Three Indian Peacekeepers Killed in Eastern DRC and UN Builds a Trench Around Refugee Camp

Three Indian peacekeepers were killed overnight in Eastern Congo, the UN reports. Apparently, the base, in Karumba (in North Kivu), was attacked in the middle of the night (2am) by up to 60 armed men who wielded machetes and spears.

The article says:

Several peacekeepers engaged with the attackers, forcing them to retreat, but at least six military personnel were injured in the surprise attack, some of them critically. In the attack, whose motive is unclear, the assailants also stole two MONUSCO weapons.

And then the MONUSCO spokesperson (MONUSCO is new name for MONUC, the UN's mission in DRC) said:

The blue helmets, he stressed, “are not party to the conflict. They are here to ensure peace. So we don’t know exactly what are reasons behind this attack.”

This isn't the kind of thing that the peacekeepers should be dealing with or at least not if you're calling them peacekeepers. But, they are and it's clear they didn't have what it takes to respond adequately (MK, some help here would be nice). That being said, it is clear that the UN's peacekeepers in the DRC have long been a party to the conflict: they continue to provide support to the Congolese Army's efforts to defeat the FDLR and other rebel groups in the East. It's also clear that clinging to this pretense of impartiality, pretending that what is happening in Eastern Congo is "peacekeeping," and not providing contingents with what they need to really do at least a decent job, is completely counter-productive. Finally, the motive was unclear? Umm, how about just scaring these soldiers, threatening them, and sending a message that they are not in control?

Meanwhile, in Darfur, the UN/African Union Mission, UNAMID, is building a trench around Nyala and Kalma refugee camp. UNAMID is working with the local government to build a 40km long trench. You'll recall that the area has been suffering from increased crime and violence in recent months.

'The measure is designed to reduce the high incidence of criminality by regulating travel to and from the town,' UNAMID said on Monday, explaining that while the trench would limit entry and exit through small roads, Kalma town will remain fully accessible through major roads and highways. According to the Mission, local authorities will provide 24-hour protection for UNAMID equipment and personnel until the project’s completion.

I wonder how much it will help but that's it for today's "peacekeeping update."

France to spend 300 Million Euros on training 12K African troops for peacekeeping (UPDATED)

At the 25th France-Africa summit, President Sarkozy announced that France would spend 300 million Euros to train 12,000 African troops for deployment to peacekeeping operations in Africa. He said the training would occur between now and 2012. Sorry all the links are in French--if you find something in English, I can update up here if you put it in the comments.

Now you might remember that back in 2004, at the G8 summit, the US had announced that it would train 75,000 peacekeepers, mostly from Africa, by 2010. GPOI (the Global Peace Operations Initiative), was supposed to be a G8 initiative and France and the UK had promised to help. As far as I know, that hadn't happened until now. Anyway, for the US, GPOI ended up costing about 90 million per year (if you want a breakdown on the numbers, Nina Serafino, from the Congressional Research Service has a nice chart here).

A couple questions: how does 300 million only pay for 12,000 troops to be trained--this seems way more expensive that US efforts (and don't get me started on how little the State Department knows about how well the training works or not)? Does anyone know how the training will be different? Does France plan on giving these troops a LOT more stuff than the US hands out as part of its own effort? Does that number include actually paying for these soldiers to fly to places and set up bases etc?

I understand that France sees providing this training as a way to decrease its own role in peacekeeping in Africa (which with ongoing withdrawal from Chad/CAR and a much small presence in Ivory Coast is already down a lot). Sarkozy also said the troops could help combat piracy (though how 300M gets you anywhere in terms of naval capacity I'm not sure). Anyway, given France's need for decreasing its deficit (and bailing out Greece...) what does this look like to all of you?

UPDATE: Gulliver reminds me that GPOI was renewed for another five years and that the initial effort exceeded the 75K goals and reached 85K instead. Friends at GAO who work on GPOI point out that GPOI hasn't been able to figure out how much impact the training has had on the performance of deployed troops.

Longer-term engagement in Haiti: Beware the Insta-Pundits

Revealing just how much our foreign policy discourse has changed over the last decade, the discussion of humanitarian relief for Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake has quickly turned to considering what if any form longer-term US engagement should take. This is a good thing, but a serious danger lurks as the denizens of security think tanks and policy shops try to quickly develop some expertise on a situation they have, for the most part, ignored. Although there are a handful of Haiti-hands scattered through-out the administration and the foreign-policy firmament, I worry that too many will succumb to the urge to fill in the gaps in their knowledge with what passes for 'received wisdom.'

What do I mean? Check out this briefing from the Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Not my favorite institution at the best of times, but to get this much wrong in only two and half pages is, well, remarkable. Aristide was removed in 2004, not 2006. Comparing Haiti today to Somalia in 1993 is absurd - I don't think I even have to explain why. And in claiming that the UN peacekeeping mission (aka MINUSTAH) has "been struggling to counter the activities of gangs and other armed groups—the primary power‐brokers in the embattled nation," AEI manages to simultaneously be several years out of date on the security situation, and unfairly dismissive of the UN's successes. I'm picking on AEI because Small Wars Journal linked to the article, but I suspect there are other examples out there.

Between 2005 and 2007, MINUSTAH broke the back of the gangs through intelligence-led joint military-police operations. Following a 'clear-hold-build' pattern, they expanded security bubbles into previously gang-controlled neighborhoods by targeting gang leaders for arrest, stepping up patrols, establishing new police stations and checkpoints, and introducing employment and essential services projects on the heels of security operations. While progress has been slow, the mission has also made important headway on reforming the Haitian National Police. This is not to gloss over the serious problems that persist (and there are plenty), but Haiti in 2010 is not Haiti in 2004, or 1994 for that matter.

Point is, if we want to help prevent Haiti from backsliding, we have to recognize what has changed over the last 6 years. MINUSTAH has had a hard time responding to the earthquake because it has effectively been decapitated by the collapse of its HQ and the death of a significant chunk of its senior staff. It's apparently hamstrung response is not reflective of its role over the last few years, or its potential going forward. Likewise, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada and CARICOM have all been seriously engaged in Haiti, and should be viewed as partners for the development of a regional strategy. While greater US engagement could be critical for re-energizing international efforts, in most cases it would be counter-productive to shoulder them aside.

Bottom line: beware the proliferation of insta-pundits peddling stale-dated information, anecdotes rather than careful assessments, and received wisdom that sounds a little too familiar. We get more than enough of all that on Afghanistan.

MONUC 10 Years Later: Anything New?

MONUC's mandate is up for renewal in a couple weeks and there's lots of discussion now about what needs to change and what MONUC should do differently. The discussion is also occurring in the context of MONUC's 10th anniversary and a strong desire, both at the UN and of course within the Congolese government, for the mission to begin drawing down. There's also much controversy over MONUC's support to the Congolese Army (FARDC) as it attempts to get rid of the FDLR.

Given this context, I thought that what the Force Commander, General Babacar Gaye, told the Congolese paper, Le Potentiel, in an interview was interesting. He explained his evolving strategy in DRC. It's in French--the link is to Relief Web.

The General said:

It would be pertinent to evaluate the situation and put in place new modes of action rather than launch counter-guerilla operations which requires capacities and means that the FARDC does not have have. This is why it's better to control the zones where the FDLR usually came to stock up on resources.

He adds that this effort needs to happen alongside better support to security sector reform, in particular for the Army and National Policy, and capacity building for Congolese institutions.

Does this seem a little confused to you? I'm not sure I get it because so far the only thing that's happened is that ongoing operations have pushed the FDLR deeper into Congo but without protecting populations from reprisals. They have also not completely cut off the FDLR from their mineral resource funding bases, and finally security sector reform efforts right now are not much beyond really intent prayers. So I'm curious, what are your thoughts on a strategy for MONUC and how should its mandate change?