One last comment on this Auftragstaktik business*

This is my last comment on this topic until people who disagree with me can adequately show that:

1. Centralization is inherently bad - especially with the administration of large units;
2. Long orders (almost all of which is support and admin) are inherently bad;
3. That the U.S. Army’s mixture of execution- and mission-type command styles makes it less effective and is harming its combat capabilities from its current supremacy**;
4. Precision isn’t needed on the battlefield.

From FM 5-0 (Army Planning and Orders Production), paragraph G-3 (Characteristics of Good OPLANS and OPORDS):

Balance. Balance centralized and decentralized control. The commander determines the appropriate balance for a given operation based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). During the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level. Over centralization slows action and inhibits initiative. However, decentralized control can cause loss of precision. The commander constantly balances competing risks while recognizing that loss of precision is usually preferable to inaction.

Does every commander and staff use this as a guide? Of course not. But the vast majority have in my experience (which quite frankly is very extensive when it comes to combat operations). So for now, I’m calling “Target. Cease Fire.”

*This is cross-posted from Hull Defilade, my new-ish tumblr blog that I'm using for shorter, less formed thoughts that exceed 140 characters.

**Credit where due: Gulliver posed this question to me earlier today via email. His idea, not mine.

Command and control of a UN coalition for Libya

As the international community has reached consensus that a coalition of air forces will begin enforcing a no-fly zone and possibly air strikes, it's time to begin thinking about how to operationalize this endeavor. At last count, France, UK, Canada, and Denmark have already ponied up forces and President Obama was in discussions with Congress and French and UK leaders about possible U.S. involvement.

Here's the catch with U.S. involvement: if we provide troops (in this case planes and naval vessels), command and control of the operation may fall to the U.S. Title X of the U.S. Code dictates that the chain of command for U.S. forces will never deviate from the President to operational commanders. In the 1990s, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25, which states that if the U.S. is involved in UN operations, U.S. forces can be placed under the operational command of competent UN force commanders. It also states that as the proportion of U.S. forces in the command increases, it is less likely that U.S. forces would fall under foreign command. At the moment I can't find anything that supersedes this PDD (if our readers do know of anything please post in the comments), so it seems that it is the most liberal document on this topic and can likely be ignored, leaving the default deciding factor as Title X.

If the United States provides an aircraft carrier or two, we would likely be the largest single nation contribution to the coalition. That means we would have command. I would imagine this is in the administrations calculus on whether or not to be part of a coalition. It doesn't seem we want to own this and would prefer letting Europe take the lead, but it seems we can't do that and provide forces. This will be a tough decision for the U.S. and the international community.