasingly important to the coalition effort in Afghanistan in light of instability and insecurity in Pakistan. Spencer quotes Ariel Cohen and suggests that Russian complicity with U.S. wishes on the S-300 deal may be part of some sort of "quid pro quo" for the ministerial visit. But look at the Serdyukov-Gates chat alongside the NDN developments and recent U.S. interest in Russian helicopters. Just so there's no misunderstanding here, the Russians know exactly what's going on; here's what Serdykov had to say after his meetings with Gates: "“We discussed that our cooperation in the military and technical sphere isn’t developing. We, of course, have an interest in some American technology and, I think, they have an interest in some of ours.” Hint hint.

So, seriously: what's in it for Russia? They've helped with the NDN, they've agreed not to sell S-300s to the Iranians, and they're interested in exchanges of defense technology (to include facilitating U.S. efforts to supply warfighting partners with difficult-to-find Russian airframes). It can't be as simple as us refusing to satisfy Georgian pipe dreams about self-defense, right? Or pushing the "overcharge" button? So really: what is it?

UPDATE: This morning's Playbook has a statement on the S-300 issue from National Security Staff spokesman Mike Hammer:

"The White House strongly welcomes the Executive Order signed by Russian President Medvedev which bans the transfer of advanced weaponry to Iran, including the S-300. We believe President Medvedev has demonstrated leadership on holding Iran accountable to its international obligations from start to finish. We welcome this faithful and robust implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1929, and we remain committed alongside our Russian and other P5+1 partners to finding a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue."

UPDATE 2: Josh Rogin has an excellent rundown on this issue, though I think the space he gives to David Kramer's bleating is probably excessive. But to the point of this post, Rogin speculates that Russia's decision is an effort to win support for WTO accession:

As for why the Russians finally decided to scuttle the arms deal after years of lobbying by Washington, the official speculated that Moscow now has something it needs -- and that it finally has faith that the U.S. is willing to help. Russia is jockeying for as much U.S. support as possible for their upcoming bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Moscow is planning to finalize its bid this year.

"Momentum on WTO accession is what they see as they next big negotiations with us. We're right in the middle of that. That's asymmetric because that's more in their interest than ours. I think we have to deliver on that," the official said.

But the Obama administration isn't asking Russia for favors or giving them out in return, the official explained. The idea is to make the U.S.-Russia relationship more valuable to the Russians than their relationship with Iran, and both countries should act in their own interests.

"The objective is not actually to develop a good relationship with Russia. The goal here is to advance our national security and economic interests and to promote universal values," the official said.

The last bit is noteworthy in light of Kramer's criticism, perhaps. Anyway, it's worth reading the whole piece.

Love those exceptionally descriptive German compound words

Seeing as I'm going all negative on y'all lately, here's one to brighten things up. From the Economist's excellent "Defence spending in a time of austerity" (h/t Exum and Paul McLeary) here's a few words on requirements creep:

Jointly developing weapons carries considerable costs: decisions are arduous and work has to be shared out. Reconciling the needs of each can result in building countless variants, or in piling multiple requirements on a single aircraft. This happened to the A400M, which suffered a cost overrun of more than €11 billion. Germany wanted it to skim over treetops, Britain needed it to lift (now-scrapped) new armoured vehicles. Both Britain and France said it had to operate from rough airfields. One Airbus insider calls the A400M an eierlegende Wollmilchsau, or “egg-producing wool-milk-sow”.*

Hilarious imagery, and timely in light of the Army's decision last week to cancel the original solicitation for Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) proposals. Secretary Gates has made the point repeatedly that while industry is to blame for a great many ills of the acquisition and contracting process, the government has its own responsibility to ensure that requirements are well-defined, stable, and ultimately, satisfiable with a reasonable amount of risk.

* No need to parse the translation, Positroll and other German speakers, if it's not totally accurate. Those are the Economist's words, not mine!

On the SECDEF's efficiencies initiative and the poor GOs

Slate's got a funny cartoon up -- apparently by a Jack Ohman -- about Secretary Gates' comments on the profusion of general officers at the Pentagon ("a substantial increase in the most senior leadership... a situation where personnel of higher and higher rank are assigned to do things that could reasonably be handled by personnel of lower rank").

It's not quite this bad, but it ain't far off from that with GS-15s/YA-3s and colonels.

SECDEF clarifies adjustment to Korea OPCON transfer

As I wrote about last week, Geoff Morrell's had a hell of a time dancing around the reasons why we've decided (mutually with our Korean allies) to delay the OPCON transfer from 2012 to 2015. Don't worry, Geoff, the boss has come in to bail you out, and I'm sure now that things are clarified, there won't be any more questions on the subject.

We were scheduled to transfer in April of 2012, but at the request of the Korean government, we agreed to slide the date to 2015 and also make the relationship more robust in terms of exercises, command and control, capabilities, and so on.

I continue to believe that the Koreans are fully capable and a professional military ready to lead the combined defense. But I think this additional time will allow us to make the eventual transfer more wide-ranging and more synchronized and ultimately better for the alliance.

Um, right. We're going to make the eventual transfer more wide-ranging and more synchronized. So there's that cleared up.

"We cannot continue to dismiss actions by North Korea as 'more of the same'"

So says Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK). The question that immediately leaps to mind is something like "ok, so then what should we do?"

The Washington Post is making a big production out of the fact that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen refused yesterday to call North Korea's sinking of a South Korean warship (which cost 46 sailors their lives) an "act of war." The Post's Anne Flaherty pressed the two on the subject during yesterday's press conference, using the words "act of war" in no less than three separate (leading) questions:

SEC. GATES: Anne.

Q Does the United States consider the sinking of the South Korean warship an act of war? And seeing as the United States has vowed to defend South Korea, what do you plan to do about it? What are your options?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, we certainly support the findings of the Korean -- the South Korean investigation. We obviously are in close consultation with the Koreans. The attack was against one of their ships. And we will -- naturally they would have the lead in determining the path forward. They've laid out some paths forward, and we will be consulting very closely with them as we move ahead.

ADM. MULLEN: I spoke to my counterpart yesterday. And we've been engaged with them since the incident, not just from here, but also Admiral Willard in PACOM, as well as, obviously, General Sharp. And we are all focused on that region, the stability in that region -- that needs to be sustained -- and at the same time very focused on supporting our strong ally in the Republic of Korea.

Q But could you say whether or not you agree that -- with the South Koreans that it is in fact an act of war? And can you go over some of the options that you have to
respond?

SEC. GATES: I think that -- I think basically what we've said is about all there is for us to say. We accept the findings and support the findings of the investigation. The Republic of Korea has outlined several paths forward, and we will be consulting very closely with them going forward.

Q Admiral, could you address that too, please? It's clearly an act of war, isn't it?

ADM. MULLEN: Again, I think the secretary -- we've said all we want to say on this right now. Certainly we're concerned about it. We've supported them. We've helped them in the investigation and we agree with the conclusion. They're a great friend and great ally, and we'll continue to do that.

Which makes one wonder exactly what the newspaper's trying to accomplish beyond getting a flashy headline like "SECDEF: KOREA SHIP SINKING 'ACT OF WAR'", right?

Leaving aside the pretty obvious answer to why the press would be interested in inflammatory, provocative, and frankly dangerous pronouncements from senior policymakers, what about the real substance of all this: how does this all shake out? Obviously the U.S. response is conditioned on what the South Koreans decide is necessary, but what would the Jim Inhofes of the world have us do?

How does South Korea defend itself against the aggressive actions of a nuclear-armed neighbor? Does anybody believe that a sort of tit-for-tat, you sink ours, we sink yours kind of reaction is going to accomplish a whole lot, or make something like this less likely in the future?

Seeing as we've all pretty much decided that the North Korean decisionmaking process and apparatus is entirely obscure to us, I'm not going to bother wondering out loud what the hell the DPRK gets out of something like this. Is retributive action necessary to avoid setting some sort of pussified precedent, to avoid emboldening Kim Jong Il and whoever else is running stuff up there to push even harder?

Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA) says "we cannot allow North Korea to take the lives of 46 South Korean sailors with a torpedo attack and pretend it didn't occur," and I'd tend to agree with him. But that doesn't get us any closer to figuring out what we do instead, and I don't have any bright ideas.

Loren Thompson: if you thought he was douchey for his position on shipbuilding, wait 'til you see THIS! (UPDATED)

We already knew Loren Thompson was a shill for the defense industry, but who knew that he's also apparently an unfunny a-hole [meh, edited to excise original, more vitriolic commentary/epithets]?

The only people celebrating at the Pentagon last week were the Mexicans working on renovating the building. Wednesday was Cinco de Mayo, a holiday for honoring Mexican history and culture.

Uh... are you serious?

That's the lead-in to an otherwise tired and uninsightful slap at the SECDEF for his anti-waste speeches last week, the kind of speeches that send shivers down the spine of people who make their living off of fear and unrestrained defense spending. Here's Gates on Saturday:

Given America’s difficult economic circumstances and parlous fiscal condition, military spending on things large and small can and should expect closer, harsher scrutiny. The gusher has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of time.

Wait wait wait... "things large AND small"?? You can cancel the DDG-1000, but how will we get along if you can't pay for MEXICANS TO RENOVATE THE PENTAGON?!?!

UPDATE: Nathan Hodge at Danger Room charitably gives Thompson a chance to clarify his comments. Thompson responds by acting willfully stupid yet again.

And in a phone conversation with Danger Room, Thompson said the comment about Mexicans was a “straightforward observation” about the ethnicity of many of the workers on the Pentagon’s renovation.

“I often notice as I walked in and out of the building that a lot of Hispanics were working in the building,” Thompson said. “It’s not a criticism, it’s just an observation.”

Last week, Thompson added, was Cinco de Mayo, a holiday that honors Mexican history and culture: “We don’t have a lot of Mexicans working desk jobs in the Pentagon. I was just observing that they were the only people in the building that may have had a reason to celebrate.”

Man, that guy sucks.

Serious question: does anyone give a damn about export-control reform? (UPDATED)

Because seriously, I know a lot about this. I think it's pretty boring, and I think most other people think it's boring, but I used to be involved in it professionally and can probably tell you a whole lot about it if suddenly you've got the itch.

The reason I ask is that Secretary Gates, following up on a directive by President Obama last August to undertake a thorough review of the USG's export-control regime, today made a major speech to a meeting of the Business Executives for National Security outlining exactly why the old system isn't working and how he envisions the reform process going.

The fact is . . . America’s decades-old, bureaucratically labyrinthine system does not serve our 21st-century security needs or our economic interests. It is clear our current limitations in this area undermine our ability to work with and through partners to confront shared threats and challenges – from terrorism to rogue states to rising powers. Our security interests would be far better served by a more agile, transparent, predictable, and efficient regime. Tinkering around the edges of our current system will not do.

For these reasons and more, in August of last year, the president directed a broad-based review of the U.S. export-control regime. He has called for reforms that focus controls on key technologies and items that pose the greatest national-security threat. These include items and technologies related to global terrorism, the proliferation and delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction, and advanced conventional weapons. In short, a system where higher walls are placed around fewer, more critical items.

Following this directive, and informed by a recent National Intelligence Council assessment of the key national-security considerations, I have worked closely with my counterparts at the departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security, as well as with the director of national intelligence and the national security advisor to develop a blueprint for such a system. Our plan relies on four key reforms: a single export-control list, a single licensing agency, a single enforcement-coordination agency, and a single information-technology system.

This is sort of a big deal, I guess, especially when considered in concert with the SECDEF's article in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs advocating for security assistance reform (about which more later). Export-control reform can be seen as a significant part of streamlining the security assistance process, making it more flexible, agile, and responsive -- something that everybody wants.

So if you care about this, tell me. Or if you have questions, ask them. We can go into this deeper, and I can provide you with a whole lot of context and explain why this is important to national security, or how the old system works, or why the new system will or won't be better, or whatever, or we can all be happy to say "export-control regime(s) being reformed and streamlined, check, duly noted, carry on smartly," etc. It's up to y'all.

(Note that this reader discretion does not extend to security assistance reform, which I am going to beat you over the head with whether you like it or not. But again, more on that later.)

UPDATE: I initially forgot to include the link to this transcript of a "senior defense officials" press briefing on export-control reform from Monday (prior to the SECDEF's speech).

While we're at it, here's some other coverage, too: Post / Spencer / Hill / Reuters

And Bernard Finel pops in to usefully link us to Evelyn Farkas' report on the subject for the American Security Project, which strikes me as thorough and well-done (if perhaps a touch OBE as a result of these most recent announcements).

Welcome to the party, David, even if you're like three years late

Did you know that America's global competitors are focusing on the development of anti-access technologies to counter U.S. power projection and expeditionary capabilities? Oh, you did? Yeah, me too. I heard from Andy Krepinevich like a year ago. And Bob Gates even before that. David Wood just caught on, apparently from "Pentagon strategists." But, I mean, that's cool -- keep getting the word out!

The United States, Pentagon strategists say, is quickly losing its ability to barge in without permission. Potential target countries and even some lukewarm allies are figuring out ingenious ways to blunt American power without trying to meet it head-on, using a combination of high-tech and low-tech jujitsu.

At the same time, U.S. naval and air forces have been shrinking under the weight of ever more expensive hardware. It's no longer the case that the United States can overwhelm clever defenses with sheer numbers.As Defense Secretary Robert Gates summed up the problem this month, countries in places where the United States has strategic interests -- including the Persian Gulf and the Pacific -- are building "sophisticated, new technologies to deny our forces access to the global commons of sea, air, space and cyberspace.''Those innocuous words spell trouble. While the U.S. military and strategy community is focused on Afghanistan and the fight in Marja, others – Iran and China, to name two – are chipping away at America's access to the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf and the increasingly critical extraterrestrial realms.

On the bright side, Wood links to Krepinevich's new study Why AirSea Battle?, which focuses on DoD's efforts to develop a counter-anti-access operational concept. It's worth a read. While you're at it, you might also take a look at Gunslinger's Document of the Week: The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confonting Irregular Challenges (or as Bernard Finel described it on Twitter, "fascinating document. Shows the power of the COIN/hybrid war junta inside the building." Um, right).

I probably wouldn't highlight this Wood piece on any other day, but I have a case of the redass about an appearance he made on the Diane Rehm Show the other night, in which he said some frankly idiotic things about what's going on in Afghanistan. (My favorite part is where he says that U.S. forces are pursuing "in essence a conventional, industrial-age strategy in Marja, not unlike one you saw in the American Civil War 150 years ago.") I would really encourage you not to listen.

Morrell explains Gates' uniform directive

Here's what I wrote on this a month ago.

In a move that I roundly applaud, Secretary Gates has apparently told his military staff to stop wearing cammies/ACUs/utilities/battle dress/whatever else you want to call it to the office.

Geoff Morrell got asked about it in his press conference yesterday, and he elaborated on the decision. His answer is copied here in full for your edification and education.

Q Real quickly, has there been a decision made to change within the Pentagon -- to change the dress code for the military? And if so, what's the thinking behind that?

MR. MORRELL: Let me try to do this in one minute.

There's not been a decision from on high about this. To give you the quick history of this, the secretary has for a long time been thinking about making a change in his office. When he came back from Christmas vacation, he asked his military staff to switch out of their BDUs, out of their fatigues, and into dress uniforms, their more appropriate work uniforms.

His thinking was simply that this is the headquarters of the United States military in our nation's capital. He hosts leaders from around the world. The people we do business with, from across the river, the professionals that come to see us are all dressed in business attire. And he thought it was time for his office to be dressed accordingly.

This is -- he understands fully why this building changed in 19 -- in 2001 into its fatigues. This building was hit, it was attacked. We were at war. Not only was that the appropriate dress, in the aftermath of that attack, it showed solidarity with the warfighter.

I think we are at a point now where he believes at least that what one dresses in does not necessarily reflect their commitment to the warfighter or, and that there are other ways to demonstrate their solidarity. Frankly it's by doing everything you can, once you walk in this door every day, to make sure they have what they need to succeed.

This was not a mandate for the building as a whole. This was meant for his staff. If others take notice, as they clearly have, and make adjustments, that is their decision. And I think you've seen some offices go about that.

You'll certainly see the people you deal with in Public Affairs, starting Monday [March 1], dressed in their business or dress attire. And I think you'll likely see other officers in the building as well. But it was not by fiat. It was not mandated. It's -- they've probably taken notice of the change upstairs and re-evaluated their own policies.

So there's that handled.

Bob Gates or Bill Gertz -- who seems more sane?

Bill Gertz wrote a piece in today's Washington Times bleating about an essentially meaningless downgrade in China's intelligence collection priority, a move that's intended to ease tensions with Beijing.

The White House National Security Council recently directed U.S. spy agencies to lower the priority placed on intelligence collection for China, amid opposition to the policy change from senior intelligence leaders who feared it would hamper efforts to obtain secrets about Beijing's military and its cyber-attacks.

The downgrading of intelligence gathering on China was challenged by Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair and CIA Director Leon E. Panetta after it was first proposed in interagency memorandums in October, current and former intelligence officials said.

The decision downgrades China from "Priority 1" status, alongside Iran and North Korea, to "Priority 2," which covers specific events such as the humanitarian crisis after the Haitian earthquake or tensions between India and Pakistan.

The National Security Council staff, in response, pressed ahead with the change and sought to assure Mr. Blair and other intelligence chiefs that the change would not affect the allocation of resources for spying on China or the urgency of focusing on Chinese spying targets, the officials told The Washington Times.

White House National Security Council officials declined to comment on the intelligence issue. Mike Birmingham, a spokesman for Mr. Blair, declined to comment. A CIA spokesman also declined to comment.

But administration officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the new policy is part of the Obama administration's larger effort to develop a more cooperative relationship with Beijing.

I'm gonna be honest: I have no idea what it means to move a state from Pri 1 to Pri 2. Gertz says that there's no movement of assets or shift in resources, but I have to wonder what the hell this rating even means if there's no money or people associated with the ranking. That aside, what's really telling is the last paragraph in the section I've quoted above: Gertz expects his audience to feel outrage at the suggestion that we'd want to have a "more cooperative relationship with Beijing." (Also, dude, why do you need three sentences to say "the NSC, DNI, and CIA all had no comment"?!)

Contrast this with the eminently sane Bob Gates, responding to a question in India today about whether he and his Indian counterparts had discussed cooperative responses to Chinese cyber threats:

We didn’t talk about China at length. We did talk in more generic terms about a common interest in security of the Indian Ocean and security of the global commons, and the global commons meaning the air, sea, space, and if you’re talking about the internet, the ether, I suppose.

There was a discussion about China’s military modernization program and what it meant and what the intentions of that military buildup were. And a desire, I won’t speak for the Indian side, but certainly a desire on our part to engage China in a more routine, in-depth dialogue about our strategic intentions and plans so as to avoid any miscalculations or misunderstandings down the road. As I’ve long said, I was involved with the strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union for many many years. I’m not sure those talks ever actually reduced any arms, but the dialogue over a long period of time with great candor about nuclear capabilities, thinking about nuclear options, thinking about how each side looked at nuclear weapons and at their military modernizations, I think played a significant role over time in preventing miscalculations and mistakes in the relationship between these two super powers during the Cold War. I think that kind of a dialogue with China would be most productive and frankly in the best interests of global stability.

Sounds about right to me. And what about you: are you a Gatesian or a Gertzian on China? (I'm not going to pretend like I have a charitable neutrality on this. If you think Bill Gertz is smarter on long-term strategy towards China than Bob Gates, then... Well hell, I don't know, vote Republican I guess. Mabe Pete Hoekstra will run for president!)