Longer-term engagement in Haiti: Beware the Insta-Pundits

Revealing just how much our foreign policy discourse has changed over the last decade, the discussion of humanitarian relief for Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake has quickly turned to considering what if any form longer-term US engagement should take. This is a good thing, but a serious danger lurks as the denizens of security think tanks and policy shops try to quickly develop some expertise on a situation they have, for the most part, ignored. Although there are a handful of Haiti-hands scattered through-out the administration and the foreign-policy firmament, I worry that too many will succumb to the urge to fill in the gaps in their knowledge with what passes for 'received wisdom.'

What do I mean? Check out this briefing from the Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Not my favorite institution at the best of times, but to get this much wrong in only two and half pages is, well, remarkable. Aristide was removed in 2004, not 2006. Comparing Haiti today to Somalia in 1993 is absurd - I don't think I even have to explain why. And in claiming that the UN peacekeeping mission (aka MINUSTAH) has "been struggling to counter the activities of gangs and other armed groups—the primary power‐brokers in the embattled nation," AEI manages to simultaneously be several years out of date on the security situation, and unfairly dismissive of the UN's successes. I'm picking on AEI because Small Wars Journal linked to the article, but I suspect there are other examples out there.

Between 2005 and 2007, MINUSTAH broke the back of the gangs through intelligence-led joint military-police operations. Following a 'clear-hold-build' pattern, they expanded security bubbles into previously gang-controlled neighborhoods by targeting gang leaders for arrest, stepping up patrols, establishing new police stations and checkpoints, and introducing employment and essential services projects on the heels of security operations. While progress has been slow, the mission has also made important headway on reforming the Haitian National Police. This is not to gloss over the serious problems that persist (and there are plenty), but Haiti in 2010 is not Haiti in 2004, or 1994 for that matter.

Point is, if we want to help prevent Haiti from backsliding, we have to recognize what has changed over the last 6 years. MINUSTAH has had a hard time responding to the earthquake because it has effectively been decapitated by the collapse of its HQ and the death of a significant chunk of its senior staff. It's apparently hamstrung response is not reflective of its role over the last few years, or its potential going forward. Likewise, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada and CARICOM have all been seriously engaged in Haiti, and should be viewed as partners for the development of a regional strategy. While greater US engagement could be critical for re-energizing international efforts, in most cases it would be counter-productive to shoulder them aside.

Bottom line: beware the proliferation of insta-pundits peddling stale-dated information, anecdotes rather than careful assessments, and received wisdom that sounds a little too familiar. We get more than enough of all that on Afghanistan.

Service Does Not an Expert Make...

...in and of itself. I have done more than my fair share of time in Iraq as a soldier, but that does not make me an expert on all of Iraq or Afghanistan or national defense strategy or even counterinsurgency for that matter. Service, at any level or location, is a lens - like education or other life experiences - through which one gains a unique perspective. But let us not confuse that with "expertise."

There are a large number of bloggers and commentators who are veterans who look down upon those that have not served as not being qualified to speak on matters of the conflicts in which we are fighting. Those non-veteran commentors could, however, be just as or more qualified to speak on these issues than most uniformed personnel who ever served due to whatever their life experiences may be. Those life experiences provide a lens as well and may end up being of more value to the general populace than a soldier who spent 15 months on a FOB guarding the local national workers sweeping the latrines.

Before you all start writing letters (comments, on the other hand, are welcome), I am not saying that that soldier's service wasn't important. I am saying that his performing that function does not make him an expert on theater- or strategic-level issues in Iraq even if he does get to wear a patch on his right shoulder. I would conjecture that below the Corps level, being a veteran of Iraq provides a lens and not expertise (with the caveat that only certain positions at the Corps level provide true "expertise"). My Army career culminated as a brigade planner in Iraq which caused my expertise to culminate at operations conducted within my brigade's battlespace and no further. My expertise is limited by my experiences.

I'll use a historical example: Tammy Duckworth. Ms. Duckworth is a fine American who served, and continues to serve, her nation well - both in and out of uniform. She has certainly sacrificied much because of her tour in Iraq. But during her run for the House in 2006 she made a lot of statements about the strategic history and direction of Iraq that was given validity in the media because she was a wounded Iraq veteran. The reality is that as UH-60 pilot, she had gleaned no more expertise on Iraq because of her service than the LN guard mentioned above. That expertise was given to her because of her service and it was unwarranted. She knew as much about Iraq outside of a FOB as anyone else who read the NY Times or Fiasco. I'll also say that I don't believe that she tried to say that she was an expert because of her experiences, but that mantle was certainly given to her by others because of it.

This is not to say that her opinion didn't matter, even through the lens of her experiences. She should be listened to as a vet, but not given the credence of an expert commensurate with an academic who has spent years studying either U.S. defense policy or Iraq specifically. Her experiences as a wounded vet give her much more validity to warrant her positions in the Illinois and U.S. Veterans Affairs departments, but not that alone. That would suggest that any of the millions of citizens that are dependant upon VA hospitals are qualified to run VA directorates, and I'm pretty sure no one here believes that.

No one's opinion should be dismissed out of hand because they did not (or did for that matter) serve in the military. That fact alone does not make anyone an expert on anything and merely provides a lens through which to view the world. This lens can be significant (it has certainly defined much of my world outlook), but it does not equate to expertise. Expertise is limited to an individual's experiences. Arguments, on the other hand, are based on elements derived from facts or views seen through the author's lens. And they should be weighed on those elements, not on some ordained or self-described expertise that extends beyond that person's experiences.

Friedman and the officer corps in Afghanistan

Tom Friedman's column in today's NYT strikes me as a bit simplistic. Yesterday, his column was about how courageous and wonderful it is to create girls' schools (which is true) but it was also extremely sappy. I think I actually thought "aww" as I was reading it--don't get me wrong, schools for girls are great but did the column have to elicit an "aww"?

Today's column is about how officers in Afghanistan today have figured out an anti-insurgency strategy. A question or two: does the lingo here matter? is that an intentional phrase? He says these officers, many on their at least their third deployment, are different because:

They learned everything the hard way — not in classes at Annapolis or West Point, but on the streets of Fallujah and Kandahar.

And then after a very general explanation of clear, hold, and rebuild, and why this may be an impossible mission, he concludes with not much at all:

So, here’s hoping that The Class Too Dumb to Quit can take all that it learned in Iraq and help rebuild The Country That’s Been Too Broken to Work.

Oh, and what's up with the capitalization? Is there supposed to me some extra meaning there?