Three Indian Peacekeepers Killed in Eastern DRC and UN Builds a Trench Around Refugee Camp

Three Indian peacekeepers were killed overnight in Eastern Congo, the UN reports. Apparently, the base, in Karumba (in North Kivu), was attacked in the middle of the night (2am) by up to 60 armed men who wielded machetes and spears.

The article says:

Several peacekeepers engaged with the attackers, forcing them to retreat, but at least six military personnel were injured in the surprise attack, some of them critically. In the attack, whose motive is unclear, the assailants also stole two MONUSCO weapons.

And then the MONUSCO spokesperson (MONUSCO is new name for MONUC, the UN's mission in DRC) said:

The blue helmets, he stressed, “are not party to the conflict. They are here to ensure peace. So we don’t know exactly what are reasons behind this attack.”

This isn't the kind of thing that the peacekeepers should be dealing with or at least not if you're calling them peacekeepers. But, they are and it's clear they didn't have what it takes to respond adequately (MK, some help here would be nice). That being said, it is clear that the UN's peacekeepers in the DRC have long been a party to the conflict: they continue to provide support to the Congolese Army's efforts to defeat the FDLR and other rebel groups in the East. It's also clear that clinging to this pretense of impartiality, pretending that what is happening in Eastern Congo is "peacekeeping," and not providing contingents with what they need to really do at least a decent job, is completely counter-productive. Finally, the motive was unclear? Umm, how about just scaring these soldiers, threatening them, and sending a message that they are not in control?

Meanwhile, in Darfur, the UN/African Union Mission, UNAMID, is building a trench around Nyala and Kalma refugee camp. UNAMID is working with the local government to build a 40km long trench. You'll recall that the area has been suffering from increased crime and violence in recent months.

'The measure is designed to reduce the high incidence of criminality by regulating travel to and from the town,' UNAMID said on Monday, explaining that while the trench would limit entry and exit through small roads, Kalma town will remain fully accessible through major roads and highways. According to the Mission, local authorities will provide 24-hour protection for UNAMID equipment and personnel until the project’s completion.

I wonder how much it will help but that's it for today's "peacekeeping update."

Gallup Poll on Prospects for Peace in Eastern Congo

Gallup has a new poll out on Congolese views on the prospects for peace in the country. Gallup interviewed 1,000 Congolese adults in late 2009.

Gallup found that "Congolese surveyed late last year were optimistic about the future of the region; a majority (63%) agree there can be peace in eastern Congo within the next 12 months."

But before you get your hopes up, Gallup owns up to a major problem with data collection:

While Gallup could not interview people in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) because of security constraints, media reports document concern among people in the region about what will happen once U.N. peacekeepers leave as DRC President Joseph Kabila has requested. U.N. peacekeepers arrived in DRC in 1999 to help protect civilians and disarm and demobilize combatants, but the vast territory and lack of resources have hindered their role.

Congolese surveyed believe there can be an internal solution to the problems in eastern Congo, with residents most likely to spontaneously mention the government (51%) and the president (33%) when asked to name the party responsible for bringing peace. Despite its presence in the region for more than 10 years, relatively few Congolese view the United Nations as responsible for peace.

Gallup also asked about the role of Rwanda's role in bringing peace. A large majority of those interviewed (84%) said they did NOT think Rwanda was playing a positive role in bringing peace to the east.

My larger question is: why bother spending what I can only imagine is a lot of money polling if you don't even interview those most affected by the conflict? How exactly is this poll of any use?

MONUC's new mandate and directive on cooperation with the FARDC

Several important things have happened in the last few weeks with regard to MONUC's mandate and its role in supporting the FARDC.

But first, some background. As you might remember, just before the mandate was renewed on December 23, the New York Times ran this story, with links to relevant memos, about recommendations the UN's Office of Legal Affairs had made concerning MONUC's support to Kimia II, the operation the Congolese Army (FARDC) had been prosecuting against the FDLR. Basically, the memos cautioned MONUC against supporting FARDC units if these units were suspected of or known to have committed human rights abuses.

Next, Human Rights Watch issued its latest report, criticizing MONUC's support to the FARDC and recommending that clear conditions be set for continuing support, in particular that no support be provided to units known to abuse human rights. Next, the Congolese authorities, after seeing a draft of the resolution, threatened to kick out senior MONUC staff because such a mandate would impinge on DRC's sovereignty and violate the SOFA the UN has with the DRC.

Then, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Alan Doss (whom more people than I can count have said should resign for reasons ranging from not being tough enough with the Congolese authorities to just being a pain to deal with because he won't take any criticism or advice), reported to the Security Council on his work and announced the end of Kimia II operations.

On December 23, the Council passed a resolution, here, extending the mission but only for 6 months. Second, it ranked MONUC's priorities starting with protection of civilians, and moving to implementing effective DDR(RR) (that Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation, and Resettlement in case you get lost with your Rs, like I do), and finally coordinating SSR (Security Sector Reform) between donors and the Congolese authorities.

Finally, the Council provided conditions under which MONUC can support ongoing FARDC operations:

...the support of MONUC to FARDC-led military operations against foreign and Congolese armed groups is strictly conditioned on FARDC’s compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and on an effective joint planning of these operations, decides that MONUC military leadership shall confirm, prior to providing any support to such operations that sufficient joint planning has been undertaken, especially regarding the protection of the civilian population, calls upon MONUC to intercede with the FARDC command if elements of a FARDC unit receiving MONUC’s support are suspected of having committed grave violations of such laws, and if the situation persists, calls upon MONUC to withdraw support from these FARDC units.

Yesterday, MONUC outlined the new conditions under which it will provide support to FARDC's successor to Kimia II, Amani Leo. According to a press release:

The Operation’s principal objectives are to protect civilian populations, clear strategic areas of negative forces, hold territory liberated from FDLR control, and assist in restoring State authority in these zones. The Special Representative also informed the Council that Operation Amani Leo would include preventive interventions aimed at stopping the FDLR from regrouping and attacking civilian populations and re-occupying major mining areas...

The FARDC and MONUC will concentrate on controlling strategic areas in order to ensure that armed groups, notably residual FDLR elements, will not be able to retake territory and inflict reprisals. The Operation aims at creating conditions for stabilization and re-establishment of State authority. Coordination between civilian and military components will be strengthened to stabilize these areas and create conditions for the safe return of civilian populations.

The FARDC and MONUC Force commands are engaged in intensive joint planning down to the tactical level in order to improve communications, liaison and planning throughout the Operation.

At the FARDC’s request, MONUC will provide rations and other essential support to those FARDC units carrying out protection and preventive operations provided that they are jointly planned and conducted in accordance with international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law...

As you can tell, MONUC is making an effort to abide by the Council's conditions but I have a couple questions. Doesn't Amani Leo look exactly like Kimia IIb or maybe Kimia III? Second, what constitutes joint planning? How is this being done down the tactical level? Finally, since when does the UN do clear, hold, and build? I kept being told--both in Goma and Kinshasa, "we're fighting an insurgency here but no one will use the word or actually behave like this is the case." Has this changed or is this just a not so great PR stunt?

DRC Group of Experts Report Leaked

The DRC Group of Experts' Report, which is due to be discussed by the Security Council today, was, it seems, pretty systematically leaked to the media. Usually, that means that it's extremely controversial and that there's concern that it might get watered down by annoyed member states. Leaking it like this basically forces the Secretariat and the Council to discuss the report and its findings.

Anyway, you can read the stories about it in the following outlets: Reuters, BBC, New York Times, and Associated Press.

Finally, Jason Stearns, over at Congo Siasa, has excerpts of the report itself. I've pasted the Summary below and I will provide the link to the full report once it's out.

Summary

This report concludes that military operations against the FDLR have failed to dismantle the organization’s political and military structures on the ground in eastern DRC. The increasing rate of FDLR combatant defections and the FDLR temporary removal from many of its bases are only a partial success considering that the armed group has regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and continues to recruit new fighters. This report shows that the FDLR continues to benefit from residual but significant support from top commanders of the FARDC, particularly those officers in the 10^th military region (South Kivu), and has sealed strategic alliances with other armed groups in both North and South Kivu. External support networks, both regional and international, have been used by FDLR in the field to counteract the effects of Kimia II, for instance networks in Burundi and Tanzania. [...]

The Group investigated the FDLR’s ongoing exploitation of natural resources in the Kivus, notably gold and cassiterite reserves which the Group calculates continue to deliver millions of dollars in direct financing into FDLR coffers. This report illustrates how FDLR gold networks are intertwined tightly with trading networks operating within Uganda and Burundi as well as the UAE. The Group also documents that a number of minerals exporting houses, some of whom were named in the Group’s previous report in 2008, continue to trade with the FDLR. This report shows that end buyers for this cassiterite include the Malaysia Smelting Corporation and the Thailand Smelting and Refining Company, held by Amalgamated Metals Corporation, a UK entity.

The report analyzes the integration of non-state armed groups into the FARDC through the rapid integration in January 2009; as well as prior and during the FARDC/RDF joint operation Umoja Wetu and Kimia II. In this context, the CNDP officer class, in particular General Bosco Ntaganda, has continued to retain heavy weapons acquired during its period of rebellion in spite of its official integration into the FARDC and still controls revenue generating activities and parallel local administrations. The Group also presents documentary evidence showing that Gen Ntaganda continues to act as Kimia II deputy operational commander.

CNDP military officers deployed as part of FARDC Kimia II operations have profited from their deployment in mineral rich areas, notably at the Bisie mine in Walikale, North Kivu, and in the territory of Kalehe, in South Kivu. In both these areas, the FARDC commanding officers on the ground are ex-CNDP officers. The Group includes evidence in the report showing direct involvement of CNDP military officials in the supply of minerals to a number of exporting houses in North and South Kivu, some of which also supply the same international companies mentioned above. [...]

MONUC 10 Years Later: Anything New?

MONUC's mandate is up for renewal in a couple weeks and there's lots of discussion now about what needs to change and what MONUC should do differently. The discussion is also occurring in the context of MONUC's 10th anniversary and a strong desire, both at the UN and of course within the Congolese government, for the mission to begin drawing down. There's also much controversy over MONUC's support to the Congolese Army (FARDC) as it attempts to get rid of the FDLR.

Given this context, I thought that what the Force Commander, General Babacar Gaye, told the Congolese paper, Le Potentiel, in an interview was interesting. He explained his evolving strategy in DRC. It's in French--the link is to Relief Web.

The General said:

It would be pertinent to evaluate the situation and put in place new modes of action rather than launch counter-guerilla operations which requires capacities and means that the FARDC does not have have. This is why it's better to control the zones where the FDLR usually came to stock up on resources.

He adds that this effort needs to happen alongside better support to security sector reform, in particular for the Army and National Policy, and capacity building for Congolese institutions.

Does this seem a little confused to you? I'm not sure I get it because so far the only thing that's happened is that ongoing operations have pushed the FDLR deeper into Congo but without protecting populations from reprisals. They have also not completely cut off the FDLR from their mineral resource funding bases, and finally security sector reform efforts right now are not much beyond really intent prayers. So I'm curious, what are your thoughts on a strategy for MONUC and how should its mandate change?

Germany Arrests FDLR Leaders

In case you missed it, Germany arrested two key FDLR leaders earlier this week.

Ignace Murwanashyaka, the leader of the FDLR rebel group, and his aide Straton Musoni were held on suspicion of crimes against humanity and war crimes

Jason Stearns, over at Congo Siasa, explains why this matters (incidentally, if you're interested in DRC and you don't read his blog, you should, it's great). In short, while these two leaders have not been in Rwanda for years, the UN group of experts (of which Stearns was a member last year) has documented the FDLR's reliance on its leaders abroad. It's been tricky though to get Germany and other states to act on evidence against these officials. I suspect that Germany in particular might have been encouraged to do so after being briefed by the current group of experts on new evidence on these leaders. As Jason says, you'll have to wait for the report (due out mid-December at the latest) to find out what that evidence is.

Meanwhile, Rwanda has requested the extradition of the arrested leaders. This BBC article also has more on the FDLR.

Washington Times series on Congo and Rape

I don't normally read the Washington Times much but this headline today caught my eye as I was walking to work this morning: "Congo's shame: rape used as a tool of war." The Times (for our international readers, the Times is considered a right-wing newspaper here in Washington and it's not as well regarded as the Washington Post) is running a three day special on DRC--more specifically on rape as a weapon of war. The series is based on six weeks of reporting in the war-torn country.

I've read the first article and it's a pretty good introduction to the problem of rape in DRC. There's also a couple narrated slideshows/videos that you might want to watch/listen to (while the pictures are difficult, the narration/interviews can be rather graphic).

There's not really much to say except move coverage of this is a positive development. I think it's a good thing that a paper like the Washington Times is covering this because I suspect its readers aren't normally exposed to the reality of war in DRC.

Beautiful Photos from Eastern Congo

The New York Times has these beautiful photographs from Eastern Congo.

There's more I want to write about but I just got back from a business trip to New York and need to finish follow up...so weapons trafficking will have to wait a bit (though with my luck, it's probably actually work to look at it).

In the meantime, go take a look at those photos.

War in Congo: Rape, the Secretary of State and Security Sector Reform (Update 2)

Secretary Clinton is on an 11 day, 7 nation trip through Africa this week and next. She started in Kenya and Angola. Today she was in Kinshasa and then Goma and highlighted the continuing use of rape as a weapon in the long-running Congolese conflict. There are a several things to flag and read if you haven't already.

First, the Washington Post has this horrifying piece about the rising rate in rape as a result of the ongoing FARDC offensive against the FDLR (in part the former Rwandan genocidaires). What I found was different about the piece: interviews with rape victims and interviews with soldiers who try to justify/rationalize their behavior. It also describes how nothing happens, even when commanders are notified of these crimes.

The story includes an interview with a soldier explaining that lack of pay, lack of food rations, and being away from home, justify rape (the can of sardines was supposed to be a food ration for several soldiers for more than a week):

"The truth is like this," said one officer, sitting under a shed and sipping a powerful local brew. "What is making soldiers to do these bad things is their treatment by the army. Imagine, one can of sardines?! And you send a soldier away for 10 years?! So, I'm hungry, I'm in need of a wife and I have no money to pay for a prostitute, he said. "If I see a woman walking on the road, and I love her, I will take her. I will help myself."

So, in Goma, Secretary Clinton, reportedly visibly shaken by her conversations with victims, announced $17 million in assistance.

She also reportedly spoke to President Kabila about improving pay, living conditions,and training for the Congolese armed forces. That sounds nice, but let's hope she provided more advice than that. Since Ambassador Rice keeps saying the US is actually going to contributing more than its substantial assessed contributions to UN operations, maybe we can figure out a way to help build capacity for military justice for example, perhaps by training others to do it given our obligations in Afghanistan.

Since we've learned a lot recently about actually paying soldiers, lowering absenteeism rates and increasing professionalism, maybe that's something we could share with the EU and the UN as they work to professionalize the FARDC. One thing is for sure, things aren't going to change in Congo until we figure out ways to make sure the FARDC aren't away from home for too long, and of course are held accountable for raping, looting, and generally behaving like a bunch thugs.

UPDATE 1: More on Clinton's plan to fight rape in DRC:

She announced that the American government would train doctors, supply rape victims with video cameras to document violence, send American military engineers to help build facilities and train Congolese police officers, especially female police officers, to crack down on rapists.

That and the Secretary also mentioned the need to better regulate the conflict-funding mineral trade in the region.

UPDATE 2: Thanks to Vanessa for pointing this out but Texas in Africa (and some people in the comments) makes the following observation about the program:

$17 million is a drop in the bucket compared to what is needed to treat the tens of thousands of victims who need immediate help...That money is nowhere near enough to whip the police force into shape (and they need training on more issues than just gender-based violence), but it will certainly help.

And then a commenter:

Also on the camcorders - don't they contain coltan, and wouldn't distributing large numbers of them simply increase the demand for the mineral "they" say should be curtailed to stop the violence? Or don't they believe that?

Well, obviously, I don't know how many camcorders we're talking about but that strikes me as the deepest of ironies. The minerals are funding the conflict. The soldiers/combatants who are exploiting resources rape women. And then later the women get the camcorders, the very camcorders for which the resources are exploited and...And as Texas in Africa points out, that's money we're not spending on training/properly paying security forces.

"Today, there are no soldiers in Congo. Today, they are jokers."

This is how a Congolese WWII veteran describes his country's forces today. The quote is from a Washington Post story from yesterday about a camp for Congolese WWII veterans in Eastern Congo.

The story describes how they were "recruited" and served in the war. They weren't really recruited at all of course, more kidnapped and made to fight for Belgium (does that sound familiar?).

The story raises the question of how you support veterans in countries like Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and of course Afghanistan. Figuring out what an adequate pension looks like has been a challenge and a source of tension in these countries. In many cases, ex-combatants found to lack the qualifications to integrate new forces have refused to demobilize until they were assured sufficient pensions to support themselves and their families.

Still, I was surprised that these veterans were apparently paid pensions until the fall of Mobutu:

The men returned to eastern Congo after the war. Tami [one of the veterans] became a nurse; Ngumbi became a farmer. During the rule of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, who wrecked the economy but also instilled a sense of national and African pride, the men said they received a decent pension.

When Mobutu was overthrown in a coup, though, the pensions stopped. These days, the veterans get by on food and help from relatives.

War has swept a few times through Walikale, with a succession of rebel groups and recently the Congolese army -- now known as one of the worst-trained armies on the planet -- looting the veterans' camp. The soldiers stole the men's boots, their uniforms, their Congolese flag, and most of their medals.

And the story ends with the title quote.

Want to listen to Radio France Internationale? Pas au Congo

This week, the DRC government cut the radio signal for Radio France France Internationale (RFI). RFI, which is basically the equivalent of Voice of America, has a 27% audience share in DRC. Its signal was cut for the third time in three months.

What did RFI report about to warrant being banned? The Committee to Protect Journalists says:

RFI stated that Congolese authorities faulted the station for citing a July 22 AFP news item that reported on the desertion of ex-rebels who had joined the national army as part of a peace deal. The AFP report quoted the military spokesman of the United Nations Organization Mission in DRC, Lt. Col. Jean-Paul Dietrich, as saying that the deserters complained of nonpayment of salaries, ethnic conflicts, and sluggish bureaucracy within the Congolese army.

None of this is untrue so it's a clear case of the government not wanting its difficulties broadly reported. If it's true, one of the government's legitimate criticisms of RFI is that the station was not giving the authorities airtime to deny the reporting or further explain events from their own point of view.

So why does it matter? Because radio is how people get news in Congo. The population is largely illiterate so radio is how people find out what's going on. As in other places, radio broadcasts can of course be used mobilize listeners but they can also be used to defuse tension by keeping listeners better informed. This is why most UN missions set up radio stations. In Congo, the station is called Radio Okapi and they play an important part not just in keeping people informed and defusing tensions, but also in training journalists and highlighting the role that media can play in keeping authorities open and accountable.

Radio Okapi did report on why RFI was banned, providing the government's reasoning and an interview with a media defense organization (the article is in French). That part of the article says the media defense organization agrees with the government's decision and that RFI will have to be more accommodating in order to resume its broadcasts.

So the larger questions I think include how do you balance freedom of the press with legal requirements to "not demoralize troops who are conducting ongoing operations" and at what points should donors, MONUC, and others protest these types of decisions? I'm skeptical that reporting on the well-known difficulties the FARDC faces as it integrates formerly rebel CNDP forces and battles the FDLR warrants shutting down a radio station. The government's heavy-handedness also makes me wonder what the repercussions will be for other stations as they work to report on the same issues.

What is the role and responsibility of the media in reporting about challenges to ongoing operations? How will the remaining radio stations work within the parameters set by the Congolese authorities? What's the difference for media between working within operational security requirements, being a tool of one party's information operations, and censoring?