Semantically Ignorant Comic Irony of the Day, "bang for the buck" edition

Les Gelb published an article in the November/December 2010 Foreign Affairs entitled "GDP Now Matters More than Force: A U.S. Foreign Policy for the Age of Economic Power" ($). The thesis is simple: American foreign policy must be reoriented if we are to remain successful and secure in a world where states and their citizens care more about economic matters than about military might. Gelb ties up his introduction with what must've seemed to him quite a charming turn of phrase:

Having overlooked profound changes in the world, U.S. leaders have done little to modernize their national security strategy. Present U.S. strategy offers too little bang for its buck because there is not enough buck in the strategy.

(I've added the emphasis above.)

What's he trying to say here, do you think? One could easily suffer some confusion at Gelb's glibness, especially if the excerpt is taken out of context: couldn't that sentence have indicated that U.S. strategy is failing because we're not spending enough money? But considering the rest of the article, I reckon Gelb means that American "strategy" is getting an insufficient return (as measured in "security," presumably) on "investment" because our foreign policy fails to sufficiently account for the importance of economics and economic power in international relations. We're focusing too much cash and attention on our military machine and neglected economic strength, he seems to suggest.

Which, ok, maybe right, maybe not, but to use the expression "bang for the buck" to illustrate it? Downright hilarious.

That phrase was first used in an idiomatic sense by Charles Erwin Wilson, Secretary of Defense to President Eisenhower and post-Korea Pentagon budget-cutter. He was explaining the rationale for the policy of "massive retaliation," in which even limited provocations by the Soviets might be met with an overwhelming American nuclear response. The doctrine was codified in 1953's NSC 162/2 (pdf), which asserted that "the security of the United States requires development and maintenance of a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power." Proponents of the "New Look" defense policy thought the destructive power of nuclear weapons -- and a stated willingness to use them -- could counterbalance the Soviets' overwhelming conventional military superiority and save the U.S. the outrageous sums it might otherwise pour into the maintenance of innumerable maneuver formations.

"More bang for the buck" was one of those rare idioms that means exactly what it says: by building our security policy around nukes, we figured to get more destruction for less money.

Gelb seems to want us to believe that international relations have evolved to the point that we simply don't need as much bang these days, so we ought to be spending less bucks. Whether or not you agree with him, you've got to admit his formulation was a miserable (if funny) failure.

Schelling on nuclear terrorism

Thanks to Zack Beauchamp, I've just come across this blog post by nobel laureate and renowned scholar of strategic behavior Thomas Schelling. In it, Schelling tries to understand why his decades-old prediction that a non-state group would soon possess a nuclear weapon seems not to have come true, and then speculates about to what end such a group might apply their weapon if ever they did achieve that feat. It's thought-provoking if not staggeringly original, and it's worth reading if only to consider whether the very concept of "nuclear terrorism" might not be a sort of paradox. After all, wouldn't the coercive power of nuclear weapons possession be far more useful to a political group of any kind than its terroristic value? Well, that's not exactly correct either, is it? The seemingly "irrational" and expressive use of a weapon of mass destruction would in fact be incredibly effective in producing terror, but if we understand terror as a means to convey a broader message or achieve a political end, then couldn't those things be accomplished more readily and effectively by refraining from terror and bargaining more traditionally? c.f.:

If a team is assembled that, in isolation, spends months making a workable bomb, or a few bombs, what will they spend their evening hours talking about? They are all concentrated on a nuclear weapon. Won’t they continually converse about what the thing is good for, what should properly be done with it, how it might be used to advance some important objective, and whether they might have any influence on its use? They will almost certainly have spent more hundreds of hours trying to think strategically about the possible uses of a few nuclear weapons than any head of government, or even senior government adviser has devoted to the question. It’s possible—I think likely—that they may be listened to. And what “strategy” might they propose?

I propose that they will conclude that exploding a weapon over Los Angeles or Vladivostok or Bremen will “waste” the weapon. They will think, “we are a nuclear power. There are the USA, Russia, France, Britain, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Maybe Iran, and now US. We have status, power, influence. Let’s use it!”

Schelling is the expert on game-theoretic approaches to strategy and he seems not to have the answers himself, so I'm not going to offer anything conclusive here. Just the same, it's an interesting thought experiment.

Apropos of absolutely nothing, some notes about the atomic bomb

I'm just finishing up an excellent book that asserts a direct continuity between the secrecy and lack of accountability fostered during the Manhattan Project and the roughly six-decade accumulation of unprecedented (and arguably unconstitutional) executive power, which continues essentially unabated to this day. It's a brief volume called Bomb Power by Pulitzer Prize-winner Garry Wills, published last year, and you should read it.* While some of the author's more strident claims may strike you as a bit... aggressive (q.v.: "Our anxiety over nations 'going Communist' was in large part prompted by a fear that this would shrink the area" of the globe in which we could stage nuclear missiles or port our nuclear submarines, p. 44), I'll agree with Walter Isaacson that the book is "persuasive [and] elegantly argued." If you're interested in the creeping militarization (or what I prefer to call the "securitization") of America's engagement with the world in the decades since the Second World War -- that is, the subordination of U.S. foreign policy priorities to the presumed prerogatives of defense and "security" -- then you shouldn't miss this important contribution to the literature.

One of the early chapters provides a few details of the Manhattan Project with which I was either previously unfamiliar or poorly acquainted, and because it's 0427, I'll reproduce recount [EDIT: it occurs to me that this word, plus the use of page numbers, may have given the impression that I'm quoting passages verbatim, which -- unless it's in quotation marks -- I'm not] them here for your comment or general edification.

• Among the leading physicists in the German atomic weapons program was Werner Heisenberg, one of the pioneers of quantum mechanics and original exponent of the "uncertainty principle." BG Leslie Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project, allegedly dispatched former major league catcher and OSS operative Moe Berg to investigate killing Heisenberg if he perceived that Germany was close to the production of a bomb. (It wasn't.) (p. 24)
• When the war with Germany ended prior to the successful fielding of the atom bomb, President Truman set up what was called the "Interim Committee" to advise him on whether or not the weapon should be used against Japan. The members of the committee (among them the presidents of Harvard and MIT) unanimously recommended on 01 June 1945 "that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers' homes; and that it be used without prior warning." (p. 25) I'll be honest: I'm more than a little surprised that there was unanimous consent on the stipulation "without prior warning," but Oppenheimer and his colleagues were apparently concerned that a failed detonation after announcement of the bomb's existence would set back the war effort dramatically.
• The committee that drew up a possible target list for the bomb expressly avoided those cities that had been previously subjected to American firebombing, as the effects of prior raids would make it difficult to evaluate the destructive impact of the atom bomb. (p. 25)
• The second bomb was initially intended not for Nagasaki but for a city called Kokura. Flak and cloud cover forced the aircrew to divert to a secondary target. Similarly poor weather over Nagasaki meant that the bomb landed off-target, which accounts in part for the more powerful second weapon's comparatively smaller casualty count (40,000 killed and 40,000 injured in Nagasaki versus 70,000 and 50,000 at Hiroshima). (p. 27)
• Manhattan Project officials had little reason for confidence that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs would be even this effective, as the successful prior test detonation had taken place under controlled conditions and with a stationary warhead. The risk of failure was highlighted in the first post-war test at Bikini Island in 1946: only five ships were sunk when an air-dropped bomb missed its target -- a 90-vessel floating boneyard -- by half a mile.
• While Secretary of War Stimson speculated an invasion that could cost 1 million American lives would be required to assure Japanese surrender without use of the bomb, other senior U.S. leaders thought continued firebombing and blockade could be effective. This latter viewpoint was supported by the results of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, conducted in 1946, in which "sixty-four percent of the [Japanese] population stated that they had reached a point prior to surrender where they felt personally unable to go on with the war." The Survey's Summary Report asserted that "certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." The emphasis here is mine. (p. 28)
• Between 1953 and 1955, the U.S. doubled its weapon count from just under 900 to almost 1800, increasing the overall yield of those weapons from around 5,000 Hiroshimas to almost 200,000. By the middle of the decade, the nuclear production complex consumed a staggering SIX POINT TWO PERCENT of total U.S. electrical power. (p. 42)
• As of 2007, nuclear warheads cost the U.S. only about a quarter of a million dollars each. The vast majority of spending on strategic arms goes to delivery systems and the massive security apparatus that protects the nuclear weapons program. (p. 42)

Maybe you already knew all of this and I'm the only dummy who didn't, but I find the subject fascinating. As much as I admire Wills's work, I find myself making excuses for the various Doctors Frankenstein who brought to life the monstrosity of "Bomb Power." It is, for me, basically impossible to imagine the pervasive and overwhelming fear that must have driven senior leaders in the Project to set up what the author calls "the vast and secret apparatus of the National Security State" (53). One can easily see in the era of the "Global War on Terror" just exactly how simple it is to mobilize public support for questionable policies by cultivating (or more charitably, indulging) a sense of national fear. Imagine if you can how Groves, Oppenheimer, and the rest must've dreaded finishing a close second in the race to beat the Germans to the bomb, and it's easy to see how every bit of extra-legal corner-cutting could have seemed not just excusable, but absolutely essential.

Wills is eager to assign base motives to power-grabbing presidents and their self-satisfied aides, but I'm more of a structuralist on this one. It's sometimes tough to see how things could've turned out any other way considering the politico-historical and geographic realities of the post-war period, which, I suppose, is precisely the sort of resigned inattention against which the author is militating. One thing is for sure: it's very, very difficult to imagine an alternate history in which the U.S. could have played a similarly assertive global role without the centralization of authority over military action and accumulation of responsibility for foreign affairs in the office of the presidency. Whether this is a good or bad thing is for you to decide.

* If you're interested in learning more about the book, read this review-slash-interview with Wills by Rick Perlstein, who, by the way, has two written excellent books about the post-Goldwater evolution of American conservatism and the Nixon presidency.

Bill Gertz: Terminally dishonest, analytically handicapped, or just a really bad writer? (UPDATED)

You guys do know that -- despite all evidence to the contrary -- I don't actually go out looking around on the internet for stuff to get pissed off about, right? (You: "Then why do you follow Bill Gertz on Twitter?" Me: Touche.) Really, I don't. And sometimes I even beat myself up about how negative I get on the blog, how it seems to be so much easier to criticize other people's work and call my e-nemeses dummies than to write something original and constructive and pioneering.

But seriously: my e-nemeses are dummies. 

So here I am last night just trying to mind my own business and get some work done (on Twitter? Shut up) when I see this:

@BillGertz: State Dept. report confirms secret missile defense deal with Russia http://tinyurl.com/3ah4ktw

Well! That sounds interesting! Let's go read about a secret missile defense deal! And so I follow the link. There I am: the venerable Washington Times, home to venerable "geopolitics editor" Bill Gertz and the best damned China-hawkery you'll find this side of Air Combat Command. The same "news"paper that referred to Armenia as a "small Central Asian state" in an article last night until I childishly taunted the writer into fixing it with nary an acknowledgement of the mistake in the original, you ask? Yep, one and the very same. 

So what's all this about a secret deal with the Russians? I wish I could say it was easy to sort the whole thing out, but Gertz's prose is damned near impenetrable, what with his tenuous hold on grammatical convention, artless overuse of generic identifiers, and general inability to construct clear and meaningful English sentences free of loaded, leading pre-judgment. Here's the lede, largely (and mercifully) free of the sort of advocanalysis and debatable-contention-disguised-as-conventional-wisdom that fills the rest of the piece:

The Obama administration, despite public denials, held secret talks with Russia aimed at reaching a ballistic missile defense agreement that Moscow ultimately rejected in May, according to an internal State Department report.

Disclosure of the report to The Washington Times comes as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Tuesday pressed for a new anti-ballistic missile treaty, warning that a failure to reach an agreement would trigger a new strategic arms race.

The four-page document circulated on Capitol Hill stated that administration officials held four meetings with the Russians and last spring presented a draft Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement (BMDCA) to Russian negotiators.

The internal report contradicts congressional testimony by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in June denying a missile defense deal was in the works.

I'm not sure about you, but it seems to me like this would be a good time to introduce some kind of concrete detail about the aforementioned report, right? But there's perilously little of that, aside from those few excerpts you'll see quoted here. In case you're confused already (and I was -- it took me three readings to sort through the whole thing), the "report" seems to be some kind of internal State Department communication referencing a proposed BMDCA that was discussed with the Russians. Gertz elaborates... sort of:

As part of the U.S.-Russia talks, the State Department submitted to Congress on May 5 a legal memorandum called a Circular 175 report that is required before reaching treaties and agreements.

"The BMDCA was designed to be a framework agreement under which the United States and Russia could begin missile defense cooperation while not limiting either party's missile defense capabilities in any way," states the report, which is labeled "sensitive but unclassified."

The draft 10-year agreement would have set up a BMD Cooperation Sub-Working Group. The Circular 175 was "approved by Under Secretary [of State Ellen] Tauscher on May 5, 2010," the report said.

Presumably the Circular 175 report to Congress is not the generically-titled "report" to which Gertz continually refers, and we're actually dealing with a completely separate document that communicated details about the Circular 175 from one part of the State Department to another. (I think.) Still with me? So this communication outlines the basics about the proposed BMDCA: "framework agreement... begin missile defense cooperation... not limiting either party's missile defense capabilities...", etc. What else does it say? Well, it tells us that "the Russian Government indicated... that they were not interested" in a BMCDA. So the USG wanted to talk to Russia about working together on missile defense in a way that wouldn't place any limits on American defenses, but Moscow decided to pass. Simple enough. Case closed.

Not so fast, says our intrepid correspondent!

The draft missile defense agreement was first reported in The Times on June 16, noting that U.S. officials feared it would limit defenses.

A day later, Mrs. Clinton was asked about The Times report and dismissed the idea of any secret draft agreement to limit defenses. "No. 1, there is no secret deal. No. 2, there is no plan to limit U.S. missile defenses, either in this treaty or in any other way. And No. 3, on that score, the story is dead wrong," she said.

Mr. Gates, appearing with Mrs. Clinton, also denied any draft agreement was being negotiated, stating that "whatever talks are going on are simply about trying to elicit [Russian] willingness to partner with us along with the Europeans in terms of a regional missile defense."

When asked whether the draft agreement was public, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley told The Times on June 18 "there is no draft agreement to provide you."

Gertz modestly fails to mention that when "the draft missile defense agreement was first reported in The Times," it was in the June 16th edition of his own weekly "Inside the Ring" column. (Editorial aside: when he says "...noting that U.S. officials feared it would limit defenses," Gertz is presumably making a grammatical mistake. That is, he means to say that his column noted purported U.S. fears, and that wacky participial phrase in the latter half of the sentence isn't intended to indicate that the "draft missile defense agreement [noted] that U.S. officials" had fears. But I digress. Fears were noted!) So here's where we are now: Gertz has quoted from the Senate Armed Services hearing on START and has affirmed that Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates both denied any talks with the Russians related to limiting missile defenses.

Because Gertz -- surely limited by space considerations and not tempted in the least to make questionable editing decisions out of bad faith or a desire to mislead -- only quoted part of Secretary Clinton's comments before the committee, it's probably worth referencing the transcript (pdf). Here's the first mention of "secret deals" -- the very first question out of the gate (p. 13) after Clinton, Gates, Energy Secretary Chu, and CJCS ADM Mullen have delivered their prepared statements:

[Senator LEVIN, Chairman:] Secretary Clinton, let me start with you. During the course of the negotiations on the New START, were there any side agreements, any informal agreements, any secret agreements with Russia that are not included in the treaty relative to any limitations on U.S. missile defenses or any other subject?

Secretary CLINTON. No.

There we are, right off the bat: no secret agreements. The next time this comes up if a few minutes later (p. 19-20).

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Clinton, you were very clear in answering the chairman’s first question about whether there was any secret agreement or side deal associated with the negotiations of the New START Treaty that would affect missile defense. And you were very clear in saying that, no, there were not.

There’s a press report that came out last night that claims that the administration is secretly working with the Russians to conclude an agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses. It goes on to say that the administration last month presented a draft agreement to the Russians. Is this report accurate?

Secretary CLINTON. No. I’m not aware of the report, Senator Collins, but, as Secretary Gates said, we have consistently told the Russians that if they wish to work with us on missile defense we are open to working with them. So maybe there is something lost in the translation here, because we have consistently reached out to them. We would like them to be part of a broad missile defense system that protects against countries like Iran, North Korea, both of which they border, by the way, so it is in their interest.

But Secretary Gates mentioned that in his opening remarks, so if I could ask him to just perhaps add onto what I said.

Senator COLLINS. Yes.

Secretary GATES. Well, I have seen—I have just seen a reference to the newspaper story that you described, and what I emphasized, what I added, frankly, in my opening statement was that whatever talks are going on are simply about trying to elicit their willingness to partner with us along with the Europeans in terms of a regional missile defense.

But there is nothing in the approaches that have been made to the Russians that in any way, shape, or form would impose any limits whatsoever on our plans.

Again we have Secretary Clinton responding to Gertz's assertion that "the administration is secretly working with the Russians to conclude an agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses," and his further assertion that a draft of such an agreement had been presented to the Russians in May, with a firm denial. Both Clinton and Gates emphasize the administration's interest in working collaboratively with the Russians on missile defense while repeatedly insisting that any such cooperation would not place limits on American missile defenses. This point is made very clear.

Secretary Clinton must have sensed how eager critics of the treaty were to focus on this bogus "secret negotiations" bugaboo, because she came back to it of her own accord later in the hearing (p. 36). This part's important, because it fleshes out the excerpt that Gertz provides in his piece.

[Secretary CLINTON:] Mr. Chairman, if I could, just on a follow-up to your last questions, which I very much appreciate. I want to ensure that the record is clear on one additional point. Senator Collins raised a certain press report about a U.S.- Russia deal to limit U.S. missile defenses and I want to be as clear as I possibly can. Number one, there is no secret deal.

Number two, there is no plan to limit U.S. missile defenses, either in this treaty or in any other way.

Number three, on that score the story is dead wrong. I want to be very clear about that because I don’t want anyone using what is yet again another inaccurate story to argue against this treaty. As Secretary Gates and I have both said, we will continue to explore missile defense cooperation with Russia, but the talks are not secret and there is nothing on the table or even in the wildest contemplation that would involve any limits on our missile defense. Instead, we’re seeing to see whether they can be expanded with additional capabilities for our security.

So here we are yet again: a firm denial of any "secret deal"; a firm denial of any agreements that would limit U.S. defenses; and an elaboration of the administration's consistent position that missile defense collaboration with Russia is a desirable opportunity to increase European and global security. Clinton notes that "on that score" -- that is, on the subject of possible limitations on U.S. missile defense -- "the story is dead wrong." Dead wrong. No two ways about it. It's very clear: there is no secret agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses. Simple as.

Where could the confusion be coming from here? How is it that Gertz is now claiming a win, telling "arms control wonks who argued my June 16 scoop was wrong: you're wrong," arguing that the newly-revealed "internal State Department report" shows that "Hillary misled Senate"? Well, yet again we're going to have to dig around and speculate; it's not easy to do in a 1,000-word article in a publication that one would assume has editors, but Gertz steadfastly refuses to apply clear thinking and narrative structure to make his point in any kind of meaningful way. So let's go back to the original piece that asserted secret negotiations, the one published the day before the hearing, and see how Gertz characterized the matter:

The Obama administration is secretly working with Russia to conclude an agreement that many officials fear will limit U.S. missile defenses, a key objective of Moscow since it opposed plans for a U.S. missile defense interceptor base in Eastern Europe, according to American officials involved in arms control issues.

According to the officials, the administration last month presented a draft agreement on missile defenses to the Russians as part of talks between Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for international security and arms control, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov.

The secret talks and possible agreement have triggered alarm among pro-missile defense advocates who are concerned that the administration, in its effort to "reset" ties with Moscow, will make further concessions constraining current and future missile defenses.

Ok, now we might be on to something. "many [unnamed, obviously!] officials fear" that a BMDCA "will limit U.S. missile defenses," Gertz asserts, while also tacking on the misleading suggestion that Russia had made such limitation a priority in its negotiations with the U.S. (If that were the case, one might reasonably ask, then why wouldn't the Russians insert ANY limitation language in the actual text of the treaty -- beyond a mutual prohibition against modifying ICBM and SLBM launchers to host missile defense components instead -- rather than working to that end by negotiating a similarly non-binding informal arrangement, ironically one that focused on cooperation rather than limitation and reduction, as the treaty's main text does?) Senator Collins read the statements like the preceding as "claims that the administration is secretly working with the Russians to conclude an agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses," which is perhaps a slightly misleading formulation if only because it implies that Gertz was suggesting the "secret" agreement would include concrete limits rather than simply limiting missile defense as a matter of uncharitable interpretation.

Let's try to sum this up, shall we? On June 16th, Bill Gertz writes that the U.S. and Russia are working toward a "secret agreement" that he alleges has some U.S. officials worried about possible limitations on missile defense. On June 17th, Secretaries Clinton and Gates both deny that any secret agreements to limit missile defense have been negotiated, and assert that while the U.S. seeks to cooperate with Russia on this matter, the administration will not accept any provisions that limit missile defense. (Oh yeah, and the U.S. side decided unilaterally to insert a statement in the treaty's preamble that yet again insists that missile defenses are not subject to the treaty, and also to include more than $10 billion for missile defense in its FY11 budget request.) On June 18th, P.J. Crowley responds to Gertz's question about whether the "secret draft agreement" is public by telling him that there is no such agreement. Then at some point in the intervening months, it emerges that there was in fact a draft agreement on missile defense cooperation that was not secret, was not concerned with limiting missile defense, and was not ultimately agreed to -- a draft agreement that seems instead to have been focused on precisely what the SECDEF stated before Congress was the object of ongoing discussions with Russia, which was to "elicit willingness to partner with us as well as the Europeans in terms of a regional missile defense" --  and somehow Gertz claims that this revelation "contradicts congressional testimony" by Gates and Clinton "that a missile defense deal was in the works" and feels vindicated for his earlier assertion that there was a "secret draft agreement to limit defenses." Except that 1) THERE STILL IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS EVER A "SECRET DRAFT AGREEMENT TO LIMIT DEFENSES," 2) BOTH SECRETARIES INSIST THAT THERE NEVER WAS SUCH AN AGREEMENT, AND 3) THEY EACH TESTIFIED TO THAT EFFECT. Neither even briefly addressed the existence of a possible missile defense cooperation agreement except to indicate that such an agreement would be consistent with the administration's overall goals and policy.

So I am being totally serious when I ask: is Bill Gertz a liar, or is he just incredibly stupid?

UPDATE: Courtesy of Blake Hounshell on Twitter, here's the fact sheet the State Department issued this morning on the subject of Missile Defense Cooperation with the Russian Federation. Some highlights:

There are no “secret deals” with Russia on missile defense.

The Administration has repeatedly communicated to the Russian Government at the highest levels that the United States will not agree to any limitations or constraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses, and that the United States intends to continue improving and deploying BMD systems to defend the U.S. against limited missile launches, and to defend our deployed forces, allies, and partners against regional threats.

The Administration has repeatedly made clear that it is pursuing missile defense cooperation with Russia. As one example, at a June 17 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Gates stated: “Separately from the treaty, we are discussing missile defense cooperation with Russia, which we believe is in the interests of both nations. But such talks have nothing to do with imposing any limitations on our programs or deployment plans.”

The Obama Administration believes that missile defense cooperation with the Russian Federation is in the national security interests of the United States, as did the Bush Administration. Restrictions or limitations on U.S. missile defense capabilities are not under discussion in any forum.

So yeah, pretty much what I said (/boom).

2053 nuclear explosions, 1945-1998

Courtesy of @pourmecoffee on Twitter, here's a really interesting animated video depicting the two thousand plus nuclear detonations since the first in 1945. Each second represents one month, and each country's explosions are depicted in a different color. Shit really starts getting crazy in the 1960s.

This is particularly interesting to me at this precise moment because I'm just finishing Don DeLillo's Underworld, in which the nuclear arms race is a significant motif.

If you get bored, jump ahead to about the 13 minute mark, when there's a sped-up recap.

A question for those who think the Afghan war is essential to maintaining stability in Pakistan

The argument about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons tends to be nested into a multi-pronged rationale for why escalation in Afghanistan is necessary -- very few people will say "the one and only reason we need to be in Afghanistan is to keep Pakistani nukes out of al-Qaeda's hands." But a lot of people (including John Nagl and Dave Kilcullen, unfortunately) will tack this on to whatever other justifications they've got, toss this one in there ominously. And why not? They probably think that even the slightest risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists is just about the most terrifying thing most Americans can imagine, and they're probably right.

I guess I should also make it clear that I agree about Pakistani stability being important. In fact, I think it's probably the most important feature of the entire war, and I have no qualms saying that regional stability in south Asia ought to be a bigger priority for America than the utter annihilation of al-Qaeda (which, like Rid, I think is probably impossible and possibly unnecessary) or the vaunted denial of the much-talked-about terrorist safe haven.

But lemme come to the point already: if you think that keeping Pakistani nuclear weapons safe is an important reason for us to stay in Afghanistan in significant numbers, then I want you to answer a question. Ready?

Why do we imagine that a third-party counterinsurgency campaign in the country without the nuclear weapons will be more effective in guaranteeing their security than small-footprint, foreign internal defense (FID)-oriented backing for the government that actually possesses WMD?

Can't we do more to prevent weapons from getting to AQ by engaging with the Pakistani government and military than by running around Helmand shooting at opium smugglers?

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen wants to "hit Iran where it hurts"

In an op-ed for today's Los Angeles Times, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposes a multi-pronged approach for compelling the Iranian regime to give up the pursuit of nuclear technology.

The regime in Tehran knows only hardball, and nothing less than overwhelming and crippling sanctions could produce a reversal of its threatening programs and policies.

That is why the United States must be prepared to act alone, if necessary, and with every weapon in its political and economic arsenal. The Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act is one such tool. This legislation, which I coauthored, has the support of more than 300 members of the House, and it is urgent that this bill reaches the president's desk before the end of the year. It targets one of Iran's major weaknesses -- namely, its dependency on foreign gasoline and other refined petroleum products. By placing financial sanctions on U.S. and foreign companies providing these crucial resources, Iran's economic lifeline would be severed and its already weak economy would crumble.

But these sanctions must be coupled with action on all fronts. The U.S. must also specifically reject Iran's claim to an inalienable right to produce nuclear fuel.

So let's sum that up for clarity:

1. Block Iran from importing refined petroleum.
2. Inform Iran that it has no right to produce nuclear energy.

Iran can't refine its own oil, and needs to import gasoline from other countries. (As a result, the government must provide massive, nearly-bankrupting gasoline subsidies to offset the outrageously high natural price and stave off domestic discontent.) This is a massive vulnerability for Iran; if circumstances were similar in America, we would consider this a threat to our national security.

So I've got an awesome idea for bending Iran to our will: do everything possible to exploit its fears of isolation and vulnerability. Don't just prevent them from taking advantage of a plentiful resource to secure their energy requirements, but make sure they know you'll never allow them to find alternative solutions! In fact, make sure you tell them that if they try to develop the infrastructure to refine more of their own oil, you'll bomb the hell out of that, too!

This is certain to calm everyone down and reduce tensions in the region. Certain!

But the Taliban Might Try to Get Pakistan's Nukes! Oh Wait... UPDATED

...they have tried already. Via the Times of India:

Pakistan's nuclear facilities have already been attacked at least thrice by its home-grown extremists and terrorists in little reported incidents over the last two years, even as the world remains divided over the safety and security of the nuclear weapons in the troubled country, according to western analysts.

The incidents, tracked by Shaun Gregory, a professor at Bradford University in UK, include an attack on the nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha on November 1, 2007, an attack on Pakistan's nuclear airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber on December 10, 2007, and perhaps most significantly the August 20, 2008 attack when Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up several entry points to one of the armament complexes at the Wah cantonment, considered one of Pakistan's main nuclear weapons assembly.

Well thank goodness the attacks were ineffectual. So it seems that extremists know where Pakistan's nuclear weapons are and have attempted to at least disrupt activities at those locations, if not failed utterly in actually absconding with a device. It is slightly reassuring that the Pakistani Army was able to keep the weapons safe and appear to maintain fairly robust security measures.

Granted, these attacks all occurred prior to the late winter offensives by the Pakistani Taliban, but the reality is the Taliban threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is way overblown. Pakistan sports one of the largest armies in the world that is becoming increasingly modern (thanks to the infusion of U.S. money and training). To suggest that the Taliban will come out of the mountains to defeat the Pakistani Army to obtain nuclear weapons seems absolutely preposterous to me.

I would even argue that such an attempt by the Taliban would be a grave strategic misstep by them. Without Pakistan viewing them as an existential threat (which they are not), the Pakistani government will not attempt to eradicate them. If a substantial effort is made to obtain weapons, that could very well change the government's calculus on who is a greater threat: extremists or India.

I don't believe that the Taliban will mount a serious attempt to obtain a nuclear weapon nor will they ever be a serious threat to the existence of Pakistan. That just leaves us to worry about a coup in which the ownership of the devices is left in question. But don't bet on the Taliban making that happen. There are a whole lot of other groups that want to get their hands on those weapons whose agendas are much more aligned with the ISI's.

H/T to SNLII for passing on the article.

UPDATE: Jari points out that the footnotes from the CTC Sentinel suggest that the sites that had been attacked were not likely nuclear facilities and that the attacks were overstated. I'd say much like the Taliban threat to the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.