Corruption in Afghanistan

On my way home today, I was reading this article (NYT) about how some of the infamous cables discuss the scope of corruption in Afghanistan. The article annoyed me for a couple reasons. I'm just going to start with the second and third paragraphs, because, as I'm writing, I'm realizing dealing with that will suffice for this evening. I think I need to start a series--Lil's Afghanistan corruption vignettes or something--...but only if you people are interested.

Back to my second paragraph, where,

One Afghan official helpfully explained to diplomats the “four stages” at which his colleagues skimmed money from American development projects: “When contractors bid on a project, at application for building permits, during construction, and at the ribbon-cutting ceremony.”

The article is describing how contractors (we don't know what kind, Afghans? foreigners? that's detail that matters don't you think?) skim off money at these four project phases. Let's go through the phases.

First phase, umm, isn't that a phase where we could do something about it? We're the ones with the cash. Not only that but who are we relying upon to publicize bids, make sure businesses know how to bid etc? No, this is not something that small to medium businesses know how to do, that's why organizations like Peace Dividend Trust are on the ground.

Second phase, ok, that's an internal problem but that seems to be something that donors could work on (ie support the relevant ministry office). Don't you find it crazy that nine years into this thing we're still not sure how ministries work and we still don't know how corruption happens for things like applying for a building permit? Really, that's reminds me that it took an Integrity Watch Afghanistan Survey for us to find out that it takes 20 steps to get a driver's license (and seriously plenty of donor country officials found out through the survey).

Third phase, now this is an interesting one. One of the crazy things I've learned is that we don't really monitor projects. No, really, we don't. Why? Well, outside of Kabul, the auditors we've hired (and it's not just us, other donors too) just won't go, it's not safe. The quote in the graph talks about US money. Fear not, it's not better when it's (donor) money funneled through the World Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which, as I've repeatedly been told, is "not designed to detect fraud." The ARTF is how most donors provide direct budget support. Its recurring window operates on a reimbursement basis so the auditors get receipts (yes receipts, they won't go out and make sure the school was actually built) and give the Afghan authorities the money for the projects. I get that in some places Westerners really can't go the school but why the hell can't we help civil society organizations do this kind of monitoring, pay their transportation costs, provide them with a GPS equipped camera and get them to take pictures every week and keep doing it for a year after the project is done? It would be pretty easy to tell whether the school is being built where the people said it would and whether we should keep paying for teachers and books.

Fourth phase, the ribbon cutting ceremony. This is something where we should be putting out foot down. No, we won't cover that expense. This is like donors getting played by senior Afghan officials on salary top ups. "What do you mean you didn't know that X just had a meeting with another donor who said "no" to a top up yesterday"? And now we're saying yes because we don't want to lose their "support." We've been at this nine years and we're still surprised about this kind of thing?

Ok, third paragraph:

"It is hardly news that predatory corruption, fueled by a booming illicit narcotics industry, is rampant at every level of Afghan society." And then a trite reminder about Transparency International's latest ranking on corruption perception.

The first sentence annoyed me. First of all, when is corruption ("the abuse of entrusted office for private gain") not predatory? I'm trying to think of an example but I'm drawing a blank. Second, "fueled by a booming narcotics industry"? In the preceding graph you said it was fueled by American money. Now I'm not saying it can't be both, because it certainly is both but why do you now focus on the latter?

So I would ask you to consider this: in 2001, the international community provided Afghanistan with $250 million in assistance money (I know it was under the Taliban, still it's an interesting baseline). Yes, you read that right, $250 million dollars (I got that from the World Bank's fast facts page on Afghanistan).

What kind of impact do you think the cash we're pouring in now is going to have? In 2008 (the last year for which I could find figures), the drug trade represented about $3.4 billion while US assistance alone that same year was $5.7 billion. In a country where we just figured out it takes 20 steps to get a driver's license (even though we've been there nine years), those numbers are really alarming so let's not boil down corruption like this. The rest of the article goes on to explain more local dynamics but I think we need to keep in mind that we have a role a responsibility here as well and that it's a big one.

Longer-term engagement in Haiti: Beware the Insta-Pundits

Revealing just how much our foreign policy discourse has changed over the last decade, the discussion of humanitarian relief for Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake has quickly turned to considering what if any form longer-term US engagement should take. This is a good thing, but a serious danger lurks as the denizens of security think tanks and policy shops try to quickly develop some expertise on a situation they have, for the most part, ignored. Although there are a handful of Haiti-hands scattered through-out the administration and the foreign-policy firmament, I worry that too many will succumb to the urge to fill in the gaps in their knowledge with what passes for 'received wisdom.'

What do I mean? Check out this briefing from the Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Not my favorite institution at the best of times, but to get this much wrong in only two and half pages is, well, remarkable. Aristide was removed in 2004, not 2006. Comparing Haiti today to Somalia in 1993 is absurd - I don't think I even have to explain why. And in claiming that the UN peacekeeping mission (aka MINUSTAH) has "been struggling to counter the activities of gangs and other armed groups—the primary power‐brokers in the embattled nation," AEI manages to simultaneously be several years out of date on the security situation, and unfairly dismissive of the UN's successes. I'm picking on AEI because Small Wars Journal linked to the article, but I suspect there are other examples out there.

Between 2005 and 2007, MINUSTAH broke the back of the gangs through intelligence-led joint military-police operations. Following a 'clear-hold-build' pattern, they expanded security bubbles into previously gang-controlled neighborhoods by targeting gang leaders for arrest, stepping up patrols, establishing new police stations and checkpoints, and introducing employment and essential services projects on the heels of security operations. While progress has been slow, the mission has also made important headway on reforming the Haitian National Police. This is not to gloss over the serious problems that persist (and there are plenty), but Haiti in 2010 is not Haiti in 2004, or 1994 for that matter.

Point is, if we want to help prevent Haiti from backsliding, we have to recognize what has changed over the last 6 years. MINUSTAH has had a hard time responding to the earthquake because it has effectively been decapitated by the collapse of its HQ and the death of a significant chunk of its senior staff. It's apparently hamstrung response is not reflective of its role over the last few years, or its potential going forward. Likewise, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada and CARICOM have all been seriously engaged in Haiti, and should be viewed as partners for the development of a regional strategy. While greater US engagement could be critical for re-energizing international efforts, in most cases it would be counter-productive to shoulder them aside.

Bottom line: beware the proliferation of insta-pundits peddling stale-dated information, anecdotes rather than careful assessments, and received wisdom that sounds a little too familiar. We get more than enough of all that on Afghanistan.

Well that was a pretty easy fix

Two notes from today's news: first, Afghanistan comes in at number 179 (or for you glass half-full types, #2 Most Corrupt!) in Transparency International's Corruption Perception's Index (h/t Ex).

Of course, there's a simple solution for that, right? SPECIAL ANTI-CORRUPTION SQUAD!

Afghan officials launched a new anti-corruption unit and major crime fighting force Monday amid stiff international pressure to clean up the government following a fraud-tainted presidential election.

The Afghan government has been dogged by corruption for years and this is the third formal launch of a unit promising to rein in rampant graft and bribery. But Afghan government officials told reporters this attempt has a better chance because of a real desire to succeed and strong international backing.

It has also been accompanied this time by international threats.

I picture them wearing ninja suits and shoulder patches depicting Themis and the Scales.

U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry both praised the plan and called for follow-through.

"It requires action. Words are cheap. Deeds are required," he told reporters.

And ninjas.

"Karzai should see this as 'Godfather II'..."

"You got to get out of the business and go legit."

That's what one UN official had to say about the Afghan president's familial links to drug trafficking and other forms of criminality, as related by the excellent Elizabeth Rubin in yesterday's New York Times Magazine. More:

Yet on every trip I’ve made to Kandahar, I have heard another story about Ahmed Wali and drugs. Some of the people who have recounted the incidents are now dead. Like Malim Akbar Khakrezwal, an elder of the Alakozai tribe. In 2006, he took me around the fertile lands of his district, which are now infiltrated by Taliban. He told me that when he was provincial-intelligence chief, he captured 1,400 kilograms of opium belonging to Jan Muhammad, then governor of Uruzgan and a very close friend of the president. Jan Muhammad told Akbar to release the opium, and he refused. “My brother called me and said, ‘We are not able to fight these big people,’ ” Akbar told me. “ ‘We are weak. Release them.’ So I went to Ahmed Wali and said: ‘You are my commander; what should I do with this opium? Should I give it back to Jan Muhammad?’ ‘Yes. Give it back,’ he said. Twenty days later I was released from my position.” Last year he was assassinated.

A Western intelligence official who has spent much of the last seven years in Kandahar and, for obvious reasons, wanted to remain anonymous, told me: “The Karzai family has opium and blood on their hands. They systematically install low-level officials up to provincial governors to make sure that, from the farm gate, in bulk, the opium is moved unfettered. When history analyzes this period and looks at this family, it will uncover a litany of extensive corruption that was tolerated because the West tolerated this family.”

Perhaps. Or not. As many Afghans have pointed out, U.S. history is full of robber barons and of families who made their fortunes during Prohibition, and in the words of Ashraf Ghani “turned very decent as families.”

The article's already been linked by a bunch of people, but I'm highlighting it here in case you've missed it. In the midst of all this talk about strategic re-assessment in Afghanistan, and with the 20 August presidential election looming, we might ought to give a little consideration to how our horse (?) is being perceived by his own (myriad) constituency/ies, right?