Josh Foust's book launch - a couple takeaways (UPDATED)

For those of you who didn't know, yesterday Josh Foust (of Registan fame, Central Asia expert, and a great guy) held a launch for his new book, Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. I bought the book at the event and thus haven't yet read it, so hopefully a review will happen once I've finished it. However, the event was very good, with Ambassador Ronald Neumann (US Ambassador to Afghanistan 2005-2007) conversing with Josh. Their discussion covered off on a number of topics related to Afghanistan: the Human Terrain System (HTS), the Afghan people, Karzai and the presidency, the ANA, and US policy and operations. All of which was very interesting. As was the idea of Just World Books turning his blog and other writings into a book.

There are a couple of things that stood out for me from this talk that were probably peripheral to the main talk. The first was Josh talking about the inability of the military to transition their records and knowledge of their area of operations to their follow-on units. Josh recounted that the U.S. Army's Center for Lessons Learned has to send people to units that had rotated home to get copies of their hard drives to provide data to units in the field. This simply blows my mind. I hope this info is dated and doesn't still occur, but the idea that transfers of authority are or have occurred in Afghanistan without digital records is damned near criminal on the part of both units involved. The outgoing needs to provide that info and the incoming needs to ask for it if they don't get it. It's simply common sense. Hopefully, some of you who are there now or recently can let us know if this has changed and transferring data is SOP in a transition.

The second topic that really hit me was the discussion of the HTS and their Human Terrain Teams (HTT) embedded at the brigade level. Josh had worked for them until 18 months ago and had some interesting perspectives. Like all organizations have to deal with, he reported that some teams were really good and some were really bad. Recently, DoD has been moving from a contractor solution to an institutionalized civilian solution to propagate HTS beyond our current wars. I'm actually slightly distressed at this.

I'm a big supporter of the work that the HTS does even if I never had them supporting my units in Iraq. Understanding the locals seems like a pretty good idea to me in any conflict. However, I do question the need to keep large numbers of civilian personnel on the rolls to study areas that we may have conflicts with in the future. Some regional or cultural experts, sure. But not lots. It seems to be a large expenditure that has a small likelihood of ever being practically used.

This may be the former military side of me, but I've always looked at "human terrain" as an intelligence function. Intelligence used to assist the unit commander in making decisions on what activities his unit should conduct. Understanding that a lot of intelligence agencies employ cultural experts, this needs to be done in the military at the unit level. Military intelligence needs to be able to analyze non-combatant locals like they do the enemy. We don't keep civilians who are experts on every enemy we might face and deploy them with BCTs - we train our intel folks to be able to analyze an enemy, however he is and irrespective of that analyst's previous knowledge of them and their organization, so that analyst can give the commander the best information he has. I don't understand why the military is still failing to do this with human intelligence. Granted, there are my intel officers who are leaning forward in the saddle and are doing this on their own, but it needs to be an institutionalized process. Otherwise all that touchy-feely human stuff will remain a civilian role and quite possibly civilians who don't necessarily understand the commander's intelligence needs.

So those are my take aways from the talk. There was, of course, much, much more. Followed by even more engaging discussion at the after-party (#foustfest for your twitter types) with lots of smart and fun people. It was great to meet all of you who I've only conversed with over the interwebs and to see some old friends. Now go buy the book.

UPDATE: Josh has posted a very helpful and insightful response to this post at Registan.

Which part of Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build are these guys doing?

The London Daily Telegraph today reports on a British unit called the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) in Helmand, incidentally under the eye-catching headline "Taliban Fly Bloodied British Uniforms as Warning." The article focuses on a raid by BRF troops on a small compound where Taliban have been reportedly spotted, mentioning how the British troops were stopping vehicles leaving the area and collecting biometric data on military-aged males. (I gather the drivers of those vehicles are responding to ISAF's call for civilians to evacuate the Marja area in advance of Operation Moshtarak, but I suppose that's only peripherally relevant.)

The force attacked the Taliban position, killing a commander and two fighters. “What we have to do out here is kill low-level commanders, that’s the key. But we are not some hunter-killer force, we are here to find the enemy, gather information and then it’s up to others what to do with it.”

The Daily Telegraph joined the BRF for a mission into an area, whose location cannot be disclosed, that is known to harbour Taliban commanders and bomb-ferrying routes. Setting out in a fast-moving column of Jackal off-road vehicles that, while vulnerable to bombs, can drive across difficult terrain avoiding ambushes, we left in darkness using night vision goggles to navigate.

Mounted with grenade launchers and .50 calibre heavy machine guns, the Jackals swept through to a compound where intelligence had suggested arms were hidden. Accompanied by Afghan commandos, the soldiers found an AK47 and Makarov pistol and the compound owner was detained. In another home, three pairs of handcuffs, a cosh and binoculars were found in a haystack.

Along a narrow dirt road, BRF soldiers stopped vehicles driving close to the area targeted by Operation Moshtarak.

But here's the real money quote:

The 100-strong BRF, which is similar to the Parachute Regiment’s Pathfinders, was formed specifically for the six month tour and takes in men from 12 different regiments who have passed a selection course that has a 50 per cent failure rate. “We operate behind enemy lines where ground holding troops cannot go,” said Capt Robin BourneTaylor, a BRF troop commander. “Our job is to disrupt, screen and find the enemy.”

I'm not sure exactly how this differs from what SOF are doing, particularly when Capt BourneTaylor draws a distinction between his men and "ground holding troops." What exactly constitutes "behind enemy lines"? Does this mean that they're capable of swift raiding in places that would draw more resistance if slower-moving, heavier forces were to enter the area?

Listen, I think we can go beyond the COIN buzzwords and understand that there are things going on that might not seem to fit the template. I'm not willing to go so far as Ex and offer up a blanket condemnation for anyone who's talking about chasing bad guys. But really, this sort of raiding -- what's being accomplished? That house where they found an AK and a Makarov and detained the owner... isn't it possible that this is the proverbial one weapon per house for self-defense?

And what of "what we have to do out here is kill low-level commanders, that's the key"? Is it, really? He goes on to note that this isn't really their job, that they're just an intelligence-gathering force. Well, ok, but are they doing intel-gathering for more hunter-killer raids? It's fine to collect intelligence that informs offensive and kinetic operations, but (and this all links back to the Flynn report from last month) there's a difference between what they're calling "mapping the human terrain" and collecting strike-targeting data.

So I guess the answer is that these guys are doing what's called IPB -- intelligence preparation of the battlefield, "a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making. Applying the IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield" -- in an enemy-controlled area in advance of an offensive there. Which is to say that they're shaping the battlefield for the Clear portion, I suppose, if we're being charitable.

Am I reading too much into this? I don't want to be the guy who objects just because people are using the wrong words, or failing to echo BG Nicholson's repeated refrain that "the people are the prize in counterinsurgency."

Human Terrain: War Becomes Academic (The Film)

Have any of you heard about this? The Watson Institute's Global Media Project, at Brown University, just won the Audience Award at the 50th Festival dei Popoli in Florence last month for its film on Human Terrain teams.

You can watch the trailer here.

It's an interesting trailer and the film apparently discusses the formation and work of Human Terrain teams. I haven't seen it obviously but I'm curious to find out if anyone has and if so, what you thought.