Much ado about nuclear nothings

The Telegraph has caused quite a stir by reporting that the New START Treaty negotiations require the United States to provide information on Trident II Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) that the U.S. sells to the United Kingdom. Some folks have been up in arms about this, believing it to be a slight to our partners in the Special Relationship. While it seems like a pretty dickish move by the U.S., I don't see it that way.

Firstly, the language of the agreement in the document linked to by the Telegraph only requires the U.S. to report to Russia on Trident II missiles while they are in U.S. hands. Essentially, the treaty requires the U.S. to report and allow inspection of all offensive arms produced and maintained by both parties, including SLBMs. We have to report on each Trident II we make - why on earth would the missiles we make for the UK be exempt from that? I'm sure the Russians would just accept an "Oh those? Those are for the UK. Don't worry about them and please don't look at or count them." I know this is surprising, given U.S.-Russian relations over the decades, but something tells me that the treaty would be completely useless unless we gave them the details on our export missiles. Same, same for when the UK returns them to us for destruction at the end of their life cycle. We can't have the treaty at all (the overall effect of which is still up for debate) without this clause. Which was, apparently, in the 1991 START Treaty. There is no change in policy on this.

Our UK readers are probably thinking, "That's all fine and good for you, but what about us?? This screws us!!" Not exactly. Your new government has changed its policy on keeping its stockpile a secret and is moving towards increasing transparency on its nuclear weapons and policies. Since the UK uses SLBMs exclusively and you have a known number of submarines, the whole world knows you can only keep 160 missiles in operation at any given time. You also make your own warheads, so each missile's yield is still your state secret and not something we can know or share with the Russians. This clause doesn't change what the world knows about your arsenal, where it is, or how it may ever be used.

Bottom line is everyone needs to calm down. This hasn't changed anything that has already been ongoing for 20 years and no one's security is degraded by it. It sounds like the U.S. is screwing the UK, but a few minutes of reading reveals that we're not. The Special Relationship may not be as special as it used to be, but we're not stabbing you in the back. Well, in the New START Treaty at least. The other takeaway? Never take anything the Telegraph reports at face value. Ever.

UPDATE: John Noonan pointed out to me via Twitter that I was erroneously referring to the recent treaty as START II when New START is the appropriate term. Apologies for the inaccuracy.

From the Special Relationship to a Dependency Relationship

For those who haven't noticed, the United Kingdom this week has released a National Security Strategy and the follow-on Strategic Defence and Security Review. First, the good news: cuts are not as drastic as had been reported in UK papers the past few weeks. I guess the government was leaking a Doomsday scenario, because the final decision on defence cuts aren't nearly as bad as were leaked.

Other good news is that the UK intends to keep carrier-based aircraft (going through with the purchase of a carrier model Joint Strike Fighter), although after the Harriers are cut there will be a period when the UK will not have a carrier capability until 2020 when the HMS Prince of Wales is completed. But it's good news for the long-term interests of the UK (in my mind at least). Also, the UK will maintain defence spending around 2% of GDP, per NATO requirements (even if this requirement is rarely met by member nations).

Now for the bad news. There are probably quite a few people who think that these documents are full of bad news, but I'm going to focus on one aspect that I'm probably most qualified to speak to: ground forces. The cuts are atrocious. The SDSR sizes ground forces to the ability to conduct:

• one brigade-level operation with maritime and air support for a long period of time, while also conducting:
• one non-enduring "complex" intervention with up to 2,000 personnel, and
• one non-enduring simple intervention of up to 1,000 personnel.

Or

• three non-enduring operations (presumptively with a brigade and a half?)

Or

• a limited-duration, one-off operation with 30,000 troops (according to the paper, 2/3 of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003).

A brigade is all they'll be able to field for any long-term operation, which then prohibits their ability to deploy a whole division in an emergency. A brigade. The government takes pride that the UK is one of only a few countries in the world able to do so. I'm sorry, but I'm not impressed. Granted, it's easy to sit here in the United States, a veteran of my country's forces and say who cares about your brigade. But who cares? A brigade is a very powerful organization, but if you keep in mind that it took no less than six brigade combat teams to surround and secure Baghdad during the Surge (or two very large divisions) - and that many of those brigades would likely be called a division (-) in most militaries around the world given their extra battalions. What does the UK expect they would be able to do with a brigade? Or a division. Short of a nuclear deterrent, the UK is positioning themselves to be virtually unable to project ground forces to meet their own strategic needs without significant support from coalition partners. By that, I mean the United States.

This is a tough pill to swallow given the very close US-UK relationship. With the UK so limited in their ability to use flexible force around the globe, they will undoubtedly require US assistance if their strategic needs obscure the "or"s on the lists above and "and"s become realities. To say nothing of the UK's obligations to NATO and EU operations. Secretaries Clinton and Gates have already stressed that cuts such as these decrease the alliance's capabilities and that other countries will expect the US to fill their own gaps. If you read the UK NSS, that is obviously their expectation.

But this will become untenable for the US. Every country is feeling a tightening belt and the US will be no exception once our current conflicts wind down. Who is to say the US will be able to fill this very large gap in Western capabilities? We don't know that the US will be able to in 10 years after we gouge our own defense budget. And that ignores our will to do so to come to the UK's aid when and where they may need us to. Yes, the UK needs to align their defense spending with their treasury means. But those means don't align with their security strategy. Which weakens the UK's security. And since they're going to depend so much upon the US, it is possible that these cuts could weaken the US's security as well. I said it a couple weeks ago and I'll say it again: the US needs to develop special military relationships outside of Europe because the utility and efficacy of NATO is decreasing - creating more risk for the United States and decreasing benefits to the US.

Happy St. David's Day!

I'm sure you all have a daffodil (or a leek) in your lapel, right?

Spare a thought today for the boys of the Royal Welsh, celebrating the fourth anniversary of the regiment's formation (through the agglomeration of the historic Royal Welch Fusiliers and Royal Regiment of Wales) by kicking ass in TF Helmand.

Which part of Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build are these guys doing?

The London Daily Telegraph today reports on a British unit called the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) in Helmand, incidentally under the eye-catching headline "Taliban Fly Bloodied British Uniforms as Warning." The article focuses on a raid by BRF troops on a small compound where Taliban have been reportedly spotted, mentioning how the British troops were stopping vehicles leaving the area and collecting biometric data on military-aged males. (I gather the drivers of those vehicles are responding to ISAF's call for civilians to evacuate the Marja area in advance of Operation Moshtarak, but I suppose that's only peripherally relevant.)

The force attacked the Taliban position, killing a commander and two fighters. “What we have to do out here is kill low-level commanders, that’s the key. But we are not some hunter-killer force, we are here to find the enemy, gather information and then it’s up to others what to do with it.”

The Daily Telegraph joined the BRF for a mission into an area, whose location cannot be disclosed, that is known to harbour Taliban commanders and bomb-ferrying routes. Setting out in a fast-moving column of Jackal off-road vehicles that, while vulnerable to bombs, can drive across difficult terrain avoiding ambushes, we left in darkness using night vision goggles to navigate.

Mounted with grenade launchers and .50 calibre heavy machine guns, the Jackals swept through to a compound where intelligence had suggested arms were hidden. Accompanied by Afghan commandos, the soldiers found an AK47 and Makarov pistol and the compound owner was detained. In another home, three pairs of handcuffs, a cosh and binoculars were found in a haystack.

Along a narrow dirt road, BRF soldiers stopped vehicles driving close to the area targeted by Operation Moshtarak.

But here's the real money quote:

The 100-strong BRF, which is similar to the Parachute Regiment’s Pathfinders, was formed specifically for the six month tour and takes in men from 12 different regiments who have passed a selection course that has a 50 per cent failure rate. “We operate behind enemy lines where ground holding troops cannot go,” said Capt Robin BourneTaylor, a BRF troop commander. “Our job is to disrupt, screen and find the enemy.”

I'm not sure exactly how this differs from what SOF are doing, particularly when Capt BourneTaylor draws a distinction between his men and "ground holding troops." What exactly constitutes "behind enemy lines"? Does this mean that they're capable of swift raiding in places that would draw more resistance if slower-moving, heavier forces were to enter the area?

Listen, I think we can go beyond the COIN buzzwords and understand that there are things going on that might not seem to fit the template. I'm not willing to go so far as Ex and offer up a blanket condemnation for anyone who's talking about chasing bad guys. But really, this sort of raiding -- what's being accomplished? That house where they found an AK and a Makarov and detained the owner... isn't it possible that this is the proverbial one weapon per house for self-defense?

And what of "what we have to do out here is kill low-level commanders, that's the key"? Is it, really? He goes on to note that this isn't really their job, that they're just an intelligence-gathering force. Well, ok, but are they doing intel-gathering for more hunter-killer raids? It's fine to collect intelligence that informs offensive and kinetic operations, but (and this all links back to the Flynn report from last month) there's a difference between what they're calling "mapping the human terrain" and collecting strike-targeting data.

So I guess the answer is that these guys are doing what's called IPB -- intelligence preparation of the battlefield, "a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making. Applying the IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield" -- in an enemy-controlled area in advance of an offensive there. Which is to say that they're shaping the battlefield for the Clear portion, I suppose, if we're being charitable.

Am I reading too much into this? I don't want to be the guy who objects just because people are using the wrong words, or failing to echo BG Nicholson's repeated refrain that "the people are the prize in counterinsurgency."